   
   
   
   
                              CHAPTER FOUR
                                           
                                Parajika
                                ~~~~~~~~
                                           
                                           
   This term, according to the Parivara, derives from a verb meaning to 
   lose or be defeated. A bhikkhu who commits any of the four following 
   offenses has surrendered to his own mental defilements to such an 
   extent that he defeats the purpose of his having become a bhikkhu in 
   the first place. The irrevocable nature of this defeat is 
   illustrated in the Vibhanga with a number of similes: "as a man with 
   his head cut off...as a withered leaf freed from its stem...as a 
   flat stone that has been broken in half cannot be put together 
   again...as a palm tree cut off at the crown is incapable of further 
   growth." A bhikkhu who commits any of these offenses severs himself 
   irrevocably from the life of the Sangha and is no longer considered 
   a bhikkhu.
   
   
   
       1.Should any bhikkhu -- participating in the training and 
       livelihood of the bhikkhus, without having renounced the 
       training, without having declared his weakness -- engage in 
       the sexual act, even with a female animal, he is defeated 
       and no longer in communion.
   
   
     Effort. In this rule, the term //sexual act refers to all kinds of 
   sexual intercourse. The Vibhanga classifies the various types of 
   intercourse by the organs involved -- the genitals, the mouth, the 
   anus -- and in any of the possible combinations (except for 
   mouth-to-mouth, which is treated separately under Sanghadisesa 2, 
   below), the sexual act has been performed when one organ enters the 
   other even if just to "the extent of a sesame seed." This means that 
   a bhikkhu engaging in genital, oral, or anal intercourse is subject 
   to this rule regardless of which role he plays. The question of 
   whether there is a covering, such as a condom, between the organs is 
   irrelevant, as are the questions of whether the bhikkhu is actively 
   or passively involved, and whether or not any of the parties 
   involved reaches orgasm.
   
     Object. The full penalty under this rule applies to any voluntary 
   sexual intercourse with a human being, a "non-human" being (a 
   //yakkha//, //naga//, or //peta//), or a common animal, whether 
   female, male, neuter, or hermaphrodite.
     
     Performing the sexual act with a dead body -- even a decapitated 
   head -- also entails the full penalty if the remains of the body are 
   intact enough for the act to be accomplished.
     
     The Vinita Vatthu also lists two examples of "self-intercourse": A 
   bhikkhu with a supple back takes his penis into his mouth, and a 
   bhikkhu with an unusually long penis inserts it into his anus. Both 
   cases carry the full penalty, which shows that one's own anal and 
   oral orifices can fulfill the factor of object here.
   
     Knowledge & consent. For the sexual act to count as an offense, 
   the bhikkhu must know that it is happening and give his consent. 
   Thus if he is sexually assaulted while asleep or otherwise 
   unconscious and remains oblivious to what is happening, he incurs no 
   penalty. If, however, he becomes conscious during the assault or was 
   conscious right from the start, then whether he incurs a penalty 
   depends on whether he gives his consent during any part of the act.
   
     Strangely enough, neither the Canon nor the Commentary discusses 
   the factor of consent in any detail, except to mention by way of 
   passing that it can apply to the stage of inserting, being fully 
   inserted, staying in place, or pulling out. From the examples in the 
   Vinita Vatthu, it would appear that consent refers to a //mental// 
   state of acquiescence, together with its physical or verbal 
   expression. Mere physical compliance does not count, as there are 
   cases where bhikkhus forced into intercourse comply physically but 
   without consenting mentally and so are absolved of any offense; but 
   there is some question as to whether a bhikkhu who consents mentally 
   to letting the sexual act happen would incur the penalty if he 
   simply lies still and lets it happen, or if he would have to 
   indicate his consent with a verbal act or physical motion.
     
     As we mentioned in Chapter 1, the rules contains two patterns 
   concerning what does and does not count as a physical expression of 
   consent when one is forced into a situation that would break a rule. 
   In two of the Vinita Vatthu cases mentioned under this rule, 
   bhikkhus are approached by women who volunteer to fondle them to the 
   point where they emit semen (%). Both bhikkhus let them go ahead, 
   and both incur the full penalty under Sanghadisesa 1. In such cases, 
   simply letting the act happen counts as physical acquiescence. Under 
   Sanghadisesa 2, however, if a bhikkhu is approached by a woman who 
   fondles his body, and he consents mentally to what she is doing, he 
   incurs a penalty if he says something or makes a physical move to 
   indicate that consent, but no penalty if he remains perfectly still.
     
     None of the texts explain why there are these two patterns, but 
   two possibilities suggest themselves: (1) It is physically 
   impossible to emit semen and to enjoy the emission without the 
   body's moving in one way or another. (2) One is not necessarily 
   responsible if a woman simply makes contact with one's body, even if 
   one enjoys the contact; but if one is happy to let her get to the 
   point where she has one ejaculating, one cannot deny responsibility 
   for what is happening. In either case, this rule would seem to 
   follow the pattern for Sanghadisesa 1: If one is sexually assaulted, 
   one is completely absolved from an offense only if (1) one does not 
   give one's mental consent at any time during the act or (2) one does 
   feel mental consent during at least part of the act but puts up a 
   struggle so as not to express that consent physically or verbally in 
   any way. If one puts up no struggle and feels mental consent, even 
   if only fleetingly during the stage of inserting, being fully 
   inserted, staying in place, or pulling out, one incurs the full 
   penalty.
     
     This would seems to be the basis for the Commentary's warning in 
   its discussion of the Vinita Vatthu case in which a bhikkhu wakes up 
   to find himself being sexually assaulted by a woman, gives her a 
   kick, and sends her rolling. The warning: This is how a bhikkhu 
   still subject to sensual lust should act if he wants to protect his 
   state of mind.
     
     Derived offenses. The only thullaccaya directly related to this 
   rule is for the unlikely case of a bhikkhu who attempts intercourse 
   with the decomposed mouth, anus, or genitals of a corpse. (!) To 
   attempt intercourse with any other part of a dead body or with any 
   part of an insentient object, such as an inflatable doll or 
   mannikin, incurs a dukkata.
     
     The Vibhanga states that if a bhikkhu attempts intercourse with 
   any part of a living being's body apart from the three orifices, the 
   case falls under the Sanghadisesa rules -- either Sanghadisesa 1 for 
   intentional ejaculation or Sanghadisesa 2 for lustful bodily 
   contact. As we shall see below, the penalties assigned in the latter 
   case are as follows: if the partner is a woman, a sanghadisesa; if a 
   //pandaka// (see Sanghadisesa 2), a thullaccaya; if a man or a 
   common animal, a dukkata. We can infer from the Vibhanga's ruling 
   here that if a bhikkhu has an orgasm while attempting intercourse 
   with the decomposed mouth, anus, or genitals of a corpse, with any 
   other part of a dead body, or with any part of an insentient object, 
   the case comes under Sanghadisesa 1.
     
     The Commentary disagrees with the Vibhanga on these points, 
   however, saying that the derived offenses under this rule can 
   include only dukkata and thullaccaya penalties. In its explanation 
   of Sanghadisesa 1, it sets forth a system of eleven types of lust in 
   which the lust for the pleasure of bringing about an ejaculation, 
   lust for the pleasure of bodily contact, and lust for the pleasure 
   of intercourse are treated as completely separate things that must 
   be treated under separate rules. Thus, it says, if a bhikkhu aiming 
   at intercourse takes hold of a woman's body, it is simply a 
   preliminary to intercourse and thus entails only a dukkata, rather 
   than a sanghadisesa for lustful bodily contact. Similarly, if he has 
   a premature ejaculation before beginning intercourse, there is no 
   offense at all.
     
     These are fine academic distinctions and are clearly motivated by 
   a desire to draw neat lines between the rules, but they lead to 
   practical problems. As the Commentary itself points out, if a 
   bhikkhu commits an act that falls near the borderline between these 
   rules, but cannot later report precisely which type of lust he was 
   feeling in the heat of the moment, there is no way his case can be 
   judged and a penalty assigned. At any rate, though, there is no 
   basis in the Canon for the Commentary's system, and in fact it 
   contradicts not only the Vibhanga's ruling mentioned above, but also 
   its definition of "lustful" under Sanghadisesas 2, 3, & 4, which is 
   exactly the same for all three rules and places no limits on the 
   type of lust involved. All of this leads to the conclusion that the 
   Commentary's neat system is invalid, and that the Vibhanga's 
   judgment holds: If a bhikkhu attempts intercourse with any part of a 
   living being's body apart from the three orifices, the case falls 
   under the Sanghadisesa rules -- either Sanghadisesa 1 for 
   intentional ejaculation or Sanghadisesa 2 for lustful bodily contact 
   -- rather than here.
     
     Blanket exemptions. In addition to bhikkhus who do not know they 
   are being assaulted or do not give their consent when they do know, 
   the Vibhanga states that there are four special categories of 
   bhikkhus exempted from a penalty under this rule: any bhikkhu who is 
   insane, possessed by spirits, delirious with pain, or the first 
   offender (in this case, Ven. Sudinna) whose actions prompted the 
   Buddha to formulate the rule in the first place. The Commentary 
   notes that anyone who "goes about in an unseemly way, with deranged 
   perceptions, having cast away all sense of conscience and shame, not 
   knowing whether he has transgressed major or minor training rules," 
   counts as insane here. It recognizes this as a medical condition, 
   which it blames on the bile. As for spirit possession, it says that 
   this can happen either when spirits frighten one or when, by 
   distracting one with sensory images, they insert their hands into 
   one's heart by way of one's mouth. (!) At any rate, it notes, insane 
   and possessed bhikkhus are exempt from penalties they incur only 
   when their perceptions are deranged ("when their mindfulness is 
   entirely forgotten, and they don't know what fire, gold, excrement, 
   and sandalwood are") and not from any they incur during their lucid 
   moments. As for a bhikkhu overcome with pain, he is exempt from 
   penalties he incurs only during periods when the pain is so great 
   that he does not know what he is doing.
   
     These four categories are exempted from penalties under //all// of 
   the rules, although the first offender for each rule is exempted 
   only for the one time he acted in such a way as to provoke the 
   Buddha into formulating the rule. I will not mention these 
   categories again, but the reader should bear them in mind as being 
   exempt in every case.
     
     Lastly, the Vinita Vatthu to this rule includes an interesting 
   case that formed the basis for an additional rule:
     
       "At that time a certain monk had gone to the Gabled Hall in 
       the Great Wood at Vesali to pass the day and was sleeping, 
       having left the door open. His various limbs were stiff with 
       the 'wind forces' (i.e., he had an erection). Now at that 
       time a large company of women bearing garlands and scents 
       came to the park, headed for the vihara. Seeing the bhikkhu, 
       they sat down on his male organ and, having taken their 
       pleasure and remarking, 'What a bull of a man!' they went on 
       their way, taking up their garlands and scents."
     
     The bhikkhu incurred no penalty, but the Buddha gave formal 
   permission to close the door when resting during the day.
   
       Summary: Voluntary sexual intercourse -- genital, anal, or 
       oral -- with a human being, non-human being, or common 
       animal is a parajika offense.
   
                                 * * *
   
   
       2. Should any bhikkhu, in the manner of stealing, take what 
       is not given from an inhabited area or from the wilderness 
       -- just as when, in the taking of what is not given, kings 
       arresting the criminal would flog, imprison, or banish him, 
       saying, "You are a robber, you are a fool, you are 
       benighted, you are a thief" -- a bhikkhu in the same way 
       taking what is not given is defeated and no longer in 
       communion.
   
     This rule against stealing is, in the working out of its details, 
   the most complex in the Patimokkha and requires the most explanation 
   -- not that stealing is a concept especially hard to understand, 
   simply that it can take so many forms.
   
     The Vibhanga defines the act of stealing in terms of four factors:
   
       1) //Object//: anything belonging to another person, a group 
       of persons, or a location (such as the offerings made to a 
       sacred place).
       
       2) //Perception//: One perceives that the object belongs to 
       another person, etc.
       
       3) //Intention//: One decides to steal it.
       
       4) //Effort//: One takes possession of it.
     
     Stealing under any circumstances is always an offense. However, 
   the severity of the offense depends on another factor, which is --
     
       5) //The value of the object//.
   
     Object. For an object to qualify as //what is not given// -- the 
   rule's term for anything that may be the object of a theft -- it 
   must belong to another person or be guarded as common property of a 
   group or of a location, such as the offerings to a Buddha image, 
   chedi, or other sacred place, as mentioned above. A further 
   stipulation is that the owner or person responsible for guarding the 
   object has neither given nor thrown it away. Thus there is no 
   offense for a bhikkhu who takes a discarded object, such as rags 
   from a pile of refuse; unclaimed things from a wilderness; or things 
   unclaimed by any human being but in the possession of an animal or 
   ghost. The Vinita Vatthu mentions an interesting case in which the 
   groundskeeper in an orchard permits bhikkhus to take fruit from the 
   orchard, even though he was not authorized to do so. The bhikkhus 
   committed no offense.
     
     The question of property belonging to the Sangha logically fits 
   here, but since the topic is fairly complex, I will treat it as a 
   special case below
     
     Perception. For the act of taking "what is not given" to count as 
   theft, one must also //perceive //the object as being something not 
   given. Thus there is no offense if one takes an object, even if it 
   is "not given," if one sincerely believes that it is ownerless or 
   thrown away. Similarly, if a bhikkhu takes an object mistaking it 
   for his own or as belonging to a friend who has given him permission 
   to take his things on trust, there is no offense. Or again, a 
   bhikkhu who takes things from the Community's common stores, on the 
   assumption that he has the right to help himself, commits no offense 
   even if the assumption proves false.
     
     Intention. The act of taking "what is not given," even when one 
   perceives it as "not given," counts as theft only if one's intention 
   is to steal it. Thus if a bhikkhu takes an object on loan or on 
   trust, he commits no offense. According to the Commentary, to take 
   something on loan means that one has the intention that, "I'll 
   return it," or "I'll make compensation."
     
     As for taking an object on trust, Mv.VIII.1.19 lists five 
   conditions that must be met if a bhikkhu is rightly to take an 
   object on trust:
     
       a. The owner is a friend.
       b. He/she is an intimate.
       c. He/she has given one permission to take from his/her 
       things.
       d. He/she is still alive.
       e. One is confident that he/she will not mind.
   
     If any of these factors is lacking -- for example, the owner is a 
   good friend but has never given explicit permission to take from 
   his/her things -- one has no right to take the things on trust. 
   However, the Vinita Vatthu gives the case of a bhikkhu who takes an 
   item mistakenly thinking that he had the right to take it on trust; 
   the Buddha termed this a "misconception as to trust" and did not 
   impose a penalty.
     
     The most common problem that arises in this area is when one 
   sincerely assumes that the owner will not mind, but it turns out 
   that he/she does. In cases of this sort there is no offense, and the 
   matter is left to the bhikkhu and the owner to settle on their own 
   as amicably as possible.
     
     A bhikkhu who, seeing an article left in a place where it might be 
   damaged, puts it in safe keeping for the owner, commits no offense.
     
     Effort. Assuming that all of the above conditions are met -- the 
   object belongs to someone else, one perceives it as belonging to 
   someone else, and one intends to steal it -- if one then takes it, 
   that constitutes stealing. The question then arises as to precisely 
   what acts constitute //taking//. To summarize the Vibhanga's 
   treatment of this question, we can classify objects into two broad 
   types: moveable and immovable.
     
     Moveable items are said to be taken when they are moved entirely 
   from their "base(s)," i.e., the spot(s) on which they rest. An 
   object such as a box or a trunk lying flat along the ground or 
   touching its support at a single area has a single base and counts 
   as "taken" if it has been moved entirely from its base. An object 
   such as a table or chair touching its support at a number of 
   separate places has that number of bases. For instance, a stool with 
   three legs touches the floor at three points and so has three bases. 
   An object with more than one base is "taken" when it has been moved 
   from all of its bases. Thus a television set standing on four legs 
   is taken when all four of its legs have been lifted or slid away 
   from the four spots on which they were standing.
     
     If a moveable object is placed on another moveable object, such as 
   a television set placed on a cart, there are two ways to count it as 
   taken -- either when it is removed from its base on the cart or when 
   the wheels of the cart have been moved from all of their bases on 
   the floor -- whichever occurs first.
     
     If person A is carrying an object, and person B tries to take it 
   from him, it is counted as taken even if B succeeds only in moving 
   it from one spot on A's body to another.
     
     According to the Vibhanga, if a person holding an object with the 
   owner's permission then decides to abscond with it, it counts as 
   taken when he shifts it to another part of his person (e.g., into 
   his pocket) or places it elsewhere. The Vinaya Mukha, however, takes 
   issue with this point, saying that cases of this sort should be 
   treated under the terms of a breach of trust, which is discussed 
   below.
     
     Animals are reckoned to have one base (e.g., snakes, any reclining 
   animal) or more (e.g., chickens or dogs on their feet) in the same 
   way as inanimate objects, and are said to be taken when they are 
   pulled, chased, etc., completely from their base(s).
     
     When a bhikkhu takes a moveable object in theft, the question of 
   whether he makes off with it is irrelevant as far as the offense is 
   concerned. For example, if he tries to steal a radio and succeeds in 
   moving it completely from its base, but then hears the owner coming 
   and so returns it to its original place, the owner would not even 
   know that the object was in danger of being taken, and the civil law 
   would regard the act at most as an attempted theft. As far as the 
   Vinaya is concerned, though, the theft occurred when the bhikkhu 
   first moved the object, and the fact that he returned it would not 
   erase the theft. He would still be guilty of an offense.
     
     As for immovable objects -- land or things such as buildings or 
   trees affixed to the land -- these are taken when the rightful owner 
   unwillingly abandons his claim to them of his own accord (through 
   fear of intimidation or reluctance to incur the expense and bother 
   of a court battle) or when he is forced to do so by a court of law 
   and cannot, or does not, make a further appeal. In the Buddha's 
   time, a court dispute involving land was considered fully settled 
   when the winner of the case staked out his claim with the permission 
   of the court. Thus the Vibhanga states that a bhikkhu who unfairly 
   wins a court case of this sort has "taken" the land when he formally 
   stakes out his claim after winning the case. At present we would say 
   that he has taken the land when he receives the deed.
     
     Immovable objects in the secondary sense -- trees, buildings, etc. 
   -- are treated in the same light as ordinary moveable objects if a 
   bhikkhu cuts them down or dismantles them: They count as taken when 
   removed from their bases.
     
     These are the general considerations for determining when an 
   object is taken. The Vibhanga, though, cites a number of additional 
   cases involving special contingencies, as follows:
     
       a. //Fraudulence//: Objects are being distributed by lot to 
       the Community. A bhikkhu desiring the portion rightfully 
       going to another bhikkhu exchanges his ticket for the other 
       bhikkhu's ticket. The "taking" is accomplished when the 
       tickets have been exchanged.
       
       b. //Breach of trust//: A person places goods in trust with 
       a bhikkhu. When the owner comes to ask for their return, the 
       bhikkhu claims that he does not have them. The taking is 
       accomplished when the owner stops pressing his claim. If the 
       case goes to court, the taking is accomplished when the 
       owner loses the case in the final court to which he appeals.
       
       c. //Embezzlement//: A bhikkhu responsible for items kept in 
       a storeroom removes one of the items from the storeroom. The 
       taking is accomplished when the item leaves the storeroom's 
       boundary.
       
       d. //Smuggling//: A bhikkhu carrying items subject to an 
       import duty hides them as he goes through customs. The 
       taking is accomplished when the item leaves the customs 
       area. If, however, the bhikkhu informs the customs official 
       that he has an item subject to customs duty, and yet the 
       official decides not to collect the duty, the bhikkhu incurs 
       no penalty. And there is no penalty if the bhikkhu goes 
       through customs not knowing that he has an item subject to 
       import duties among his effects.
   
     Special cases cited in the Commentary include the following:
   
       a. //False dealing//: A bhikkhu makes counterfeit money or 
       uses counterfeit weights. The taking is accomplished when 
       the counterfeit is accepted.
       
       b. //Extortion//: Using threats, a bhikkhu compels the owner 
       of an object to give it to him. The taking is accomplished 
       when the owner complies.
   
     The value of the object. As stated above, any case of stealing 
   counts as an offense, but the gravity of the offense is determined 
   by the value of the object. This is the point of the phrase in the 
   rule reading, "just as when there is the taking of what is not 
   given, kings...would banish him, saying... 'You are a thief.'" In 
   other words, for theft to entail a parajika, it must be a case of 
   grand larceny, which in the time of the Buddha meant that the goods 
   involved were worth at least five //masakas//, a unit of money used 
   at the time. Goods valued collectively at more than one masaka but 
   less than five are grounds for a thullaccaya; goods valued 
   collectively at one masaka or less are grounds for a dukkata, the 
   worth of the articles being determined by the price they would have 
   fetched at the time of the theft.
     
     This leaves us with the question of how a masaka would translate 
   into current monetary rates. No one can answer this question with 
   any certainty, for the oldest attempt to peg the masaka to the gold 
   standard dates from the V/Subcommentary, which sets one masaka as 
   equal to 4 rice grains' weight of gold. At this rate, the theft of 
   an item worth 20 rice grains' (1/24 troy ounce) weight of gold or 
   more would be a parajika offense.
     
     One objection to this method of calculation is that some of the 
   items mentioned in the Vinita Vatthu as being grounds for a parajika 
   when stolen -- e.g., a pillow, a bundle of laundry, a robe, a 
   handful of rice during a famine -- would seem to be worth much less 
   than 1/24 troy ounce of gold, but we must remember that many items 
   regarded as commonplace now might have been viewed as expensive 
   luxuries at the time.
     
     In spite of this objection, there is one very good reason for 
   adopting the standard set by the V/Subcommentary: It sets a high 
   value for the least article whose theft would result in a parajika. 
   Thus when a bhikkhu steals an item worth 1/24 troy ounce of gold or 
   more, there can be no doubt that he has committed the full offense. 
   When the item is of lesser value, there will be inescapable doubt -- 
   and when there is any doubt concerning a parajika, the tradition of 
   the Vinaya consistently gives the bhikkhu the benefit of the doubt: 
   He is not compelled to disrobe. A basic principle operating 
   throughout the texts is that it is better to risk letting an 
   offender go unpunished than to risk punishing an innocent bhikkhu.
     
     There is a second advantage to the V/Subcommentary's method of 
   calculation: its precision and clarity. Some people have recommended 
   adopting the standard expressed in the rule itself -- that if the 
   theft would result in flogging, imprisonment or banishment by the 
   authorities in that time and at that place, then the theft would 
   constitute a parajika -- but this standard creates more problems 
   than it would solve. In most countries the sentence is largely at 
   the discretion of the judge or magistrate, and the factor of value 
   is only one among many taken into account when determining the 
   penalty. This opens a whole Pandora's box of issues, many of which 
   have nothing to do with the bhikkhu or the object he has taken -- 
   the judge's mood, his social philosophy, his religious background, 
   and so forth -- issues that the Buddha never allowed to enter into 
   the consideration of how to determine the penalty for a theft.
     
     Thus the V/Subcommentary's method of calculation has the benefits 
   that it is a quick and easy method for determining the boundaries 
   between the different levels of offense in any modern currency; it 
   involves no factors extraneous to the tradition of the Vinaya, and 
   -- as noted above -- it draws the line at a value above which there 
   can be no doubt that the penalty is a parajika.
     
     If a bhikkhu steals several items on different occasions, the 
   values of the different items are added together to determine the 
   severity of the offense //only if they were stolen as part of a 
   single plan or intention//. If they are stolen as a result of 
   separate intentions, each act of stealing is treated as a separate 
   offense whose severity depends on the value of the individual 
   item(s) stolen in that act. This point is best explained with 
   examples:
     
     In a case given in the Vinita Vatthu, a bhikkhu decides to steal a 
   spoonful of ghee from a jar. After swallowing the spoonful, he 
   decides to steal one more. After that he decides to steal another, 
   and so on until he has finished the jar. Because each spoonful was 
   stolen as a consequence of a separate plan or intention, he incurs 
   several dukkatas, each for the theft of one spoonful of ghee.
     
     If, however, he decides at one point to steal enough lumber to 
   build himself a hut and then steals a plank from here and a rafter 
   from there, taking lumber over many days at different places from 
   various owners, he commits one offense in accordance with the total 
   value of all the lumber stolen, since he took all the pieces of wood 
   as a consequence of one prior plan.
     
     Derived offenses. If a bhikkhu tries to steal an article that 
   would be grounds for a parajika but does not succeed -- e.g., he is 
   going to steal a book from a shelf, but before he can remove it from 
   its place on the shelf he hears someone approaching and so walks off 
   without taking it -- he commits a lighter offense in accordance with 
   the effort made. Offenses of this sort are called offenses committed 
   in the //pubbayoga// or preliminary steps. In the case of stealing, 
   they are determined as follows:
   
       //Inanimate moveable objects:// If the article is made to 
       budge slightly, but is not moved completely from its base, 
       or from some but not all of its bases -- thullaccaya. All 
       actions prior to this, beginning with the act of walking 
       toward the object with intent to steal it -- dukkata.
       
       //Animals:// If in driving the animal along the bhikkhu gets 
       it to move its front feet -- thullaccaya. All actions prior 
       to this -- dukkata.
       
       //Immovable objects and articles placed in trust//: If the 
       bhikkhu creates doubt in the mind of the owner as to whether 
       he will deprive him/her of the property in question -- 
       thullaccaya. All actions prior to this -- dukkata.
       
       //Immovable objects in the secondary sense (e.g., a tree):// 
       If with one more blow of the ax the tree will fall -- 
       thullaccaya. All actions prior to this -- dukkata, unless 
       (according to the Vinaya Mukha) there is a training rule 
       imposing a higher penalty, such as the pacittiya rule 
       concerning injury to plant life.
   
     For ease of remembrance, if the bhikkhu is one step away from 
   taking the object, he incurs a thullaccaya; if he does not go that 
   far, he incurs one or more dukkatas.
     
     In offenses of this sort, when a heavier penalty is incurred, only 
   that penalty is counted, and the preceding lighter ones are 
   nullified. For example, in the case mentioned above, if the bhikkhu 
   trying to steal the book simply touches it, he incurs a string of 
   dukkatas for each step in walking up to the book and taking hold of 
   it. If he budges the book slightly but not so much as to move it 
   completely from its spot, the dukkatas are nullified and replaced 
   with a thullaccaya. If he actually takes the book, that nullifies 
   the thullaccaya and replaces it with a parajika.
     
     Shared responsibility. A bhikkhu can commit an offense not only if 
   he himself steals an object, but also if he incites another to 
   steal. The offenses involved in the acts leading up to the crime are 
   as follows:
     
     If a bhikkhu tells an accomplice to steal an object that would be 
   grounds for a parajika, he incurs a dukkata. If the accomplice 
   agrees, the instigator incurs a thullaccaya. Once the accomplice 
   succeeds in taking the object as instructed -- whether or not he 
   gets away with it, and whether or not he shares it with the 
   instigator -- the instigator incurs a parajika. If the accomplice is 
   a bhikkhu, he too incurs a parajika. If the object would be grounds 
   for a thullaccaya or a dukkata, the only penalties incurred prior to 
   the actual theft would be dukkatas.
     
     If there is any confusion in carrying out the instructions -- 
   e.g., if the accomplice, instead of taking the book specified by the 
   instigator, takes something else instead; or if he is told to take 
   it in the afternoon but instead takes it in the morning -- the 
   instigator incurs only the penalties for proposing the theft and 
   persuading the accomplice, and not the penalty for the theft itself. 
   The same holds true if the instigator rescinds his order before the 
   theft takes place, but the accomplice goes ahead and takes the 
   object anyway.
     
     According to the Commentary, an instigator who wishes to call off 
   the theft before it is carried out, but who for one reason or 
   another cannot get his message to the accomplice in time, incurs the 
   full penalty for the completed theft.
     
     If there is a chain of command -- Bhikkhu A telling Bhikkhu B to 
   tell Bhikkhu C to tell Bhikkhu D to commit the theft -- then once D 
   takes the object as instructed, all four incur the penalty coming 
   from the theft. If there is any confusion in the chain of command -- 
   e.g., Bhikkhu B instead of telling C tells D directly -- neither A 
   nor C incurs the penalty for the theft itself.
     
     If bhikkhus go in a group to commit a theft, but only one of them 
   does the actual taking, all still incur the penalty coming from the 
   theft. Similarly, if they steal valuables worth collectively more 
   than five masakas but which when divided among them yield shares 
   worth less than five masakas each, all incur a parajika.
     
     Special cases. As mentioned above, the notion of stealing covers a 
   wide variety of actions. The texts mention a variety of actions that 
   border on stealing, some of them coming under this rule, some of 
   them not.
     
     //Belongings of the Sangha//. According to the Commentary to 
   Nissaggiya Pacittiya 30, an item belongs to the Sangha when donors, 
   intending for it to be Sangha property, offer it to one or more 
   bhikkhus representing the Sangha, and those bhikkhus receive it, 
   although not necessarily into their hands. Sangha property thus 
   counts as "what is not given" as far as individual bhikkhus are 
   concerned, for it has an owner -- the Sangha of all times and places 
   -- and is guarded by the individual Community of bhikkhus.
     
     Sangha property is divided into two sorts: light (//lahu-bhanda//) 
   and heavy (//garu-bhanda//). Light property includes such things as 
   robes, bowls, medicine, and food. Heavy property includes such 
   things as monastery land, buildings, and furnishings. The Buddha 
   gave permission for individual Communities to appoint certain of 
   their members to be officials responsible for the proper use of 
   Sangha property. The officials responsible for light property are to 
   distribute it among the members of the Community, following set 
   procedures to ensure that the distribution is fair. Once an 
   individual member has received such property, he may regard it as 
   his own and use it as he sees fit.
     
     In the case of heavy property, though, the officials are 
   responsible for seeing that it is allotted for proper use in the 
   Community, //but the individual bhikkhus who are allowed to use it 
   may not regard it as their own personal property//. This is an 
   important point. At most, such items may be taken on loan or 
   exchanged -- with the approval of the Community -- for other heavy 
   property of equal value. A bhikkhu who gives such items away to 
   anyone -- ordained or not -- perceiving it as his to give, incurs a 
   thullaccaya, no matter what the value of the object. Of course, if 
   he knows that it is not his to give or take, then in appropriating 
   it as his own he incurs the penalty for stealing.
   
     The Buddha was highly critical of any bhikkhu who gives away heavy 
   property of the Sangha. In the origin story to Parajika 4, he cites 
   the case of a bhikkhu who, hoping to find favor with a lay person, 
   gives that person some of the Sangha's heavy property. Such a 
   bhikkhu, he says, is one of the five great thieves of the world.
     
     A bhikkhu who takes heavy property of the Sangha donated for use 
   in a particular monastery and uses it elsewhere incurs a dukkata. If 
   he takes it on loan, he commits no offense.
     
     //Receiving stolen goods//. Accepting a gift of goods, or 
   purchasing them very cheaply knowing that they were stolen, would in 
   Western criminal law result in a penalty similar to stealing itself. 
   However, neither the Canon nor the commentaries mention this case. 
   The closest they come is in the Vinita Vatthu, where a groundskeeper 
   gives bhikkhus fruit from the orchard under his care, even though it 
   was not his to give, and there was no offense for the bhikkhus. Thus 
   the implication is that there is no offense for receiving stolen 
   goods, even knowingly, although a bhikkhu who does so would not be 
   exempt from the civil law and the consequent proceedings, in the 
   course of which the Community would probably urge him to disrobe. 
   (In Thailand, the civil law empowers the police to force a bhikkhu 
   to disrobe if he is charged with a criminal case.)
     
     //Compensation owed//. The Commentary introduces the concept of 
   //bhandadeyya//, or compensation owed, to cover cases where a 
   bhikkhu is responsible for the loss or destruction of another 
   person's property. It defines this concept by saying that the 
   bhikkhu must pay the price of the object to the owner or give the 
   owner another object of equal value to the one lost or destroyed; if 
   he abandons his responsibility to the owner, he incurs a parajika. 
   The Commentary applies this concept not only to cases where the 
   bhikkhu knowingly and intentionally destroys the object, but also to 
   cases where he borrows or agrees to look after something that then 
   gets lost, stolen, or destroyed through his negligence; or where he 
   takes an item mistakenly thinking that it was discarded or that he 
   was in a position to take it on trust.
     
     To cite a few examples: A bhikkhu breaks another person's jar of 
   oil or places excrement in the oil to spoil it. A bhikkhu who is 
   charged with guarding the Community storeroom lets a group of other 
   bhikkhus into the storeroom to fetch belongings they have left 
   there; they forget to close the door and, before he remembers to 
   check it, thieves slip in to steal things. A group of thieves steal 
   a bundle of mangoes but, being chased by the owners, drop it and 
   run; a bhikkhu sees the mangoes, thinks that they have been thrown 
   away, and so eats them after getting someone to present them to him. 
   A bhikkhu sees a wild boar caught in a trap and, out of compassion, 
   sets it free but cannot reconcile the owner of the trap to what he 
   has done. In each of these cases, the Commentary says, the bhikkhu 
   in question owes compensation to the owner of the goods. (In the 
   case of the mangoes, he must compensate not only the owners but also 
   the thieves if it turns out that they had planned to come back and 
   fetch the fruit.) If he abandons his responsibility to the owner(s), 
   he incurs a parajika.
     
     In making these judgments, the Commentary is probably following 
   the civil law of its day, for the Canon contains no reference at all 
   to the concept of bhandadeyya, and some of its judgments would seem 
   to contradict the Commentary's. For instance, the Vinita Vatthu 
   mentions a case in which a bhikkhu knowingly sets fire to a field of 
   grass (which in those days would have been worth more than five 
   masakas), and yet it assigns only a dukkata to the action. When it 
   discusses cases where a bhikkhu takes an item on mistaken 
   assumptions, or where he feels compassion for an animal caught in a 
   trap and so sets it free, it says that there is no offense at all. 
   Thus it seems strange for an action that, according to the Canon, 
   carries a dukkata or no penalty whatsoever to become grounds for a 
   parajika. Of course, in all cases of this sort it would be a wise 
   policy to offer the owner reasonable compensation, but it is by no 
   means certain that a bhikkhu would have the wherewithal to do so. 
   The Canon places only one responsibility on him: to apologize to the 
   owner (see Cv.I.18-20). If he doesn't apologize, the Community, if 
   it sees fit, can force him to. Beyond that, though, the Canon does 
   not require that he make any material compensation at all. Thus, as 
   the Commentary's concept of bhandadeyya is clearly foreign to the 
   Canon, there seems no reason to adopt it.
     
     //Court actions//. As stated above, if a bhikkhu knowingly starts 
   an unfair court case against someone else and then wins it in the 
   final court to which the accused makes appeal, he incurs a parajika. 
   The Commentary to the Bhikkhuni's Sanghadisesa 1, however, states 
   that even if a bhikkhu is actually mistreated by someone -- defamed, 
   physically injured, robbed, etc. -- and then tries to take a just 
   court action against the guilty party, he incurs a parajika if he 
   wins. Again, this is an instance where the Commentary has no support 
   from the Canon and, as the Vinaya Mukha points out, its assertion 
   cannot stand. However, the training of a bhikkhu requires that he 
   view all losses in the light of kamma and focus on looking after the 
   state of his mind rather than on seeking compensation in social or 
   material things.
     
     There is no question in any of the texts that if a bhikkhu is 
   asked to give evidence in a courtroom and does so, speaking in 
   accordance with the facts, he commits no offense no matter what the 
   outcome for the others involved.
     
     //Deceit//. If a bhikkhu uses a deliberate lie to deceive another 
   person into giving an item to him, the transgression is treated not 
   as a case of stealing -- since, after all, the item is given to him 
   -- but rather as a case of lying. If the lie involves making false 
   claims to superior meditative attainments, it is treated under 
   Parajika 4. If not, it is treated under Pacittiya 1. The Vinita 
   Vatthu gives two examples:
     
     During a distribution of requisites in the Community, a bhikkhu 
   asks for and is given an extra portion for a non-existent bhikkhu.
     
     A bhikkhu approaches his teacher's lay supporter and asks for 
   medicines, saying that they will be for his teacher, although he 
   actually plans to use them himself instead.
     
     In both of these cases, the penalty is a pacittiya for lying.
     
     //Compassion//. The Vinita Vatthu contains a case in which a 
   bhikkhu, out of compassion, releases an animal caught in a hunter's 
   snare. He incurs no penalty.
     
     In another case, a bhikkhu with psychic powers uses them to 
   retrieve a pair of kidnapped children. The Buddha states that this 
   entails no penalty because such a thing lies in the province of 
   those with psychic power. The Vinaya Mukha, in discussing this case, 
   takes it as a precedent for saying that if a bhikkhu returns a 
   stolen article to its legal owner, there is no offense. The Buddha's 
   statement, though, was probably meant to discourage bhikkhus without 
   psychic powers from getting directly involved in righting wrongs of 
   this sort. If a bhikkhu happens to learn of the whereabouts of 
   stolen goods, kidnapped children, etc., he may inform the 
   authorities, if he sees fit, and let them handle the situation 
   themselves.
     
     //Taking articles from undecomposed corpses//. In the early days 
   of the Sangha, bhikkhus were expected to make their robes from 
   discarded cloth, one source being the cloths used to wrap corpses 
   laid in charnel grounds. (The bhikkhus would wash and boil the cloth 
   before using it themselves.) However, they were not to take cloth 
   from undecomposed bodies, and this was for a reason.
     
     "At one time a certain bhikkhu went to the charnel ground and took 
   hold of discarded cloth on a body not yet decomposed. The spirit of 
   the dead one was dwelling in the body. It said to the bhikkhu, 
   'Honored sir, don't take hold of my cloak.' The bhikkhu, ignoring 
   it, went off (with the cloak). The body, arising, followed closely 
   on the heels of the bhikkhu until the bhikkhu, entering the vihara, 
   closed the door, and the body fell down right there."
     
     The story gives no further details, and we are left to imagine for 
   ourselves both the bhikkhu's state of mind while being chased by the 
   body and his friends' reaction to the event. As is usual with the 
   stories in the Vibhanga, the more outrageous the event, the more 
   matter-of-fact is its telling, and the more its humor lies in the 
   understatement.
     
     At any rate, as a result of this incident the Buddha laid down a 
   dukkata penalty for taking cloth from an undecomposed body -- which, 
   according to the Commentary, means one that is still warm.
     
     Modern cases. The modern world contains many forms of ownership 
   and monetary exchange that did not exist in the time of the Buddha, 
   and so contains many forms of stealing that did not exist then 
   either. Here are a handful of cases that come to mind as examples of 
   ways in which the standards of this rule might be applied to modern 
   situations.
     
     //Breach of copyright.// The international standards for copyright 
   advocated by UNESCO state that breach of copyright is tantamount to 
   theft. They go on to state, however, that if one duplicates 
   articles, books, cassette tapes, or video tapes for private use, for 
   study, or for non-profit distribution, one may copy as much as one 
   likes. In some countries, though, one is allowed to copy only small 
   portions of copyrighted material for such purposes, although exactly 
   how small is only vaguely defined. Thus, as local copyright laws do 
   not always adopt the UNESCO standard, a bhikkhu should check with 
   the law before copying anything. In particular, the agreements 
   covering the copying of commercial computer software usually do not 
   permit the owner to give copies of the software to anyone for any 
   reason, and limit the number of copies one may make for one's own 
   use. One should follow such agreements to the letter.
     
     //Credit cards//. The theft of a credit card would of course be an 
   offense. The seriousness of the offense would be determined by how 
   much the owner would have to pay to replace the stolen card. 
   Nissaggiya Pacittiya 20 would forbid a bhikkhu from using a credit 
   card to buy anything even if the card were his to use, although a 
   bhikkhu who had gone to the extent of stealing a card would probably 
   not be dissuaded by that rule from using it or having someone else 
   use it. At any rate, each use of a stolen card would also count as a 
   theft, the seriousness of which would be calculated in line with the 
   principle of the "prior plan" mentioned above.
     
     //Long distance telephone calls//. Unauthorized use of a telephone 
   to place long distance calls would also count as a theft, and again 
   the seriousness of the offense would be calculated in light of the 
   principle of the prior plan.
     
     //Tax evasion//. If a bhikkhu intentionally does not pay a tax to 
   which he is subject -- say, on an inheritance he receives -- he is 
   guilty of a theft, which would occur on the deadline for payment of 
   the tax. Of course, a bhikkhu who fails to pay a tax out of 
   ignorance would not be guilty of an offense.
     
     Exchanging currency on the black market is also a form of tax 
   evasion in countries where there is a tax on currency exchange, so a 
   bhikkhu in such a country who directs his steward to change money on 
   the black market would be guilty of a theft. If, however, the 
   steward on his own initiative exchanges money on the black market 
   for use in the bhikkhu's account, the bhikkhu commits no offense.
   
       Summary: The theft of anything worth 1/24 ounce troy of gold 
       or more is a parajika offense.
   
                                 * * *
   
   
   
       3. Should any bhikkhu intentionally deprive a human being of 
       life, or search for an assassin for him, or praise the 
       advantages of death, or incite him to die (thus): "My good 
       man, what use is this wretched, miserable life to you? Death 
       would be better for you than life," or with such an idea in 
       mind, such a purpose in mind, should in various ways praise 
       the advantages of death or incite him to die, he also is 
       defeated and no longer in communion.
   
     This rule against intentionally causing the death of a human being 
   is best understood in terms of five factors, all of which must be 
   present for there to be a parajika offense.
   
       1) //Object//: a human being, which according to the 
       Vibhanga includes human fetuses as well, counting from the 
       time consciousness first arises in the womb immediately 
       after conception up to the time of death.
       
       2) //Intention//: knowingly, consciously, deliberately, and 
       purposefully wanting to cause that person's death. 
       "Knowingly" also includes the factor of --
       
       3) //Perception//: perceiving the person as a living being.
       
       4) //Effort//: whatever one does with the purpose of causing 
       that person to die.
       
       5) //Result//: The person dies as the result of one's act.
   
     Object. The Vibhanga defines a human being as a person "from the 
   time consciousness first becomes manifest in a mother's womb, up to 
   its death-time." (The concept of //death-time//, since it relates 
   most directly to questions that arise in treating the terminally 
   ill, will be discussed in the section dealing with that topic, 
   below.) It follows from this that a bhikkhu who intentionally causes 
   an abortion -- by arranging for the operation, supplying the 
   medicines, or giving advice that results in an abortion -- incurs a 
   parajika. A bhikkhu who encourages a woman to use a means of 
   contraception that works after the point of conception would be 
   guilty of a parajika if she were to follow his advice.
     
     There is a series of cases in the Vinita Vatthu in which bhikkhus 
   provide medicines for women seeking an abortion, followed by two 
   cases in which a bhikkhu provides medicines to a barren woman who 
   wants to become fertile and to a fertile woman who wants to become 
   barren. In neither of these two latter cases does anyone die, but in 
   both cases the bhikkhu incurs a dukkata. From this, the Commentary 
   infers that bhikkhus are not to act as doctors to lay people, an 
   inference supported by the Vibhanga to Sanghadisesa 13. (The 
   Commentary, though, gives a number of exceptions to this principle. 
   See the discussion under that rule.)
     
     The parajika offense is for killing a human being aside from 
   oneself. A bhikkhu who attempts suicide incurs a dukkata.
     
     A bhikkhu who kills a "non-human being" -- a yakkha, naga, or peta 
   -- or a devata (this is in the Commentary) incurs a thullaccaya. 
   According to the Commentary, when a spirit possesses a human being 
   or an animal, it can be exorcised in either of two ways. The first 
   is to command it to leave: This causes no injury to the spirit and 
   results in no offense. The second is to make a doll out of flour 
   paste or clay and then cut off various of its parts. If one cuts off 
   the hands and feet, the spirit loses its hands and feet. If one cuts 
   off the head, the spirit dies, and this is grounds for a 
   thullaccaya.
     
     A bhikkhu who intentionally kills a common animal is treated under 
   Pacittiya 72.
     
     Intention & perception. The Vibhanga defines //intentionally// as 
   "having made the decision knowingly, consciously, and purposefully." 
   According to the Commentary, //having made the decision// refers to 
   the moment when one "crushes" one's indecisiveness by taking an act. 
   //Knowingly// means being aware that, "This is a living being." 
   //Consciously// means being aware that one's action is depriving the 
   living being of life. //Purposefully// means that one's purpose is 
   murderous. Whether one is motivated by compassion, hatred, or 
   indifference is irrelevant as far as the offense is concerned.
     
     All of the above sub-factors must be present for the factors of 
   intention and perception to be fulfilled here. Thus there is no 
   offense for a bhikkhu who causes a death --
     
       //accidentally// -- e.g., accidentally dropping a rock that 
       kills a person standing below; or toying with a gun, trying 
       to decide whether or not to kill the person, and the gun 
       accidentally goes off before he can make up his mind;
       
       //not knowing that a living being was there// -- e.g., 
       placing a heavy load on a pile of cloth without realizing 
       that a person was lying underneath it;
       
       //not conscious that his action is causing death// -- e.g., 
       by unwittingly giving poisoned food to another bhikkhu who 
       eats it and dies;
       
       or when his actions are //motivated by a purpose other than 
       that of causing death// -- e.g., giving medicine to a fellow 
       bhikkhu, sincerely trying to help cure him, but the sick 
       bhikkhu chokes on the medicine and dies.
   
     One aspect of the Commentary's definition of //knowingly// is 
   worth noting here: One does not need to know that the living being 
   is a human being for the factor of perception to be fulfilled. Thus 
   if a bhikkhu hears a noise in the dark and, thinking it to be a wild 
   animal, stabs it with intent to kill, he incurs a parajika if the 
   "animal" turns out to be a human being who dies from the wound.
     
     Although this judgment may seem strange, it is supported by a 
   passage in the Canon: A man digs a pitfall with the thought that 
   whatever living beings fall into it will perish. The penalty, if an 
   animal dies as a result, is a pacittiya; if a human being, a 
   parajika. This shows that the intention/ perception of killing a 
   living being of any kind fulfills the relevant factors here.
     
     The Vinita Vatthu contains an unusual case of a bhikkhu who uses a 
   friend as a guinea pig for testing poison. The friend dies, and the 
   bhikkhu incurs only a thullaccaya. The Commentary explains this by 
   distinguishing two types of test: one to see if a particular poison 
   is strong enough to kill a person; the other, to see if a particular 
   person is strong enough to survive the poison. In either of these 
   cases, the bhikkhu incurs a thullaccaya whether or not the victim 
   dies. If, though, the bhikkhu gives poison to a person with the 
   desire that it cause that person's death, he incurs a parajika if 
   the victim dies, and a thullaccaya if not.
     
     Effort. This factor covers four types of action: taking life, 
   assisting a murderer or suicide, describing the advantages of dying, 
   and inciting a person to die.
   
     a) //Taking life//. The Vibhanga defines //taking life// as 
   "cutting off the life faculty," and the Commentary's discussion of 
   this point shows clearly that this means interrupting the continuity 
   of life before it would reach its "timely" end through the 
   exhaustion of the victim's merit or life potential The Commentary 
   lists six means by which one might make such an effort:
   
     -- //One's own person//. This includes using not only one's hands 
   or feet, but also such weapons as knives, sticks, clubs, etc.
     
     -- //Throwing//: hurling a stone, shooting an arrow or a gun, etc.
     
     -- //Stationary devices//: setting a trap, poisoning food, etc.
     
     -- //Magical formulae//: calling on malevolent spirits to bring 
   about a person's death, using voodoo, etc.
     
     -- //Psychic powers//. using the "evil eye" or other similar 
   powers.
     
     -- //Commanding//: inciting another person to commit a murder. 
   This category includes recommendations as well as express commands. 
   A few examples:
     
     Telling A to kill B. The way in which a bhikkhu is penalized for 
   getting another person to commit a murder can be inferred from the 
   discussion of //shared responsibility// under the preceding rule. 
   The Commentary to this rule goes into great detail concerning the 
   six ways the command to kill can be specified: the object [the 
   person to be killed], the time, the place, the weapon to use, the 
   action by which the weapon is to be used [e.g. "Stab him in the 
   neck"], and the position the victim should be in [sitting, standing, 
   lying down] when the act is to be done. If the instigator specifies 
   any of these things, and yet the person following his orders does 
   not carry them out to the letter, the instigator does not incur the 
   penalty for the actual murder. For instance, Bhikkhu A tells his 
   student to kill B while B is sitting in meditation at midnight. The 
   student gets into B's room at midnight, only to find B asleep in 
   bed, which is where he kills him. Bhikkhu A thus incurs only the 
   thullaccaya for convincing his student to accept the command.
     
     Inciting A to kill B. The Commentary includes a case of a socially 
   active bhikkhu who tells people, "In such-and-such a place a bandit 
   is staying. Whoever cuts off his head will receive great honor from 
   the King." If any of the bhikkhu's listeners kills the bandit as a 
   result of his instigation, the bhikkhu incurs a parajika.
     
     Recommending means of euthanasia. The Vinita Vatthu includes a 
   case of a criminal who has just been punished by having his hands 
   and feet cut off. A bhikkhu asks the man's relatives, "Do you want 
   him to die? Then make him drink buttermilk." The relatives follow 
   the bhikkhu's recommendation, the man dies, and the bhikkhu incurs a 
   parajika.
     
     Recommending means of capital punishment. Again from the Vinita 
   Vatthu: A bhikkhu advises an executioner to kill his victims 
   mercifully with a single blow, rather than torturing them. The 
   executioner follows his advice, and the bhikkhu incurs a parajika. 
   This judgment indicates that a bhikkhu should not involve himself in 
   matters of this sort, no matter how humane his intentions. According 
   to the Vinita Vatthu, if the executioner says that he will not 
   follow the bhikkhu's advice and then kills his victims as he 
   pleases, the bhikkhu incurs no penalty. The Commentary adds that if 
   the executioner tries to follow the bhikkhu's advice and yet needs 
   more than one blow to do the job, the bhikkhu incurs a thullaccaya. 
   As we have mentioned, though, the best course is to leave matters of 
   this sort to the laity.
     
     b) //Assisting a murderer or suicide.// A bhikkhu may commit an 
   offense not only by using any of the six above-mentioned means of 
   taking life, but also by intentionally assisting a person who uses 
   any of them to commit a murder or a suicide. This is how the 
   Vibhanga explains the phrase, "search for an assassin" in the rule. 
   The act of assisting includes not only finding an assassin, but also 
   procuring weapons for the would-be murderer or suicide.
     
     c) //Describing the advantages of dying//. This, the third type of 
   act covered by this rule, can include berating a sick person ("Why 
   do you keep hanging on to life like this? Don't you realize what a 
   burden you are to others?") or simply telling a person of the 
   miseries of life or the bliss of dying and going to heaven in such a 
   way that he/she might feel inspired to commit suicide or simply pine 
   away to death. The Vibhanga notes that these statements fulfill this 
   factor whether delivered by gesture, by voice, by writing, or by 
   means of a messenger
     
     d) //Inciting a person to die//, the fourth type of act, covers:
     
     -- Recommending suicide. This includes not only telling a person 
   to commit suicide, but also giving advice -- whether requested or 
   not -- to a would-be suicide on the best ways to commit the act.
     
     -- Telling a person to go to a dangerous place where he/she might 
   die of the dangers.
     
     -- Arranging a terrible sight, sound, etc. to frighten a person to 
   death, or a beautiful, "heart-stirring" one to attract a person who 
   will then pine away to death when it fades.
     
     //Command//. Giving a command or recommendation to get another 
   person to perform any of these last three types of action -- 
   assisting a murder or suicide, describing the advantages of dying, 
   or inciting another person to die -- would also fulfill the factor 
   of effort under this rule.
     
     //Expressing a wish//. According to the Vibhanga, a bhikkhu who 
   expresses an idle wish that so-and-so be murdered would incur a 
   dukkata, whether or not he was overheard. If, however, the bhikkhu's 
   purpose in expressing the wish is that his listener take him up on 
   it and commit the murder, his action would come under the category 
   of "command," mentioned above.
     
     //Inaction// does not fulfill the factor of effort here. Thus if a 
   bhikkhu sits idle when seeing a flood sweep a person down-stream, he 
   commits no offense -- regardless of his feelings about the person's 
   death -- even if the person then drowns. Recommending that another 
   person sit idle as well would also not fulfill this factor, because 
   the category of "command" here covers only the act of inciting the 
   listener to do any of the four actions that would fulfill the factor 
   of effort under this rule.
     
     Result. If a bhikkhu fulfills the factor of effort with the 
   intention of causing a person's death, and the person dies as a 
   result, he incurs a parajika. This holds even if the person does not 
   die immediately, but succumbs later, say, to complications arising 
   from a wound caused by the bhikkhu. If the person does not die, but 
   experiences pain or injury as a result of the bhikkhu's efforts, the 
   penalty is a thullaccaya. If the bhikkhu's efforts result in neither 
   pain nor death, the penalty is a dukkata for each separate action 
   leading up to them.
     
     If a bhikkhu intends simply to injure the victim or cause him/her 
   pain, and yet the victim dies as a result of the bhikkhu's actions, 
   the case is treated under Pacittiya 74.
     
     There is an apparent contradiction in the Vinita Vatthu concerning 
   the penalty for a bhikkhu who tries to kill one person but ends up 
   killing another instead. In one passage, it says that a bhikkhu who 
   means to kill X but kills Y instead incurs a parajika. In another 
   passage, it tells of a bhikkhu who gives medicine to a woman who 
   wants to commit an abortion near the end of a full-term pregnancy. 
   The woman takes the medicine but, instead of the fetus' aborting, 
   the woman dies and the infant survives. In this case, the bhikkhu 
   incurs a thullaccaya, presumably for the pain he caused the infant.
     
     The Commentary tries to resolve this contradiction with an 
   illustration: A bhikkhu with a grudge against A decides to ambush 
   him. He sees B coming down the road and, mistaking him for A, shoots 
   him dead on the spot. Since his intention was to kill the person he 
   was aiming at, he incurs a parajika. We can call this a case of 
   mistaken identity. In cases of this sort, whether the "right" or the 
   "wrong" person dies is of no consequence to the offense.
   
     If, however, the bhikkhu is a poor shot, takes aim at B but misses 
   him, and inadvertently kills C instead, he does not incur a 
   parajika, for he did not intend to kill C during any part of his 
   action. His only penalties are the dukkatas he incurs while 
   preparing for B's murder.
     
     If a bhikkhu means to cause the death of any member of a group, 
   then when any member of the group dies as a result of his efforts, 
   he incurs a parajika. 
     
     Caring for the terminally ill. Some of the most highly charged 
   issues involving this training rule concern the duties of a bhikkhu 
   acting as nurse, and his accountability in the event that his 
   patient dies. Not a few controversies have arisen in the past when 
   highly respected teachers have died after an illness, for there is a 
   tendency to blame the nurse either for the teacher's death or for 
   being so intrusive in his care that he does not let the teacher die 
   in peace. Recent developments in modern medicine -- such as 
   professionally mandated care, life-support machines, and organ 
   transplants -- have further complicated the issue of exactly how far 
   the nurse's accountability goes. Fortunately, the texts are quite 
   clear on these issues -- applying rules where rules are called for, 
   and guidelines where rules would be inappropriate -- but to 
   understand their rationale it is necessary to have some historical 
   perspective on the subject.
     
     Medical care in the time of the Buddha was primarily the 
   responsibility of the ill person's family. Subsidized health care 
   did not exist, and so families had a very real sense of the 
   exigencies -- their time, their resources, the wishes of the 
   patient, and the likelihood of his recovery -- that might force them 
   to provide less than state-of-the-art care, even for a loved one. At 
   the same time, the current Western system whereby one style of 
   medical care can establish itself as "standard" -- and can enlist 
   the help of the law to discredit alternative styles of treatment as 
   bogus -- also did not exist. Patients and their families had a wide 
   assortment of treatments to choose from and, given the means to make 
   a choice, might select a particular style for any number of reasons: 
   belief in the theory that lay behind it, trust in a particular 
   doctor, rapport with the means of treatment, etc.
     
     As a result, there was none of the belief, current in some 
   circles, that outside professionals have the right to monopolize 
   medical care or to impose their standards of treatment on an 
   unwilling patient or his family. The choice of treatment was an 
   in-family matter. If a patient balked at a particular doctor's 
   treatment, the family was free to decide whether to honor his wishes 
   and forego the treatment, or to force the treatment on him for his 
   own good. On the other hand, if the patient's condition reached the 
   point where the family felt that the doctor's treatment was futile, 
   unaffordable, or otherwise no longer appropriate, it could dismiss 
   the doctor and attempt treatment on its own, doing whatever was 
   within its ability to offer moral support to the patient and 
   alleviate his pain and discomfort while waiting for factors beyond 
   its control -- such as the patient's present and past kamma -- to 
   decide the outcome of the disease.
     
     The principal ethical constraints on this arrangement, ancient 
   medical textbooks show, were that doctors should not use their 
   knowledge to aggravate or prolong illness -- to do so would count as 
   malpractice -- and that no one should subject a patient to treatment 
   designed to bring on death faster than it would if the disease were 
   simply allowed to run its course: To defy this principle would count 
   as murder.
     
     This, in brief, was the accepted pattern for medical care in the 
   Buddha's time. The only change the Buddha introduced to the pattern 
   was to point out to the bhikkhus that, as they had no family to care 
   for them, they were to take on the role of family for one another. 
   If a bhikkhu falls ill, it is automatically the duty of his mentor, 
   his students (if he has any), or fellow students of his mentor to 
   care for him. These people are to stay with the patient until he 
   either recovers or dies -- although the Commentary to Mv.I.25.24 
   points out that they may leave him if they put him into the care of 
   another. If a bhikkhu happens to fall ill in a place where none of 
   these people are available, it is the duty of the Community in that 
   location to care for him. If it doesn't care for him, all the 
   members of that Community incur a dukkata (MV.VIII.26.3-4).
     
     The Mahavagga contains guidelines for the ill bhikkhu and his 
   nurses to follow, so that the ill bhikkhu will be easy to care for, 
   and the nurses will be chosen from among those best suited to the 
   task. The ill bhikkhu ideally avoids any food, medicine, or activity 
   that would aggravate his disease; he knows moderation in the things 
   that will be conducive to his recovery; he takes his medicine; he 
   reports to the nurse his condition as it actually is; and does his 
   best to endure his pain (Mv.VIII.26.5).
     
     The nurse ideally is one who knows how to prepare the proper 
   medicines; knows what is conducive and unconducive to the patient's 
   recovery; provides the patient with what is conducive and removes 
   what is not; tends the patient out of kindness, and not from hope of 
   gain; is not squeamish about cleaning up urine, excrement, sweat, or 
   vomit; and is competent at encouraging the patient at the 
   appropriate times with a talk on Dhamma (Mv.VIII.26.5).
     
     There is no offense for a patient who does not live up to the 
   ideal guidelines for his behavior; and none for a bhikkhu who, 
   though lacking any of the ideal qualities of nurse, is pressed into 
   a position where he must care for the sick. The only penalties 
   mentioned in the Khandhakas are the dukkatas for those who neglect 
   to care for the ill when they are duty-bound to do so or who abandon 
   an ill person they are caring for before he recovers or dies.
     
     The Vinita Vatthu to this rule contains only two basic cases in 
   which a bhikkhu acting as a nurse for an ill friend incurs a 
   parajika: one in which the friend dies after the bhikkhu gives him a 
   specific treatment with the purpose of killing him off; and one in 
   which the bhikkhu, feeling pity for a friend in severe pain, praises 
   the pleasures that await him after death so that he will give up the 
   will to live and speed up his death: The friend does so and dies as 
   a result of the nurse's instigation.
     
     Aside from the parajikas for such cases of out-and-out murderous 
   action and intent, and the dukkatas for leaving the patient 
   helpless, the Canon imposes no penalties on a bhikkhu acting as 
   nurse who provides his patient with less than ideal care. Instead, 
   within the parameters of those penalties, it offers guidelines for 
   ideal behavior, together with the encouragement of the Buddha's 
   remark that, "He who would tend to me should tend to the sick." 
   (Mv.VIII.26.3) From there it leaves it up to the bhikkhu to exercise 
   his best judgment, in light of the Dhamma, as to what is most 
   fitting in his individual case.
     
     A moment's reflection will suggest some obvious reasons for this. 
   If a particular standard of care were mandated, it would give rise 
   to countless questions stemming from the many uncontrollable 
   variables that can surround an illness, questions that rules are 
   ill-suited to answer: How much must one's resources be depleted 
   before one can say that a particular type of care is unaffordable? 
   How should limited resources be allocated when several bhikkhus fall 
   sick at the same time? What should one do if the patient says that 
   he does not want to undergo a treatment that a doctor is trying to 
   press on him? If one follows the patient's request is he assisting a 
   suicide? Should one follow the doctor's orders and thus risk 
   damaging the patient's psychological state? The list of questions 
   could go on, but it is obvious from even these examples that this is 
   an area less suited for rules than for guidelines that can be 
   adapted to suit particular circumstances. Decisions here should be 
   based on a reasoned and compassionate assessment of the particular 
   situation, rather than on fear of hard and fast penalties and rules.
     
     The commentaries' treatment of the issue of a nurse's 
   accountability follows the same general pattern as the Canon's, but 
   we find Buddhaghosa's works -- probably following the ancient 
   commentaries -- bringing a little more precision to the discussion 
   by introducing a distinction between //timely// and //untimely// 
   death that the Commentary applies to the Vinita Vatthu cases. The 
   distinction comes from Ayurveda -- ancient Indian medical science -- 
   although Buddhaghosa expresses it in purely Buddhist terms, most 
   fully in the Visuddhi Magga:
   
       "//Timely death// comes about with the exhaustion of merit, 
       with the exhaustion of life potential (//ayu//), or with 
       both. //Untimely death// comes about through kamma that 
       interrupts [other, life-producing,] kamma.
       
       "//Death through exhaustion of merit//, here, refers to the 
       death that comes about entirely through the finished 
       ripening of [former] rebirth-producing kamma even when 
       favorable conditions for prolonging the continuity of the 
       life potential may still be present. //Death through 
       exhaustion of life potential// refers to the death that 
       comes about through the exhaustion of the natural life 
       potential of human beings, which amounts to only 100 
       years....
       
       "//Untimely death// refers to the death of those whose 
       continuity is interrupted by kamma capable of causing them 
       to fall from their place [on a particular level of being] at 
       that very moment...or for the death of those whose 
       continuity is interrupted by attacks with weapons, etc., due 
       to previous kamma. All these are included under the [term] 
       //interruption of the life faculty....//" (VIII.2-3)
   
     As we saw above, the Commentary's discussion of //cutting off the 
   life faculty// refers specifically to instances where one is 
   bringing about an untimely death. When it applies this point to the 
   case of the bhikkhu inciting his patient to give up the will to 
   live, it notes that the bhikkhu incurs a parajika if his act causes 
   the patient to cut short his/her life even by a moment through such 
   things as refusing to eat, etc. However, if the patient, not acting 
   on the bhikkhu's comments, simply dies in line with his/her natural 
   life potential and continuity, there is no offense.
   
     It is important to note that the Commentary does not at any point 
   use the distinction of timely and untimely death to make a case that 
   mere negligence could be the cause of an untimely demise. Instead, 
   it restricts its use of "untimely death" to cases where the nurse's 
   care causes the patient to die earlier than he would have in the 
   absence of care.
     
     From this point of view it is easy to see that the decision not to 
   have the patient undergo a particular death-delaying treatment would 
   not count as an offense, for such a decision would do nothing to 
   speed up the approach of a timely death. In terms of the factor of 
   effort under this rule, it would count as inaction and thus not 
   fulfill the factor. Thus if a bhikkhu sees that his patient is dying 
   and -- for reasons of the expense, the trauma, or the patient's own 
   wishes -- opts against having him undergo an operation that would 
   merely delay death, there is no grounds for offense.
     
     In situations where the choice is not between action and inaction, 
   but between different courses of action, the Commentary's 
   distinction is helpful in gauging one's //perceptions// and 
   //intentions// when choosing among treatments. If a bhikkhu caring 
   for a terminally ill patient opts for an alternative, such as a 
   strong pain-killer, in hopes that it will weaken the patient's 
   system and make him die faster than he would otherwise, his aim 
   would fulfill the factor of intention under this rule. But if he is 
   presented with a number of alternatives and believes that none of 
   them would make the patient die before he would without any 
   treatment, he may choose any of them because neither the perception 
   nor the intention of bringing on an untimely death would enter into 
   his decision. Even if it turns out later that the treatment was 
   instrumental in bringing on the patient's death, the nurse would 
   still be without blame.
     
     It may seem that the Vinaya is leaving the patient in an 
   unprotected position here, but we must remember that this is an area 
   where the Dhamma takes precedence over the Vinaya in providing the 
   nurse with guidance. Even a nodding acquaintance with the principle 
   of kamma should be enough to prevent the nurse from being callous in 
   his decisions. Even a modicum of maturity will make him realize that 
   the role of nurse provides an excellent opportunity to gain insight 
   into illness as a natural part of life, as well as training in such 
   valuable qualities as compassion, patience, mindfulness, strength, 
   sacrifice, and sensitivity to the needs of others.
     
     As we noted in the Introduction, rules and standards serve 
   different purposes and are suited to different situations. The 
   authors of the texts, after using rules against murderous 
   malpractice and abandonment to delimit this area, were wise to 
   sketch in the remaining territory with standards aimed at inspiring 
   the best behavior in the nurse and his patient by appealing to their 
   higher side.
     
     Special cases. The Vinita Vatthu includes three special cases that 
   touch on this rule but inspired the Buddha to formulate separate 
   rules to deal specifically with them:
     
     A bhikkhu, for the fun of it, throws a stone from a precipice and 
   accidentally kills a person standing below -- no penalty for the 
   death, but a dukkata for throwing a stone from a precipice in fun.
     
     A bhikkhu, hoping to commit suicide, throws himself over a cliff. 
   Instead of dying, he lands on and kills a hapless basket-maker 
   standing at the foot of the cliff -- again, no offense for the 
   death, but a dukkata for throwing oneself from a high place.
     
     A bhikkhu, sitting down hard on a chair without first checking it 
   carefully, kills a child lying in the chair and covered with a 
   blanket -- again, no penalty for the death, but a dukkata for 
   sitting down without first checking carefully.
   
       Summary: Intentionally bringing about the untimely death of 
       a human being, even if it is still a fetus, is a parajika 
       offense.
                                 * * *
   
   
   
       4. Should any bhikkhu, without direct knowledge, boast of a 
       superior human state, a truly noble knowledge and vision as 
       present in himself, saying, "Thus do I know; thus do I see," 
       such that regardless of whether or not he is cross-examined 
       on a later occasion, he -- being remorseful and desirous of 
       purification -- might say, "Friends, not knowing, I said I 
       know; not seeing, I said I see -- vainly, falsely, idly," 
       unless it was from over-estimation, he also is defeated and 
       no longer in communion.
   
     All conscious lies are forbidden by the first pacittiya rule, but 
   knowingly to make a false claim to a superior human state is the 
   most heinous lie a bhikkhu can tell, and so here it receives its own 
   rule and the heaviest possible penalty.
     
     The seriousness with which the Buddha regarded a breach of this 
   training rule is indicated by his statements to the original 
   instigators:
     
     "You misguided men, how can you for the sake of your stomachs 
   speak praise of one another's superior human states to householders? 
   It would be better for you that your bellies be slashed open with a 
   sharp butcher's knife than that you should for the sake of your 
   stomachs speak praise of one another's superior human states to 
   householders. Why is that? For //that// reason you would undergo 
   death or death-like suffering, but you would not on that account, at 
   the break-up of the body, after death, fall into deprivation, the 
   bad bourn, the abyss, purgatory. But for //this// reason you would, 
   at the break-up of the body, after death, fall into deprivation, the 
   bad bourn, the abyss, purgatory....Bhikkhus, in this world with its 
   gods, maras, and brahmas, its generations with priests and 
   contemplatives, princes and men, this is the ultimate great thief: 
   he who claims an unfactual, non-existent superior human state. Why 
   is that? You have consumed the nation's almsfood through theft."
     
     Superior human states. The Vibhanga lists a large number of 
   superior human states that the Commentary classifies into two broad 
   categories: //mahaggata dhamma//, those related to the practice of 
   meditative absorption; and //lokuttara dhamma//, those related to 
   the absolute eradication of the mental fetters that bind the mind to 
   the cycle of rebirth.
   
     a. Meditative absorption -- the Pali term is //jhana// -- is of 
   two major sorts: absorption in a physical object or sensation 
   (//rupa jhana//) and absorption in a non-physical object or 
   sensation (//arupa jhana//). Both contain four levels and are 
   described in the discourses as follows:
     
       "The bhikkhu -- quite withdrawn from sensual pleasure, 
       withdrawn from unskillful (mental) qualities -- enters and 
       remains in the //first jhana//: rapture and pleasure born 
       from withdrawal, accompanied by directed thought and 
       evaluation. He permeates and pervades, suffuses and fills 
       this very body with the rapture and pleasure born from 
       withdrawal....
       
       "And furthermore, with the stilling of directed thought and 
       evaluation, he enters and remains in the //second jhana//: 
       rapture and pleasure born of composure, unity of awareness 
       free from directed thought and evaluation -- internal 
       assurance. He permeates and pervades, suffuses and fills 
       this very body with the rapture and pleasure born of 
       composure....
       
       "And furthermore, with the fading of rapture, he remains in 
       equanimity, mindful and fully aware, and physically 
       sensitive of pleasure. He enters and remains in the //third 
       jhana//, and of him the Noble Ones declare, 'Equanimous and 
       mindful, he has a pleasurable abiding.' He permeates and 
       pervades, suffuses and fills this very body with the 
       pleasure divested of rapture....
       
       "And furthermore, with the abandoning of pleasure and pain 
       -- as with the earlier disappearance of elation and distress 
       -- he enters and remains in the //fourth jhana//: purity of 
       equanimity and mindfulness, neither pleasure nor pain. He 
       sits permeating the body with a pure, bright awareness, so 
       that nothing of his entire body is unpervaded by pure, 
       bright awareness." (D.2; M.119)
     
     The four levels of arupa jhana are based on the fourth level of 
   rupa jhana.
     
       "With the complete transcending of perceptions of (physical) 
       form, and the passing away of perceptions of resistance, and 
       not heeding perceptions of diversity, thinking, 'Infinite 
       space,' one enters and remains in the sphere of the 
       infinitude of space....
       
       "With the complete transcending of the sphere of the 
       infinitude of space, thinking, 'Infinite consciousness,' one 
       enters and remains in the sphere of the infinitude of 
       consciousness....
       
       "With the complete transcending of the sphere of the 
       infinitude of consciousness, thinking, 'There is nothing,' 
       one enters and remains in the sphere of nothingness....
       
       "With the complete transcending of the sphere of 
       nothingness, one enters and remains in the sphere of neither 
       perception nor non-perception." (D.15)
   
     The Vibhanga mentions only the four rupa jhanas in its list of 
   superior human states, but as the four arupa jhanas are based on the 
   fourth rupa jhana, the Commentary includes them in the list as well.
     
     In addition to these states of absorption themselves, the category 
   of mahaggata dhamma also includes the intuitive powers (//abhinna//) 
   that can arise from them:
     
     //iddhividhi// -- the ability to manifest one or more images of 
   oneself, to appear in a different bodily form, to create a 
   "mind-made" (astral) body, to pass through solid matter, walk on 
   water, levitate, etc.
     
     //dibba-sota// -- clairaudience, enabling one to hear sounds both 
   celestial and human, far and near.
     
     //cetopariya-nana// -- the ability to read the minds of other 
   living beings.
     
     //dibba-cakkhu// -- clairvoyance, the ability to see beings in 
   other realms of existence, and in particular to see them pass from 
   death in one level to rebirth in another.
     
     //pubbe-nivasanussati-nana// -- the ability to remember previous 
   lives.
     
     There are other occult abilities that are not based on jhana and 
   for this reason do not count as mahaggata dhamma: such things as 
   divination, giving protective charms, casting malevolent spells, 
   psychic healing, practicing as a medium, etc. The discourses list 
   these and other similar activities as //tiracchana-vijja//, bestial 
   knowledge, which -- as the name implies -- is far removed from 
   superior human states.
     
     b. //Lokuttara dhamma//, in its fullest sense, refers to the 
   series of mental states, called paths and fruitions, in which the 
   fetters that bind the mind to the cycle of rebirth are eradicated; 
   and to the ultimate state of //nibbana//, or liberation.
     
     The paths and fruitions occur in four pairs. In the first pair, 
   the path to and fruition of stream-entry, three fetters are 
   abandoned: self-identity views (//sakkaya-ditthi//), uncertainty 
   (//vicikiccha//), and attachment to precepts and practices 
   (//silabbata-paramasa//). In the second pair, the path to and 
   fruition of once-returning, two additional fetters -- sensual 
   passion (//kama-raga//) and irritation (//patigha//) are weakened, 
   only to be abandoned fully in the third pair, the path to and 
   fruition of non-returning. In the fourth pair, the path to and 
   fruition of arahantship, a final set of five additional fetters is 
   abandoned: //rupa-raga// -- passion for physical phenomena (e.g., 
   the objects of rupa jhana); //arupa-raga// -- passion for 
   non-physical phenomena (e.g., the objects of arupa jhana); //mana// 
   -- conceit; //uddhacca// -- restlessness; and //avijja// -- 
   unawareness. With the cutting of this last set of fetters, all bonds 
   with the cycle of rebirth are cut for good, and the mind attains 
   nibbana.
     
     The term //nibbana// literally means extinguishing, like a fire. 
   The commentarial literature (Vism.VIII,247), derives the word 
   etymologically from //nir//, a negative prefix, and //vana//, 
   binding. Thus it means unbinding or liberation. In the physics of 
   the Buddha's time, fire as it burned was said to be in a state of 
   agitation, dependence, attachment, and entrapment -- both clinging 
   to and being trapped by its sustenance. Extinguished, it was said to 
   become calm, independent, and unattached. It let go of its 
   sustenance and was released. In the mind's extinguishing, or 
   unbinding, a parallel change occurs.
     
     Nibbana is one; the paths and their fruitions, eight. Thus there 
   are nine lokuttara dhammas.
     
     Aside from jhana, the other states mentioned in the Vibhanga -- 
   such as the destruction of the mental effluents (//asava//), the 
   signless emancipation, the desireless emancipation, the emptiness 
   emancipation, and so forth -- are either synonymous with these 
   transcendent states or -- as in the case of the "wings" to Awakening 
   (//bodhi-pakkhiya-dhamma//) -- conjoined with them.
     
     The full offense under this rule has five factors:
   
     1) //Effort//: One makes a direct claim
     2) //Object//: to a superior human state
     3) //Perception//: that one perceives as not present in oneself.
     4) //Intention//: One's intention is to misrepresent the truth.
     5) //Result//: One's listener understands what one is saying.
     
     
     Effort. To make a direct claim means to say outright that one has 
   attained a superior human state, saying such things as, "I have 
   attained the first jhana," "I have seen the heavenly realms," "I 
   know my previous lifetimes," etc. Outright claims, here, include not 
   only spoken statements, but also written statements and physical 
   gestures. An example of a claim by gesture occurs in the Vibhanga: A 
   group of bhikkhus make an agreement that the first to set out from 
   their dwelling would, by that very gesture, be known to the rest as 
   an arahant. One of the group, who was not an arahant but wanted to 
   be regarded as one, set out first from the dwelling and was soon 
   known to the rest as an ex-bhikkhu from having committed a parajika.
     
     //Indirect claims//. An indirect claim to a superior human state 
   is not grounds for a parajika. If it is a deliberate lie, it is at 
   most grounds for a thullaccaya. Such claims, which contain an 
   uncertainty in their wording even though the listener may feel no 
   uncertainty in understanding their import, may be uncertain in one 
   of two ways: uncertain as to the person and uncertain as to the 
   attainment.
     
     The Vinita Vatthu contains several examples of the first sort: a 
   bhikkhu states that whoever lives in a particular dwelling is an 
   arahant, the dwelling being the one where he lives; a bhikkhu saying 
   that all the disciples of his teacher are arahants, and so forth.
     
     There is only one example in the Vinita Vatthu of a bhikkhu who 
   makes a claim "uncertain as to the attainment": a sick bhikkhu, 
   meaning to deceive the fellow bhikkhus nursing him, says to them, 
   "There is no way that this sickness could be endured by an ordinary 
   person (//puthujjana//)."
     
     According to the Commentary, if the person to whom such indirect 
   remarks are directed understands them, the penalty for the speaker 
   is a thullaccaya. If he/she does not understand them, the penalty is 
   a dukkata. The factor of understanding is covered in the section on 
   "Result," below.
     
     //Claims about other people//. The original instigators of this 
   rule, instead of each making claims about his own attainments, made 
   false claims about one another's attainments. This case is not 
   mentioned in the Vibhanga or the commentaries and so is not an 
   offense under this rule, but it would come under Pacittiya 1.
     
     Perception. Claiming a superior human state that one mistakenly 
   thinks one has achieved is no offense under this rule, although if 
   addressed to a lay person the claim would come under Pacittiya 8. 
   The same holds for a claim that is actually true.
     
     If, however, a bhikkhu has attained a superior human state without 
   realizing it and then claims to have attained the state, thinking 
   his statement to be a lie, he commits the full offense under this 
   rule.
     
     Intention. To fall under this rule, a claim to have attained any 
   of these superior human states must be a deliberate lie. "Deliberate 
   lying," according to the Commentary, requires the arising of the 
   intention to misrepresent the truth just prior to, and motivating, 
   the actual statement. When the intention to misrepresent the truth 
   is absent, the statement does not come under this rule. Examples 
   would include --
     
       meaning to say one thing, but accidentally saying another 
       that comes out as a claim to a superior human state; and
       
       innocently making a statement that someone else misconstrues 
       to be a claim to a superior human state.
     
   Neither of these cases would involve an offense.
     
     //Equivocation//. It is not uncommon for a bhikkhu to be put on 
   the spot by lay people asking him point-blank about his attainments, 
   and for him to respond by equivocating. The Vinita Vatthu contains a 
   number of examples of this sort. In one of them, the bhikkhu 
   responds by saying, "I have attained a state attainable through the 
   exertion of effort," which of course could mean almost anything. 
   Because his purpose was simply to avoid the question, he incurred no 
   penalty. Had he meant the statement as an indirect claim, he would 
   have incurred a thullaccaya.
     
     Result. The Vibhanga, in discussing an obscure case, states that 
   when the listener understands a deliberate lie directly claiming a 
   superior human state, the bhikkhu making the claim incurs a 
   parajika. If the listener does not understand, the bhikkhu incurs a 
   thullaccaya. The Vibhanga mentions this condition only in the 
   context of a peculiar lie -- one in which the speaker intends to lie 
   saying one thing but actually states another lie -- but the 
   Commentary generalizes from this case to say that this condition 
   applies to //all// cases covered by this rule. Its explanations run 
   as follows:
     
     //Understanding//, here, means simply that the listener hears the 
   statement clearly enough to know that it is a claim. Whether he/she 
   understands the names for the states claimed -- jhana, clairvoyance, 
   clairaudience, or whatever -- is not an issue here. The same is true 
   of whether he/she believes the statement to be true or false. If the 
   listener to whom the remarks are directed does not understand them, 
   but a passer-by does, the penalty is still a parajika.
     
     If the listener does not hear the bhikkhu clearly enough to catch 
   all he says, the penalty is a thullaccaya. If the listener at first 
   has some doubt as to what the bhikkhu said, but later realizes that 
   it was a claim to a superior human state, the offense is still a 
   thullaccaya. If the listener does not hear the bhikkhu at all, the 
   offense is a dukkata.
     
     As stated above, if a bhikkhu states a deliberate lie in the form 
   of an indirect claim to a superior human state, he incurs a 
   thullaccaya if his listener understands that it is a claim, and a 
   dukkata if not.
     
     According to the Vibhanga, there is a dukkata for a bhikkhu 
   sitting in solitude who states a deliberate lie directly claiming a 
   superior human state, and another dukkata if he is overheard by a 
   devata. The Commentary adds that the same penalty applies if he is 
   overheard by a non-human being or a common animal.
     
     //Thus, to entail a parajika, the claim to a superior human state 
   must be a direct claim, a deliberate lie, and must be heard and 
   quickly understood by another human being//.
   
   
   Special cases in the Vibhanga:
   
     A bhikkhu, intending to make a false claim for one superior human 
   state, muddles his words and claims another: a parajika. The 
   Commentary explains this by noting that all the factors necessary 
   for a parajika offense are present: The bhikkhu makes a claim based 
   on the intention to tell a deliberate lie, and the listener 
   understands the claim. The fact that the intended claim and actual 
   claim are both superior human states is crucial; the fact that they 
   are different states is not.
     
     In a series of cases, a person speaking with exaggerated faith or 
   politeness addresses bhikkhus of no particular attainments as if 
   they were arahants ("May the arahants come....May the arahants be 
   seated"). This puts them in a quandary, and so they ask the Buddha 
   how to behave in such a situation. His response: There is no offense 
   in accepting invitations such as these from a "speaker with faith" 
   -- the point being that there is no offense in coming, sitting, 
   etc., as long as the intention is just to accept the invitation and 
   not to imply a claim.
     
     A bhikkhu, hoping that people will esteem him, engages in special 
   practices -- the example given in the Vinita Vatthu is living in the 
   jungle, but from it we can extrapolate to other practices such as 
   long periods of sitting, any of the ascetic (//dhutanga//) 
   practices, vegetarianism, etc., followed so as to impress other 
   people. The penalty: a dukkata.
   
       Summary: Deliberately lying to another person that one has 
       attained a superior human state is a parajika offense.
   
                                 * * *
   
   
   
     A bhikkhu who violates any of these four parajika rules is 
   automatically no longer a bhikkhu. There is no need for him to go 
   through a formal ceremony of disrobing, for the act of violating the 
   rule is an act of disrobing in and of itself. Even if he continues 
   to pretend to be a bhikkhu, he does not really count as one; as soon 
   as the facts are known he must be expelled from the Sangha. He can 
   never again properly ordain as a bhikkhu in this life. If he tries 
   to ordain in a Community that does not know of his offense, his 
   ordination does not count, and he must be expelled as soon as the 
   truth is found out.
     
     The Commentary, however, states that such an offender may "go 
   forth" as a novice if he wants to, although it is up to the 
   individual Community to consider the circumstances of his offense to 
   decide whether or not it wants to accept him.
     
     Ignorance of these rules does not exempt an offender from the 
   penalty, which is why the Buddha ordered that they be taught to each 
   new bhikkhu as soon as possible after ordination (Mv.I.77). Because 
   the rules cover a number of cases that are legal in presentday 
   society (e.g., recommending abortion, proving to oneself how supple 
   one has become through yoga by inserting one's penis in one's mouth) 
   or that are common practice among people who see nothing wrong with 
   flirting with the edges of the law (e.g., copying computer software 
   for a friend, hiding an article subject to customs duties when 
   entering a country), it is especially important to inform each new 
   bhikkhu of the rules' full implications right from the very start.
     
     If a bhikkhu suspects that he has committed a parajika, he should 
   immediately inform a senior bhikkhu well-versed in the rules. The 
   way the senior bhikkhu should handle the case is well-illustrated by 
   a incident reported in the Commentary to Parajika 2: Once a king 
   together with an enormous crowd came to worship the Great Stupa at a 
   certain monastery. One of the crowd was a visiting bhikkhu from the 
   South who was carrying an expensive roll of cloth. The commotion of 
   the event was so great that the bhikkhu dropped the cloth, was 
   unable to retrieve it and soon gave it up for lost. One of the 
   resident bhikkhus happened to come across it and, desiring to steal 
   it, quickly put it away before the owner might see it. Eventually, 
   of course, he became tormented by guilt and went to the resident 
   Vinaya expert to admit a parajika and disrobe.
     
     The Vinaya expert, though, wouldn't let him disrobe until he had 
   found the owner of the cloth and inquired about it more fully. 
   Eventually, after a long search, he was able to track down the 
   original owner at a monastery in the distant South, who told him 
   that at the time of the theft he had given the cloth up for lost and 
   had abandoned all mental attachment for it. Thus, as the cloth was 
   ownerless, the resident bhikkhu had incurred not a parajika, but 
   simply some dukkatas for the preliminary efforts with intention to 
   steal.
     
     This example shows several things: the great thoroughness with 
   which a senior bhikkhu should investigate a possible parajika, the 
   compassion he should show to the offender, and the fact that the 
   offender should be given the benefit of the doubt wherever possible: 
   He is innocent until the facts prove him guilty.
     
     Finally, the Commentary concludes its discussion of the parajikas 
   by noticing that there are altogether 24, actual and virtual, in the 
   Vinaya. They are:
   
     The four for bhikkhus.
     
     The four additional parajikas for bhikkhunis.
     
     The eleven disqualified types who should not be ordained in the 
   first place. If they happen to be ordained, their ordination does 
   not count, and once they are found out they must be expelled for 
   life (Mv.I.61-68). Thus they are virtual parajikas. They are --
     
     a pandaka (essentially, a eunuch or a person born neuter -- see 
       Sanghadisesa 2),
     a "non-human" being, such as a naga or yakkha, that can assume 
       human form,
     a hermaphrodite,
     a person who poses as a bhikkhu without having been ordained,
     a bhikkhu who has ordained in another sect or religion without 
       first giving up his status as a bhikkhu;
     a person who has murdered his father,
     a person who has murdered his mother,
     a person who has murdered an arahant,
     a person who has sexually violated a bhikkhuni,
     a person who has injured a Buddha to the point of causing him to 
       bleed,
     a person who has caused a schism in the Sangha.
     
     In addition to the above actual and virtual parajikas, the 
   Commentary gives separate listing to the four //anulomika// 
   (derived) parajikas, which refer to four cases included under 
   Parajika 1: the bhikkhu with a supple back who sticks his penis in 
   his mouth, the bhikkhu with a long penis who inserts it into his 
   anus, the bhikkhu who performs oral intercourse with someone else, 
   and the bhikkhu who receives anal intercourse.
     
     The 24th Parajika refers to the case of a bhikkhuni who, taking up 
   the role of a housewife, goes to live in a lay person's household.
   
                             * * * * * * *
