   
   
   
   
                              CHAPTER ONE
                                           
                               Patimokkha
                               ~~~~~~~~~~
   
   
   The Patimokkha is available to us in several recensions, some in 
   Indic languages, others in Tibetan or Chinese translations. However, 
   of the Indic recensions, only one -- the Pali -- is still a living 
   tradition, recited fortnightly, and put into practice by Theravadin 
   bhikkhus throughout the world. This is the recension translated and 
   explained in this book.
   
     The meaning of the term //patimokkha// is a matter of conjecture. 
   According to the Mahavagga, it means "the beginning, the head (or 
   entrance -- //mukha//), the foremost (//pamukha//) of skillful 
   qualities." (Mv.II.3.4) The term serves as the name not only of the 
   basic code of training rules, but also of a sermon in which the 
   Buddha enumerated the basic principles common to the teachings of 
   all Buddhas: "The non-doing of all evil, the performance of what is 
   skillful, and the purification of one's heart: this is the Buddhas'
   message." (Dhp.183) Thus whatever the etymology of the term 
   //patimokkha//, it denotes a set of principles basic to the practice 
   of the religion.
     
     The basic code of training rules for bhikkhus, in its Pali 
   recension, contains 227 rules, divided into eight sections in 
   accordance with the penalty assigned by each rule: //parajika//, 
   defeat; //sanghadisesa//, formal meeting; //aniyata//, undetermined; 
   //nissaggiya pacittiya//, forfeiture and confession; //pacittiya//, 
   confession; //patidesaniya//, acknowledgement; //sekhiya//, 
   training; and //adhikarana-samatha//, settlement of issues. The 
   following chapters will discuss the precise meanings of these terms. 
     
     Three of these terms, though, do not denote penalties. The aniyata 
   rules give directions for judging uncertain cases; the sekhiya rules 
   simply say, "(This is) a training to be followed," without assigning 
   a particular penalty for not following them; and the 
   adhikarana-samatha rules give procedures to follow in settling 
   issues that may arise in the Community. Thus there are only five 
   types of penalty mentioned in the Patimokkha rules themselves, 
   ranging from permanent expulsion from the Community to simple 
   confession in the presence of another bhikkhu. None of the 
   penalties, we should note, involve physical punishment of any kind. 
   And we should further note that the purpose of undergoing the 
   penalties is not somehow to absolve one from guilt or to erase any 
   bad kamma one may incur by breaking the rules; rather, the purpose 
   is both personal and social: to strengthen one's resolve to refrain 
   from such behavior in the future, and to reassure the other bhikkhus 
   that one is still serious about following the training.
     
     In addition to the penalties directly mentioned in the rules, 
   there are also penalties derived from the rules by the Vibhanga and 
   commentaries. These derived penalties deal with two sorts of cases: 
   1) A bhikkhu tries to commit an action mentioned in one of the 
   rules, but the action for one reason or another does not reach 
   completion (e.g., he tries to kill a person, but the person doesn't 
   die). 2) A bhikkhu commits an action not directly covered in any 
   rule, but similar to one that is (e.g., he strikes an unordained 
   person, which is not directly covered in a rule, while the act of 
   striking a bhikkhu is). 
     
     Penalties of this sort, when derived from the parajika and 
   sanghadisesa rules, include thullaccaya (grave offense) and dukkata 
   (wrong doing); those derived from the nissaggiya pacittiya, 
   pacittiya, and patidesaniya rules -- except for the rule against 
   speaking insults -- include only the dukkata. The penalties derived 
   from the rule against speaking insults include dubbhasita (wrong 
   speech) as well. As for the sekhiya rules, the Vibhanga states that 
   to disobey any of them out of disrespect entails a dukkata. All of 
   these derived penalties may be cleared through confession.
     
     There may, of course, be times when the assigned penalties are not 
   enough to deter an unconscientious bhikkhu from committing an 
   offense repeatedly. In such cases, the Community in which he is 
   living may, if it sees fit, formally impose additional penalties on 
   him as a means of bringing him into line. These formal acts range 
   from stripping him of some of the privileges of seniority, to 
   banishment from that particular Community, and on to suspension from 
   the Bhikkhu Sangha as a whole. In each case the punishment is 
   temporary; if the bhikkhu realizes his errors and mends his ways, 
   the Community is to revoke the act against him and return him to his 
   former status.
     
     Thus, taken as a whole, the Vinaya's system of penalties makes use 
   of three basic principles -- confession, forfeiture, and various 
   degrees of ostracism from the Community -- as means of enforcing the 
   rules. To understand the wisdom of this system, it is important to 
   realize how each of these principles is related to the practice of 
   the Dhamma and the training of the mind.
     
     //Confession//: There are several spots in the discourses (e.g., 
   D.2, M.140) where the Buddha states, 'It is growth in the discipline 
   of a Noble One that a person sees a transgression (of his own) as a 
   transgression, makes amends for it in accordance with the Dhamma, 
   and achieves restraint in the future.' From the context each time 
   the Buddha makes this statement, it is clear that "makes amends" 
   means confessing one's mistakes. In another passage (M.61), the 
   Buddha informs his son, Rahula, that if one sees that one's words or 
   deeds have harmed oneself or others, one should confess them to a 
   knowledgeable companion in the Holy Life. All those who have 
   purified their thoughts, words, and deeds in the past, all those who 
   are doing so in the present, and all those who will do so in the 
   future, he adds, have acted, are acting, and will act in just this 
   way. In addition, one of the basic requisites for exerting oneself 
   in the practice is that one not be fraudulent or deceitful, and that 
   one declare oneself to one's knowledgeable companions in the Holy 
   Life in line with one's actual behavior (A.V.53). Thus a willingness 
   to confess one's misdeeds is an essential factor in progress along 
   the path.
     
     //Forfeiture//, in most cases, is simply a symbolic adjunct to 
   confession. One forfeits the object in question, confesses the 
   offense, and then receives the object in return. In a few cases, 
   though -- where the object is improper for a bhikkhu to use or own 
   -- one must break it or forfeit it for good. In these cases, 
   forfeiture serves as a check against greed and as a reminder of two 
   essential principles -- contentment with little and fewness of wants 
   -- that are absolutely basic to the practice.
     
     //Ostracism//: In a famous passage (S.XLV.2), the Buddha tells 
   Ven. Ananda, "Being a friend, a companion, a colleague with 
   admirable people is the entirety of the Holy Life. When a bhikkhu is 
   a friend, a companion, a colleague with admirable people, he can be 
   expected to develop the Noble Eightfold Path and make much of it." 
   Thus one of the few things a bhikkhu serious about the practice 
   would naturally fear would be to be ostracized by the well-behaved 
   members of the Community, for that would be a true barrier to his 
   spiritual progress. This fear would then help deter him from any 
   action that might entail such ostracism.
     
     In this way, the Vinaya's system of penalties provides 
   rehabilitation for offenders and deterrence against offenses -- with 
   confession the means of rehabilitation, and ostracism the deterrent 
   -- growing directly out of principles basic to the practice of the 
   Dhamma.
     
     Offenses. In analyzing offenses for the purpose of determining 
   penalties, the Vibhanga divides an action into five factors: the 
   object, the perception, the intent, the effort, and the result. In 
   some of the rules, all five factors play a role in determining what 
   is and is not a full offense. In others, only two, three or four 
   play a role. For example, under the parajika rule forbidding murder, 
   all five factors have to be present for a full offense: The object 
   has to be a human being, the bhikkhu has to perceive him/her as a 
   living being, he has to have murderous intent, he has to make an 
   effort for the person to die, and the person has to die. 
     
     If any of these factors are missing, the penalty changes. For 
   instance, object: If the bhikkhu kills a dog, the penalty is a 
   pacittiya. Perception: If he cremates a friend, thinking that the 
   friend is dead, then even if the friend is actually alive but 
   severely comatose, the bhikkhu incurs no penalty. Intent: If he 
   accidentally drops a rock on a person standing below him, he incurs 
   no penalty even if the person dies. Effort: If he sees a person fall 
   into the river, but makes no effort to save the person, he incurs no 
   penalty even if the person drowns. Result: If he tries to kill a 
   person, but only succeeds in injuring him, he incurs a thullaccaya.
     
     There are some rules, though, where the factors of intention, 
   perception, and result do not make any difference in determining 
   offenses. For example, if a bhikkhu is sleeping alone in a room and 
   a woman comes in and lies down in the room with him, he incurs the 
   pacittiya for lying down in the same lodging as a woman even though 
   his intention was to lie down alone and he was unaware of her 
   presence. A bhikkhu who drinks a glass of wine, thinking it to be 
   grape juice, incurs the pacittiya for taking intoxicants all the 
   same. A bhikkhu who tries to frighten another bhikkhu incurs a 
   pacittiya regardless of whether or not the other bhikkhu is actually 
   frightened. 
     
     Another variation is that in rules where a bhikkhu may be put into 
   a passive role in committing an act that would fulfill the factor of 
   effort, the factor of intention is changed to consent: mental 
   acquiescence to the act combined with a physical or verbal 
   expression of that acquiescence. Under some rules, such as the rule 
   against sexual intercourse, simply letting the act happen counts as 
   physical acquiescence even if one lies perfectly still, and the 
   question of whether or not one incurs a penalty depends entirely on 
   the state of one's mind. Under other rules, though -- such as the 
   rule against lustful contact with a woman, which includes cases 
   where the woman is the agent making the contact -- simply lying 
   still is not enough to count as a physical sign of acquiescence, and 
   even if one consents mentally, say, to a woman's fondling, one would 
   incur a penalty only if one says something or responds with a 
   physical movement to what she is doing.
     
     The factor of effort is basic to every rule and is also used to 
   determine offenses in cases where a bhikkhu intends to break a rule 
   but does not complete the action. For instance, in the case of 
   stealing, the efforts involved are said to begin when, acting under 
   the intent to steal, a bhikkhu gets dressed and starts walking to 
   the object. With each of these preliminary efforts -- literally, 
   with every step -- he incurs a dukkata. At first glance, this may 
   seem extreme, but when we view his state of mind as having ultimate 
   importance, this system of assigning penalties is appropriate. In 
   cases like this, if the bhikkhu completes the act, the penalties he 
   incurred in the preliminary efforts are nullified, and he is left 
   with only the penalty imposed by the rule. 
     
     Thus it is important, when reading about each training rule, to 
   pay attention to what role these five factors play in determining 
   the offenses related to the rule. And, of course, it is important 
   for each bhikkhu to pay attention to all five of these factors in 
   all of his actions to make sure that he does not fall at any time 
   into an offense. This is where training in discipline becomes part 
   of the training of the mind leading to Awakening. A bhikkhu who is 
   mindful to analyze his actions into these five factors, to be aware 
   of them as they arise, and to behave consistently in such a manner 
   that he avoids committing any offenses, is developing three 
   qualities: mindfulness; an analytical attitude towards phenomena in 
   his thoughts, words, and deeds; and persistence in abandoning 
   unskillful qualities and developing skillful ones within himself. 
   These are the first three of the seven factors of Awakening, and 
   form the basis for the remaining four: rapture, tranquility, 
   concentration, and equanimity.
     
     The Parivara (VI.4), in reviewing the Vibhanga's five factors for 
   analyzing offenses, devises a number of categories for classifying 
   offenses, the most important being the distinction between rules 
   carrying a penalty only when broken intentionally through correct 
   perception (//sacittaka//), and those carrying a penalty even when 
   broken unintentionally or through misperception (//acittaka//).
     
     Although it may seem harsh to impose penalties for unintentional 
   actions, we must again reflect on the state of mind that leads to 
   such actions. In some acts, of course, the intention makes all the 
   difference between guilt and innocence. Taking an article with 
   intent to return it, for example, is something else entirely from 
   taking it with intent to steal. There are, however, other acts with 
   damaging consequences that, when performed unintentionally, reveal 
   carelessness and lack of circumspection in areas where a person may 
   reasonably be held responsible. Many of the rules dealing with the 
   proper care of communal property and one's basic requisites fall in 
   this category. Except for one very unlikely situation, though, none 
   of the major rules carry a penalty if broken unintentionally, while 
   the minor rules that do carry such penalties may be regarded as 
   useful lessons in mindfulness.
   
     The Parivara (IV.7.4) also lists six ways in which offenses can be 
   committed:  
     
     1) //unconscientiously//, i.e., knowing that an action is contrary 
   to the rules, but going ahead with it anyway; 
     
     2) //unknowingly//, i.e., not realizing that the action is 
   contrary to the rules; 
     
     3) //absentmindedly//; 
     
     4) //assuming something improper to be proper//, e.g., drinking a 
   glass of apple wine perceiving it to be apple juice; 
     
     5) //assuming something proper to be improper//, e.g., perceiving 
   a glass of apple juice to be apple wine, and drinking it 
   nonetheless; and 
     
     6) //acting out of uncertainty//, i.e., not being sure if an 
   action is proper, but going ahead with it anyway. In this last case, 
   if the action is improper, one is to be treated according to the 
   relevant rule. If it is proper, one incurs a dukkata in any event 
   for having acted irresponsibly.
     
     Another scheme introduced in the ancient commentaries for 
   classifying offenses is the distinction between those that the world 
   criticizes (//loka-vajja//) and those that only the rules criticize 
   (//pannati-vajja//). The Commentary defines this distinction by 
   saying that loka-vajja offenses are committed with an unskillful 
   state of mind (i.e., greed, anger or delusion), whereas 
   pannati-vajja offenses are committed with a skillful state of mind. 
   Thus the concepts would seem to have been developed originally to 
   deal with the exceptional cases in which a bhikkhu would be led by 
   mature consideration to break a rule -- e.g., where another person's 
   life would be at stake. Under such circumstances, the world at large 
   would not criticize his actions, although the rules would impose a 
   penalty. 
     
     As these concepts finally took shape in the ancient commentaries, 
   though, they became a way of classifying rules. The compilers 
   apparently felt that some of the rules forbade actions that 
   necessarily were motivated by an unskillful state of mind, whereas 
   others forbade actions that might be motivated by skillful states of 
   mind. Given this use of the distinction, the Vinaya Mukha redefines 
   the terms as follows:
   
      "Some offenses are faults as far as the world is concerned -- 
      wrong and damaging even if committed by ordinary people who are 
      not bhikkhus -- examples being robbery and murder, as well as 
      such lesser faults as assault and verbal abuse. Offenses of 
      this sort are termed loka-vajja. There are also offenses that 
      are faults only as far as the Buddha's ordinances are concerned 
      -- neither wrong nor damaging if committed by ordinary people; 
      wrong only if committed by bhikkhus, on the grounds that they 
      run counter to the Buddha's ordinances. Offenses of this sort 
      are termed pannati-vajja."
   
     Even a cursory glance at the Patimokkha rules will show that many 
   of them deal with the latter sort of offense, and that such offenses 
   concern relatively minor matters. The question often arises, then: 
   Why this concern with minutiae? The answer is that the rules deal 
   with social relationships -- among the bhikkhus themselves and 
   between the bhikkhus and the laity -- and that social relationships 
   are defined by seemingly minor points. 
     
     Take, for instance, the rule that a bhikkhu may not eat food 
   unless it is handed to him or to a fellow bhikkhu by an unordained 
   person on that day. This rule has wide-ranging ramifications. It 
   means, among other things, that a bhikkhu may not leave human 
   society to lead a solitary hermit's existence, foraging for food on 
   his own. He must have frequent contact with humanity, however 
   minimal, and in that contact he performs a service to others, even 
   if simply offering them a noble example of conduct and giving them 
   an opportunity to develop the virtue of generosity. Many of the 
   other seemingly trivial rules -- such as those forbidding digging in 
   the soil and damaging plant life -- will reveal, on reflection, 
   implications of a similar scope.
     
     The Great Standards. Although the Vibhanga and Khandhakas cover an 
   enormous number of cases, they do not, of course, cover every 
   possible contingency in the world; and from what we have seen of the 
   way in which the Buddha formulated the rules -- dealing with cases 
   as they arose -- there is reason to doubt that he himself wanted 
   them to form an airtight system. As for cases that did not arise 
   during his lifetime, he established the following four guidelines 
   for judgment -- called the Great Standards (a separate set from 
   those he formulated at Bhoganagara) -- for judging cases not 
   mentioned in the rules:
   
      "Bhikkhus, whatever I have not objected to, saying, 'This is 
      not allowable,' if it fits in with what is not allowable, if it 
      goes against what is allowable, that is not allowable for you.
      
      "Whatever I have not objected to, saying, 'This is not 
      allowable,' if it fits in with what is allowable, if it goes 
      against what is not allowable, that is allowable for you.
      
      "And whatever I have not permitted, saying, 'This is 
      allowable,' if it fits in with what is not allowable, if it 
      goes against what is allowable, that is not allowable for you.
      
      "And whatever I have not permitted, saying, 'This is 
      allowable,' if it fits in with what is allowable, if it goes 
      against what is not allowable, that is allowable for you." 
      (Mv.VI.40)
   
     These four Great Standards, when properly applied, are an 
   important tool for extending the principles of discipline into 
   situations unknown in the Buddha's time. We will have occasion to 
   refer to them frequently in the course of this book.
     
     There is evidence in the Canon that the Buddha's own attitude 
   towards discipline was not one of strict legalism. Take, for 
   instance, this discourse:
     
      "At one time the Blessed One was living in Vesali, in the Great 
      Wood. Then a certain Vajjian bhikkhu went to him...and said: 
      'Lord, more than 150 training rules come up for recitation 
      every fortnight. I cannot train in reference to them.'
      
      "'Bhikkhu, can you train in reference to the three trainings: 
      the training in heightened virtue, the training in heightened 
      mind, the training in heightened discernment?'
      
      "'Yes, Lord, I can....'
      
      "'Then train in reference to those three trainings....When you 
      train in reference to the training in heightened virtue... 
      heightened mind...heightened discernment, passion will be 
      abandoned in you, aversion...delusion will be abandoned in you. 
      Then with the abandoning of passion...aversion... delusion, you 
      will not do anything unskillful or engage in any evil.'
      
      "Later on, that bhikkhu trained in heightened virtue... 
      heightened mind...heightened discernment....Passion... 
      aversion...delusion were abandoned in him....He did not do 
      anything unskillful or engage in any evil." (A.III.85)
   
     Another discourse with a similar point:
   
      "'Bhikkhus, more than 150 training rules come up for recitation 
      every fortnight, in reference to which young men desiring the 
      goal train themselves. There are these three trainings in which 
      they (the training rules) are all contained. What three? The 
      training in heightened virtue, the training in heightened mind, 
      the training in heightened discernment. These are the three 
      trainings in which they are all contained....
      
      "'There is the case, bhikkhus, where a bhikkhu is fully 
      accomplished in virtue, concentration, and discernment (i.e., 
      is an arahant). With reference to the lesser and minor training 
      rules, he falls into offenses and rehabilitates himself. Why is 
      that? Because it is not said to be an impossibility. But as for 
      the training rules that are basic to the holy life and proper 
      to the holy life, his virtue is steadfast and firm. Having 
      undertaken them, he trains in reference to the training rules. 
      Because of the ending of (mental) effluents, he dwells in the 
      release of awareness and release of discernment that are free 
      from effluent, having known and made them manifest for himself 
      right in the present....
      
      "'Those who are partially accomplished attain a part; those who 
      are wholly accomplished, the whole. The training rules, I say, 
      are not in vain.'" (A.III.88)
      
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