                                           
                                           
                                           
                                           
                             CHAPTER EIGHT
                                           
                               Pacittiya
                               ~~~~~~~~~
                                           
                                           
   As explained in the preceding chapter, this term is most probably 
   related to the verb //pacinati//, "to know," and means "to be made 
   known" or "to be confessed."  There are 92 rules in this category, 
   divided into eight chapters of ten each, and one of twelve.
   
   
   
   
                                           
                       Part One:  The Lie Chapter
                       ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
   
   
       1.  A deliberate lie is to be confessed.
   
       "Now at that time Hatthaka the Sakyan had been overthrown in 
       debate.  In discussions with adherents of other sects, he 
       acknowledged points after having denied them, denied points 
       after having acknowledged them, evaded one question with 
       another, told deliberate lies, made an appointment (for a 
       debate) but then didn't keep it.  The adherents of other 
       sects were offended and annoyed and spread it about.... 
       
       "The bhikkhus heard them...and having approached Hatthaka 
       the Sakyan, asked him:  'Is it true, friend Hatthaka, that 
       in discussions with adherents of other sects, you 
       acknowledged points after having denied them, denied points 
       after having acknowledged them, evaded one question with 
       another, told deliberate lies, made an appointment (for a 
       debate) but then didn't keep it?'
       
       "'Those adherents of other sects have to be beaten in 
       //some// way or another.  You can't just give them the 
       victory!'"
       
     A deliberate lie is a statement or gesture made with the purpose 
   of misrepresenting the truth to someone else.  According to the 
   K/Commentary, a violation of this rule requires two factors:
   
     1) //Intention//:  the intention to misrepresent the truth; and
     
     2) //Effort//:  the effort to make another individual know 
       whatever one wants to communicate based on that intent.
     
     Intention.  The desire to misrepresent the truth fulfills this 
   factor regardless of what one's motives are.  Thus "white lies," 
   lies made with benevolent intentions (e.g., to a person whose state 
   of mind is too weak to take the truth), and outrageous lies meant as 
   jokes -- to amuse rather than deceive -- would all fall under this 
   rule.  
     
     For this reason, a bhikkhu who wants to shield an emotionally weak 
   person from harsh truths has to be very skillful in phrasing his 
   statements.  And any bhikkhu with an active sense of humor should be 
   careful about how he expresses it, bearing in mind a famous passage 
   from M.61:  The Buddha shows an empty water dipper to Rahula, his 
   son, telling him that anyone who feels no shame at uttering a 
   deliberate lie is as empty of the virtues of a contemplative as the 
   dipper is empty of water.  He then advises Rahula to train himself:  
   "I will not utter a deliberate lie, even for a laugh."
     
     Effort.  According to the Vibhanga, to misrepresent the truth 
   means to say that one has seen X when one hasn't, that one hasn't 
   seen X when one has, or that one has seen X clearly when one is in 
   doubt about the matter.  This pattern holds for the other senses -- 
   hearing, smell, taste, touch, and ideation -- as well.  Thus to 
   repeat what one has heard, seen, etc., even if it actually is 
   misinformation, does not count as a misrepresentation of the truth 
   under this rule, since one is truthfully reporting what one has 
   seen, etc.  If, however, one says that one believes in such 
   misinformation -- when one actually doesn't -- this  //would// count 
   as a misrepresentation of the truth, and so would fulfill this 
   factor.  
     
     According to the Commentary, effort here covers falsehoods 
   conveyed not only by speech but also by writing or gesture, as well 
   as the act of remaining silent in situations where silence would 
   convey a false message (as during the recitation of the Patimokkha, 
   where silence on the part of the listener indicates that he has no 
   unconfessed offenses).  
     
     Result is not a factor here.  Thus whether or not anyone 
   understands the lie or is deceived by it, is irrelevant to the 
   offense.
     
     In cases where a particular lie would fall under another rule -- 
   such as Parajika 4, Sanghadisesas 8 or 9, Pacittiya 13, 24, or 76 -- 
   the penalties assigned by that rule take precedence over the ones 
   assigned here.  For instance, making a false claim to a superior 
   human state and not being understood would entail a thullaccaya 
   under Parajika 4; falsely accusing another bhikkhu of a parajika 
   offense would entail a sanghadisesa under Sanghadisesa 8; falsely 
   accusing him of a sanghadisesa would entail a pacittiya under 
   Pacittiya 76; and falsely accusing him of a lesser offense would 
   entail a dukkata under that rule.  
     
     The Vinaya Mukha argues that this rule should take precedence in 
   cases where a particular lie would entail only a dukkata under any 
   of the other rules -- as in the last example -- but this contradicts 
   the Vibhanga.
     
     Non-offenses.  A bhikkhu who misrepresents the truth 
   unintentionally commits no offense under this rule.  The Vibhanga 
   gives two examples -- speaking quickly and saying one thing while 
   meaning another -- and the Commentary explains them as follows:  
   //Speaking quickly// means speaking before one has carefully 
   considered the matter.  //Saying one thing while meaning another// 
   means making a slip of the tongue, either out of stupidity or 
   carelessness.  And, as we noted above, a bhikkhu who speaks from 
   mistaken assumptions -- truthfully reporting any mistaken 
   information he may have received or mistaken beliefs he may have 
   thought up -- does not come under this rule. 
     
     Broken promises. The Mahavagga (III.14.1-14) imposes a dukkata on 
   the act of making a promise with pure intentions but later breaking 
   it.  Since the texts make no mention of any circumstances beyond 
   one's control that would exempt one from that penalty, a bhikkhu 
   should be very careful of how he states his plans for the future.  A 
   special instance of breaking a promise -- accepting an invitation to 
   a meal but then not going -- is treated under Pacittiya 33.
   
       Summary: The intentional effort to misrepresent the truth to 
       another individual is a pacittiya offense.
   
   
                                 * * *
   
   
   
       2.An insult is to be confessed.
   
   An insult is a gesture or statement, written or spoken, made with 
   the malicious intent of hurting another person's feelings or of 
   bringing him/her into disgrace.  The Vibhanga analyzes the full 
   offense under this rule in terms of three factors: 
   
     1) //Effort//:  One insults a person directly to his face, 
       touching on any one of the 10 topics for abuse 
       (//akkosa-vatthu//) discussed below.
     
     2) //Object//:  The person is a bhikkhu.
     
     3) //Intention//:  One wants to humiliate him for malicious 
       reasons. 
   
     Effort.  The Vibhanga lists ten ways a verbal insult can be  
   phrased:  making remarks about the other person's 
   
      //race, class, or nationality// (You nigger!  You bum!  You 
       Jew!);
      //name// (You really are a Dick!);
      //family or lineage// (You bastard!  You son of a bitch!);
      //occupation// (You pimp!  You capitalist pig!);
      //craft// (What would you expect from a guy who crochets?);
      //disease or handicap// (Hey, Clubfoot!  Spastic!);
      //physical characteristics// (Hey, Fatty!  Beanpole!  Shrimp! 
       Hulk!);
      //defilements// (You control freak!  Fool!  Queer!  Breeder!);
      //offenses or attainments// (Some stream-winner //you// are!     
       You liar!  You thief!); or 
      //using an abusive form of address//, such as, "You camel! You   
       goat! You ass!  You penis!  You vagina!" (%)  (All five   of 
       these come from the Vibhanga.)
   
     These ten topics are called the //akkosa-vatthu// -- topics for 
   abuse -- and appear in the following training rule as well.  
     
     As the examples in the Vibhanga show, the remark that fulfills the 
   factor of effort here must touch on one of these topics for abuse 
   and must be made directly to the listener:  "You are X."  It may be 
   phrased either as sarcastic praise or as out-and-out abuse.  The 
   Commentary and Sub-commentary say that any insulting remark not 
   listed in the Vibhanga would only be grounds for a dukkata, but the 
   Vibhanga defines the topics for abuse in such a way that //any// 
   term related to them in any way would fulfill this factor here.  
     
     Remarks made in an indirect or insinuating manner, though, would 
   not fulfill this factor.  //Indirect remarks// are when the speaker 
   includes himself together with the target of his insult in his 
   statement ("We're all a bunch of fools.")  //Insinuating remarks// 
   are when he leaves it uncertain as to whom he is referring to  
   ("There are camels among us").  Any remark of this sort, if meant as 
   an insult, entails a dukkata regardless of whether the target is a 
   bhikkhu or not. 
     
     All of the insults mentioned in the Vibhanga take the form of 
   remarks about the person, whereas insults and verbal abuse at 
   present often take the form of command -- Go to hell!  F --  off! 
   etc. -- and the question is whether or not these too would be 
   covered by this rule.  Viewed from the standpoint of intent, they 
   fit under the general definition of an insult; but if for some 
   reason they would not fit under this rule, they would in most cases 
   be covered by Pacittiya 54.
     
     Insulting remarks made about someone behind his/her back are dealt 
   with under Pacittiya 13.
     
     Object.  This factor is fulfilled for the full offense only if the 
   target of one's insult is a bhikkhu.  To insult an unordained person 
   -- according to the Commentary, this runs the gamut from bhikkhunis 
   to all other living beings -- entails a dukkata.  
     
     Intent.  The Vibhanga defines this factor as "desiring to jeer at, 
   desiring to scoff at, desiring to shame."  If, with no insult 
   intended, a bhikkhu jokes about another person's race, etc., he 
   incurs a dubbhasita, regardless of whether the person is lay or 
   ordained, mentioned outright or insinuatingly, and regardless of 
   whether he/she takes it as a joke or an insult.  This is the only 
   instance of this class of offense.
     
     The K/Commentary adds result as a fourth factor -- the target of 
   one's insult knows, "He is insulting me" -- but there is no basis 
   for this in either the Vibhanga or the Commentary.  If one makes an 
   insulting remark under one's breath, not intending to be heard, or 
   in a foreign language, not intending to be understood, the intention 
   would be to let off steam, which would not qualify as the intention 
   covered by this rule.  If one truly wants to humiliate someone, one 
   will make the necessary effort to make that person hear and 
   understand one's words -- but if for some reason that person 
   //doesn't// hear or understand (a loud noise blots out one's words, 
   one uses a slang term that is new to one's listener), there is 
   nothing in the Vibhanga to indicate that one would escape from the 
   full penalty.
     
     For this reason, whether or not the person addressed actually 
   feels insulted by one's remarks is of no consequence in determining 
   the severity of the offense.  If one makes a remark to a fellow 
   bhikkhu, touching on one of the topics for abuse and meaning it as 
   an insult, one incurs a pacittiya even if he takes it as a joke.  If 
   one means the remark as a joke, one incurs a dubbhasita even if the 
   other person feels insulted. 
     
     Non-offenses.  According to the Vibhanga, a bhikkhu who mentions 
   another person's race, etc., commits no offense if he is "aiming at 
   Dhamma, aiming at his benefit, aiming at teaching."  The Commentary 
   illustrates this with a bhikkhu saying to a member of the 
   untouchable caste:  "You are an untouchable.  Don't do any evil.  
   Don't be a person born into misfortune and going on to misfortune."  
     
     Another example would be of a teacher who uses insulting language 
   to shame a stubborn disciple.  This would entail no offense if done 
   without malice, but one should be very sure of the purity of one's 
   motives and of the beneficial effect of one's words before using 
   language of this sort.  The Cullavagga (IX.5.2) states that a 
   bhikkhu is fit to reprove another bhikkhu only if he keeps five 
   points in mind: "I will speak at the right time and not at the wrong 
   time.  I will speak about what is factual and not about what is not 
   factual.  I will speak with gentleness and not with harshness.  I 
   will speak about what is connected with the goal and not about what 
   is not connected with the goal.  And I will speak with thoughts of 
   kindness and not with inner hatred."
   
       Summary: An insult made with malicious intent to another 
       bhikkhu is a pacittiya offense.   
   
   
                                 * * *
   
   
   
       3. Malicious tale-bearing among bhikkhus is to be confessed.
   
   Malicious tale-bearing is described in the Vibhanga as follows:  X 
   makes remarks about Y touching on his race, name, or any of the  
   other ten //akkosa-vatthu// listed in the explanation to the 
   preceding rule.  Z, hearing these remarks, goes to tell someone else 
   -- either W or Y himself -- in hopes of causing a rift between X and 
   his listener, or of winning favor with his listener in case there is 
   already a rift between the two.  For example:
   
     a) X calls Y a bastard behind his back.  Z tells Y, in hopes of 
       ingratiating himself with Y.
     
     b) X makes racist remarks about Y to his face.  Z knows that W is 
       a friend of Y and hates racists, and so tells W what X said, in 
       hopes of causing a rift between W and X.   
   
     Bhikkhu Z commits the full offense here when three factors are 
   fulfilled:  object, effort, and intent.
   
     1) //Object//:  Both Z's listener and X are bhikkhus; X has made 
   remarks about Y that qualify as a direct insult under the preceding 
   rule (or, if he didn't make them in Y's presence, remarks that would 
   have qualified as a direct insult had he done so).
     
     2) //Effort//:  Z reports X's remarks to his listener verbally or 
   by gesture (as in writing a letter),
     
     3) //Intent//:  with the intent of ingratiating himself with his 
   listener, or of causing a rift between his listener and X.
     
     The K/Commentary adds a fourth factor -- Z's listener understands 
   what he is saying -- but as with the previous rule, there is no 
   basis for this in the Vibhanga.
     
     Object.  If either X or Z's listener -- or both -- are not 
   bhikkhus, then the penalty for Z is a dukkata.  
     
     If X's remarks qualified only as an indirect insult under the 
   preceding rule -- e.g., he said with reference to Y that, "There are 
   asses among us" -- then Z incurs a dukkata if he reports them with 
   the intent to ingratiate himself or cause a rift, regardless of 
   whether his listener and/or X are bhikkhus or not.
     
     The Sub-commentary states that there is a dukkata for bearing 
   tales dealing with matters other than remarks about the ten 
   //akkosa-vatthu// -- i.e., telling Y about things said or done by X, 
   to make X appear in a bad light in hopes of winning favor or causing 
   a rift, although some cases of this sort would come under Pacittiya 
   13.
     
     Effort.  This rule is sometimes translated as dealing with slander 
   -- false tale-bearing -- but as the examples in the Vibhanga show, 
   it actually deals with true tale-bearing:  X really does say 
   insulting things about Y, and Z gives a true report.  The Vinaya 
   Mukha comments that if Z engages in false tale-bearing, then 
   regardless of whether or not X and Z's listener are bhikkhus, Z 
   incurs the full penalty under Pacittiya 1.
     
     Intent.  To give a true report of such matters with motives other 
   than those of winning favor or causing a rift entails no offense.  
   Examples of this would include:
   
     informing a senior bhikkhu when one bhikkhu has accused another of 
       a serious offense, so that an inquiry can be made for the sake of 
       harmony in the Community; or
     telling a senior bhikkhu about a student of his who is making 
       racist remarks, so that the senior bhikkhu can put a stop to it.
   
       Summary:  Tale-bearing among bhikkhus, in hopes of winning 
       favor or causing a rift, is a pacittiya offense.
   
   
   
                                 * * *
   
   
   
       4. Should any bhikkhu have an unordained person recite 
       Dhamma line by line (with him), it is to be confessed.
   
   This is an offense with two factors:
   
     1) //Effort//:  One gets a student to recite Dhamma line-by-line 
       with oneself (which, as we shall see below, means to train the 
       student to be a skilled reciter of a Pali Dhamma text).
     
     2) //Object//:  The student is neither a bhikkhu nor a bhikkhuni.
   
     Only the first factor needs explanation, and is best treated under 
   two headings:  Dhamma and reciting line-by-line.
   
     Dhamma the Vibhanga defines as "a saying made by the Buddha, his 
   disciples, seers, or heavenly beings, connected with the teaching or 
   connected with the goal."  The Commentary devotes a long discussion 
   to these terms, coming to the conclusion that //connected with the 
   Dhamma// refers to the Pali Canon -- in Pali, not in translation -- 
   as agreed on in the first three councils, while //connected with the 
   goal (attha)// refers to the Maha Atthakatha, the most revered 
   ancient commentary (only in its original Pali version, the 
   Sub-commentary says).  
     
     The ancient commentaries disagreed as to what other works would 
   fit under this category, but Buddhaghosa's conclusion seems to be 
   that -- in the //Milinda Panha//, for example -- Ven. Nagasena's 
   quotes of the Buddha's words would count, but not his own 
   formulations of the teaching, and the same principle holds for other 
   texts that quote the Buddha's words as well.  The ancient 
   commentaries are unanimous, though, in saying that "Dhamma" does 
   //not// cover the Mahayana sutras or compositions (this would 
   include translations) dealing with the Dhamma in languages other 
   than Pali.)  
     
     This interpretation, identifying "Dhamma" with particular Pali 
   texts, has caused no controversy in the context of this rule -- 
   although it seems unlikely that the compilers of the Vibhanga would 
   have had the commentaries in mind when they said, "connected with 
   the goal" -- but it //has// met with disagreement in the context of 
   Pacittiya 7, and so we will discuss it there in more detail. 
     
     Reciting line-by-line.  To make someone recite line by line means 
   to train him/her by rote to be a skilled reciter of a text.
     
     Bhikkhus in the days of the Buddha committed the teachings in the 
   Canon to memory so as to preserve them from generation to 
   generation.  Although writing was in use at the time -- mainly for 
   keeping accounts -- no one used it to record teachings either of the 
   Buddha or of any other religious teacher.  The Pali Canon was not 
   written down until approximately 500 years after the Buddha's 
   passing away, when repeated wars in Sri Lanka threatened its 
   survival.
     
     The Vibhanga lists four ways in which a person might be trained to 
   be a reciter of a text:
   
     1) The teacher and student recite in unison, i.e., beginning 
       together and ending together.
     2) The teacher begins a line, the student joins in, and they end 
       together.
     3) The teacher recites the beginning syllable of a line together 
       with the student, who then completes it alone.
     4) The teacher recites one line, and the student recites the next 
       line alone.
   
     Reciters of the Vedas still use these methods at present when 
   practicing their texts.
     
     The origin story states that the Buddha forbade these methods of 
   training unordained people because they caused the lay students to 
   feel disrespect for the bhikkhus.  The Vinaya Mukha explains this by 
   noting that if a teacher made a slip of the tongue while teaching in 
   this way, his students would look down on him for it.  If this were 
   the right explanation, though, the no-offense clauses would have 
   listed "proper" ways of training novices and lay people to recite 
   the Dhamma, but they don't.
     
     A more likely explanation is that at the time of the Buddha the 
   duty of memorizing and reciting the texts was considered the 
   province of the bhikkhus and bhikkhunis.  Although some lay people 
   memorized discourses (Mv.III.5.9), and bhikkhus of course taught the 
   Dhamma to lay people, there was apparently the feeling that to teach 
   non-ordainees to become skilled reciters of the texts was not good 
   for the relationship between bhikkhus and laity.  There are two 
   possible reasons for this:
   
     1) People may have felt that the bhikkhus were shirking their 
       responsibilities by trying to pass their duty off onto lay 
       people.
     
     2) The Brahmins at the time were very strict in not allowing 
       anyone outside their caste to memorize the Vedas, and their 
       example may have led lay people to feel disrespect for bhikkhus 
       who were not equally protective of their own tradition.
   
     At present, the entire Canon is available in print, and even 
   bhikkhus rarely commit it to memory, although they do frequently 
   memorize parts of it, such as the Patimokkha, the major discourses, 
   and other passages chanted on ceremonial occasions.  To train a lay 
   person or novice person to become skilled in reciting such teachings 
   by rote would entail the full penalty under this rule. 
     
     Perception and intent are not mitigating factors here.  Thus a 
   bhikkhu who trains a novice to recite a text in any of the ways 
   mentioned above -- on the assumption that the novice is a bhikkhu -- 
   incurs a pacittiya all the same.  The same holds true for a bhikkhu 
   training a mixed group of bhikkhus and novices, even if his 
   intention is to train only the bhikkhus in the group.       
     
     Non-offenses.  Since this rule is aimed at methods of teaching, 
   the Vibhanga states that there is no offense "for one made to recite 
   in unison." This, says the Commentary, refers to a young bhikkhu who 
   is told by his teacher to recite together with a novice who is the 
   teacher's student.  
     
     Also, there is no offense if a bhikkhu chants a passage in unison 
   with unordained people who have already memorized it.  The 
   Commentary extends this allowance to include cases of bhikkhus 
   learning a text from an unordained person, probably on the model of 
   the Itivuttaka, which -- according to its Commentary -- the bhikkhus 
   first learned from a servant woman who had memorized some of the 
   Buddha's teachings that the bhikkhus had overlooked.  
     
     Finally, there is no offense if a bhikkhu corrects an unordained 
   person who has memorized most of a passage or who is reciting in a 
   confused manner.
   
       Summary:  To train a novice or lay person to recite passages 
       of Dhamma by rote is a pacittiya offense.
   
   
   
                                 * * *
   
   
   
       5. Should any bhikkhu lie down in the same lodging with an 
       unordained person for more than two or three consecutive 
       nights, it is to be confessed.
   
   As the Vinaya Mukha comments, "The Buddha originally laid down the 
   rule forbidding the act of sleeping in the same lodging with an 
   unordained person so that lay people would not see the unsightly 
   attitudes a bhikkhu might assume while asleep.  But then, when 
   novices came into being, they were classed as unordained people and 
   so had no place to stay.  The Buddha therefore relaxed the rule, 
   allowing bhikkhus to sleep in the same lodging with an unordained 
   person no more than three nights running, thus also opening the way 
   for them to sleep in the same lodging with ordinary lay men."
   
     The occasion for the first formulation of the rule was this:
   
       "Now at that time, lay men came to the monastery to hear the 
       Dhamma.  After the Dhamma had been taught, each of the elder 
       bhikkhus went to his own dwelling, while the newer bhikkhus 
       went to sleep right there in the attendance hall with the 
       lay men -- careless, absent-minded, naked, mumbling, and 
       snoring.  The lay men were offended and annoyed and spread 
       it about, 'How can revered people go to sleep careless, 
       absent-minded, naked, mumbling, and snoring?'"
   
     The occasion for the final formulation was this:
   
       "The bhikkhus said to Ven. Rahula (who must have still been 
       a novice at this point), 'There is a training rule laid down 
       by the Blessed One that (a bhikkhu) should not lie down 
       together with an unordained person.  Find yourself a place 
       to sleep.'  So Ven. Rahula, not being able to find a place 
       to sleep, went to sleep in the outhouse.  Then the Blessed 
       One, getting up towards the end of the night, went to the 
       outhouse and on arriving cleared his throat.  Ven. Rahula 
       cleared his throat.
       
       "'Who's there?'
       
       "'It's me, sir -- Rahula.'
       
       "'Why are you lying there?'
       
       "So Ven. Rahula told him what had happened." 
   
     There are two factors for the full offense here:
     
     1) //Object//:  an unordained person.
     
     2) //Effort//:  (a) lying down, (b) in the same lodging with the 
       unordained person, (c) for four nights running.
   
     Object.  The Vibhanga defines //unordained person// as anyone 
   other than a bhikkhu.  According to the Commentary, this includes 
   not only human beings, but also any animal large enough to have 
   intercourse with.  The Sub-commentary, though, following the Three 
   Ganthipadas, notes that this does not include female human beings, 
   since there is another training rule, following immediately on this 
   one, that deals specifically with them.
     
     Lying down.  To be lying down in the same lodging with someone 
   else means to be prone at the same time as the other person is prone 
   within the area defined as the lodging.  This factor is fulfilled 
   whether the bhikkhu lies down when the other person is already lying 
   there, or vice versa, or both lie down at the same time.  Although 
   there are other training rules where lying down is included under 
   the term //sitting//, sitting is //not// included under the term 
   //lying down// here.  Whether or not the bhikkhu or the other person 
   falls asleep is of no account.  
     
     Lodging.  The Vibhanga defines the lodging that can be grounds for 
   a pacittiya here as a place completely roofed and completely walled, 
   or mostly roofed and mostly walled.  A place half-roofed and 
   half-walled, it says, is grounds for a dukkata, while a place (a) 
   fully roofed but with no wall (e.g., an open pavilion), (b) fully 
   walled but with no roof (e.g., a corral), or (c) less than 
   half-roofed and less than half-walled, is not grounds for an 
   offense.
     
     Buddhaghosa quotes the Maha Atthakatha, the major ancient 
   commentary, as filling in all the other possibilities:
   
     //Grounds for a pacittiya//:  A place
        fully roofed and mostly walled,
        fully roofed and half-walled,
        mostly roofed and half-walled,
        mostly roofed and fully walled,
        half-roofed and fully walled, or
        half-roofed and mostly walled.
       
     //Grounds for a dukkata//:  A place
        fully roofed and less than half-walled,
        mostly roofed and less than half-walled,
        less than half-roofed and fully walled, or
        less than half-roofed and mostly walled.
       
     //Grounds for no offense//:  A place
        half-roofed and less than half-walled,
        less than half-roofed and half-walled, or
        less than half-roofed and less than half-walled.
   
     The Commentary notes that tents would fit under the definition of 
   place here, and it would seem that vehicles -- caravans in the time 
   of the Buddha; automobiles, trains, buses and airplanes in ours -- 
   would fit here as well. 
     
     The same lodging.  Unfortunately, the Vibhanga does not say how 
   far the boundary of a "single lodging" would extend.  For example, 
   would each separate room in a house count as a separate lodging?  
   Would the entire house?  Would an entire apartment building be a 
   single lodging?  The Commentary tries to remedy this omission by 
   introducing the factor of "having a single common entrance" or 
   "being part of the same enclosure."  (The Pali word it uses, 
   //ekupacara//, has both meanings, and the Commentary makes use of 
   both in its discussion.)  
     
     What it says is this:  Even a seven-story palace or a building 
   with 100 rooms would count as a single lodging if all the rooms make 
   use of a common entrance.  If there are several buildings in a 
   single enclosure, and one can go from one to another without 
   stepping on outside ground, they would count as part of the same 
   lodging.  If there is a building divided into units that are not 
   connected by internal doorways, each unit having a separate 
   entrance, the different units would count as separate lodgings.  
   Locking or closing a door does //not// close off the doorway.  Only 
   if the door opening is bricked up or otherwise permanently sealed 
   off does it no longer count as a doorway.
     
     The Commentary admits that the "single entrance" factor is not 
   mentioned in the Canon in connection with this rule but is borrowed 
   from the Vibhanga to NP 2.  It argues that this factor is 
   unavoidably bound up in the concept of "walled and roofed," though, 
   and illustrates its point as follows:  There is a two-room dwelling, 
   composed of an antechamber through which one must pass to get to the 
   inner chamber.  A bhikkhu is sleeping in the inner chamber, and an 
   unordained person in the antechamber.  Now suppose that a stubborn 
   Vinaya student maintains that if the door between the two rooms is 
   closed, the bhikkhu is sleeping in a separate lodging from the 
   unordained person, while if the door is open, they are in the same 
   lodging.  His teacher then asks him, "Why are they in the same 
   lodging if the door is open?"
     
       "Because the two rooms share the same roof and walls."
       
       "And if the door is closed, does that destroy the roof and 
       walls they had in common?"
       
       "No, of course not.  But the enclosure in which the bhikkhu 
       is sleeping is marked by the door."
     
     This, the Commentary says, shows that the notion of enclosure is 
   part and parcel of the concept of lodging, and that the stubborn 
   student has defeated his own argument.  Its reasoning here is 
   probably more convincing in Pali than in English, since as we noted 
   above, Pali uses the same word for enclosure and entrance, but even 
   so the illustration does not carry much force when applied to such 
   places as separate apartments in an apartment building and so leaves 
   the issue unsettled as far as they are concerned.
     
     The Vinaya Mukha notes that the factor introduced by the 
   Commentary has implications that go far beyond the original purpose 
   of this rule -- and of the following rule, in which the  concept of 
   "single lodging" is even more important.  It suggests borrowing an 
   additional factor from NP 2:  the factor of separate residences or 
   zones of ownership (the Pali word //kula// carries both meanings).  
   Thus in a large building composed of separate residences -- such as 
   an apartment building, a hotel or a hospital with private rooms -- 
   it suggests that each separate residence count as a separate 
   lodging.
     
     Since the Canon gives no clear guidance on this point, the wise 
   policy for an individual bhikkhu is to follow the views of the 
   Community to which he belongs. 
     
     Nights here, as in other training rules, are counted by dawns.  
   Thus, if a bhikkhu is sleeping in the same lodging with an 
   unordained person but one of them gets up before dawn, that night 
   does not count.  If a bhikkhu has slept in the same lodging with an 
   unordained person for two or three nights running but then skips a 
   night, the consecutive series is broken.  If he then sleeps in the 
   same lodging with an unordained person another night, the counting 
   starts again from one.
     
     However, once he has slept in the same lodging with an unordained 
   person three nights running, then if after sundown on the fourth 
   night he reclines in the same lodging in which a lay person is 
   reclining -- even if only for a moment -- he incurs a pacittiya.  
     
     The Commentary interprets the phrase "after sundown" as meaning 
   any time on the fourth day.  In other words, there is no need to 
   wait until the next dawn to count the fourth period of sleeping 
   together.  As we noted above in the conclusion to the chapter on the 
   Sanghadisesa rules, there was a tendency in the time of the Canon to 
   call a 24-hour period of day and night a "night."  Perhaps this 
   period was felt to begin at sundown, just as we now feel that a 
   24-hour "day" begins at midnight.
     
     The Commentary also states that the unordained person need not be 
   the same person each of the four nights, and the same holds true for 
   the lodging.  In other words, if a bhikkhu lies down in a lodging 
   with novice X one night, and then goes elsewhere and lies down in a 
   lodging with layman Y the next night, and so on for four nights 
   running, he commits an offense all the same.
     
     Perception and intent are not mitigating factors here.  Thus a 
   bhikkhu lying down in the same lodging with a novice whom he thinks 
   to be another bhikkhu commits an offense all the same, as does a 
   bhikkhu who miscounts the nights and lies down in the same room with 
   an unordained person for what he thinks is his third night when it 
   is actually his fourth.
     
     In fact, this is a training rule that one may break without ever 
   realizing it.  Suppose a novice comes to lie down in a room where a 
   bhikkhu is sleeping, and then gets up to leave before the bhikkhu 
   awakens.  If he does this for four nights running, the bhikkhu 
   incurs a pacittiya even though he may never have been aware of what 
   the novice was doing.  Rules like this are the reason why many 
   bhikkhus make a practice of confessing offenses even when they are 
   not consciously aware of having committed them.
     
     Non-offenses.  To lie down with an unordained person in a lodging 
   that would qualify as grounds for a pacittiya or a dukkata is no 
   offense as long as one does it no more than three days running.  And 
   there is no offense in lying down any number of consecutive nights 
   with an unordained person in a lodging that would not qualify as 
   grounds for an offense.
     
     The Vinaya Mukha comments that although this rule as it presently 
   stands no longer fulfills its original purpose, bhikkhus should keep 
   the original purpose in mind and avoid sleeping in the same place 
   with an unordained person whenever possible.  It would also be a 
   wise policy to avoid sleeping out in a public park, on a public 
   beach, in an unwalled pavilion, etc., if full view of the public, 
   even though no offense would be involved.
   
       Summary:  Lying down at the same time, in the same lodging, 
       with a novice or layman for more than three nights running 
       is a pacittiya offense.
   
   
   
                                 * * *
   
   
   
       6. Should any bhikkhu lie down in the same lodging with a 
       woman, it is to be confessed.
   
   There are only two differences between this rule and the preceding 
   one:
   
     1) The factor of "object" here is fulfilled only by a female human 
       being, "even one born that day, all the more an older one,"  
       regardless of whether or not she is related to the bhikkhu. 
     
     2) The four-night clause under "effort" is dropped, which means 
       that the bhikkhu incurs a pacittiya the instant he lies down in 
       the same lodging with her. 
   
     Object.  The Vibhanga states that female yakkhas, petas, nagas, 
   devas, and animals -- as well as pandakas, as defined under 
   Sanghadisesa 2 -- are grounds for a dukkata here.  The Commentary 
   qualifies this by saying that "female animal" means one with which 
   it is possible to have intercourse, and "female yakkhas, petas, 
   nagas, and devas" includes only those who make themselves visible.  
     
     Even if another man is present in the lodging, it does not negate 
   the offense.
     
     Perception and intent are not mitigating factors here.  Thus a 
   bhikkhu who sleeps in the same room with a woman he thinks to be a 
   man -- e.g., she has disguised herself -- commits the full offense 
   all the same.  Also, a bhikkhu lying down in the same lodging with a 
   woman commits an offense regardless or whether or not he realizes 
   that she is there.
     
     The same principles apply to pandakas:  A bhikkhu who lies down in 
   the same room with a pandaka whom he thinks to be an ordinary man 
   commits a dukkata; and the same is true for a bhikkhu lying down in 
   a lodging not knowing that a pandaka is also lying down there.
     
     A single lodging is defined as in the preceding rule.  Thus a 
   bhikkhu sleeping in the same house as his mother, even if they are 
   in separate rooms and another man is present, commits an offense all 
   the same.
     
     Effort.  The main point where this rule differs from the preceding 
   one under the factor of effort is that a bhikkhu incurs a pacittiya 
   the moment he is lying in a lodging at the same time a woman is 
   lying there, with no need to count nights or dawns.  This is 
   expressed in the Vibhanga by saying, "If at sunset a bhikkhu is 
   lying when a woman is lying, it is to be confessed."  
     
     The Sub-commentary interprets this as meaning that this rule 
   applies only at night, but the no-offense clauses in the Vibhanga 
   give no exemptions for daytime, which suggests that the 
   Sub-commentary's interpretation is invalid.  What the Vibhanga's 
   statement means is that there is no need to wait until dawn to count 
   the period of lying down together.  As we noted under the preceding 
   rule, there was a tendency in the time of the Canon to call a 
   24-hour period of day and night a "night," and this period may have 
   been felt to begin at sundown.  The Commentary, switching to our 
   current practice of calling a 24-hour period a day, says, "In the 
   previous rule, the offense is on the fourth day.  Here it is right 
   from the first day."  
     
     Thus, no matter what time of day or night a bhikkhu lies down in 
   the same lodging with a woman, he immediately incurs a pacittiya.
     
     The purposes of this rule.  Another difference between this rule 
   and the preceding one is the obvious point that they have different 
   purposes.  As the origin story shows, this rule is to prevent 
   situations that might tempt a bhikkhu to commit a serious offense, 
   such as a Parajika 1 or Sanghadisesa 2.
   
       "Then the woman, having prepared a bed inside (her house) 
       for Ven. Anuruddha, having put on her jewelry and scented 
       herself with perfumes, went to him and said, 'Master, you 
       are beautiful, good-looking, and charming.  I, too, am 
       beautiful, good-looking, and charming.  It would be good if 
       I were to be your wife.'
       
       "When she said this, Ven. Anuruddha remained silent.  So a 
       second time...a third time she said to him, 'Master, you are 
       beautiful, good-looking, and charming.  I too am beautiful, 
       good-looking, and charming.  Please take me together with 
       all my wealth.'
       
       "A third time, Ven. Anuruddha remained silent.  So the 
       woman, having slipped off her upper cloak, paraded up and 
       down in front of him, stood, sat down, and then lay down 
       right in front of him.  But Ven. Anuruddha, keeping control 
       of his faculties, didn't as much as glance at her or say 
       even a word.
       
       "Then it occurred to her:  'Isn't it amazing!  Isn't it 
       astounding!  Many men send for me at a price of 100 or even 
       1,000 (a night), but this recluse, even when I myself beg 
       him, doesn't want to take me together with all of my 
       wealth!'  So, putting her upper cloak back on and bowing her 
       head at his feet, she said to him:  'Honored sir, a 
       transgression has overcome me in that I acted in such a 
       foolish, muddle-headed and ill-considered way.  Please 
       accept this confession of my transgression as such, so that 
       I may restrain myself in the future.'"
   
     Ven. Anuruddha was very advanced in the practice and so was able 
   to get through the situation with his mindfulness and precepts 
   intact.  Many a lesser bhikkhu, though, would have succumbed right 
   from the woman's first request, and so the Buddha formulated this 
   rule for his protection.
     
     This rule is also meant to prevent situations where suspicious 
   people might think a bhikkhu had committed a serious offense even 
   when he hadn't.  Like Caesar's wife, a bhikkhu must not only //be// 
   pure, he must //look// pure if he is to uphold the religion and 
   maintain the reputation of the Community.  If a bhikkhu and a woman 
   are seen going into a house together in the evening and leaving 
   together the following morning, then even if they slept in separate 
   rooms, suspicious neighbors -- and very few neighbors aren't 
   suspicious of bhikkhus -- would be quick to jump to conclusions.  
   Thus the wise policy mentioned in the preceding rule applies even 
   more forcefully here:  A bhikkhu would be well-advised not to lie 
   down with a woman in such places as parks, beaches, or unwalled 
   pavilions even though in terms of the rules no offense would be 
   involved.
     
     There is some overlap between this rule and Pacittiyas 44 & 45, 
   which deal with a bhikkhu sitting or lying down together in private 
   with a woman (or women).  Special cases covered by this rule not 
   covered by those would include, for example, a bhikkhu and a woman 
   lying down in separate rooms of the same lodging; a bhikkhu and a 
   woman lying down in the same lodging with another man present.  
   Also, under those rules, the questions of the bhikkhu's state of 
   mind and his awareness of the situation are important factors.  Here 
   they are of no consequence:  Even a bhikkhu with the purest state of 
   mind -- or completely unknowingly -- incurs a pacittiya when lying 
   down together with a woman in the same lodging.
   
     Non-offenses.  There is no offense in lying down with a woman in a 
   lodging that under the preceding rule would not be grounds for an 
   offense, i.e.,
   
      fully roofed but with no walls (e.g., an open pavilion),
      fully walled but with no roof (e.g., a corral),
      half-roofed and half-walled,
      half-roofed and less than half-walled,
      less than half-roofed and half-walled,
      less than half-roofed and less than half-walled.
     
     Still, as noted above, a bhikkhu would be well-advised to avoid 
   such situations whenever possible, and to have another man present 
   when not.
   
       Summary:  Lying down at the same time in the same lodging 
       with a woman is a pacittiya offense.
   
   
   
                                 * * *
   
   
   
       7. Should any bhikkhu teach more than five or six sentences 
       of Dhamma to a woman, unless a knowledgeable man is present, 
       it is to be confessed.
   
       "Then Ven. Udayin, having dressed early in the morning and 
       taking his robe and bowl, went to visit a certain family.  
       At that time the lady of the house was sitting in the main 
       entrance, while the daughter-in-law was sitting in the door 
       to the inner chamber.  So Ven. Udayin approached the lady of 
       the house and whispered Dhamma into her ear.  The 
       daughter-in-law thought, 'Is this recluse my mother-in-law's 
       lover, or is he being fresh with her?'  Then, having 
       whispered Dhamma into the ear of the lady of house, Ven. 
       Udayin went to the daughter-in-law and whispered Dhamma into 
       //her// ear.  The lady of the house thought,  'Is this 
       recluse my daughter-in-law's lover, or is he being fresh 
       with her?'  After whispering Dhamma into the 
       daughter-in-law's ear, Ven. Udayin left.  So the lady of the 
       house said, 'Hey.  What did that recluse say to you?' 
       
       "'He taught me Dhamma, ma'am.  And what did he say to you?'
       
       "'He taught me Dhamma, too.'
       
       So they were offended and annoyed and spread it about, 'How 
       can Ven. Udayin whisper Dhamma into women's ears?  Shouldn't 
       the Dhamma be taught openly and out loud?'" 
   
   The two factors for the full offense here are:
   
     1) //Object//:  a female human being who knows what is and is not 
       lewd and who has not asked one a question about the Dhamma.
     
     2) //Effort//:  One teaches her more than six sentences of Dhamma 
       without a knowledgeable man present -- i.e., a male human being 
       who also knows what is and is not lewd.
   
     Object.  The word //woman// covers //women// as well:  If a 
   bhikkhu is with two or more women, but without a knowledgeable man 
   present, he may teach them no more that five or six sentences of 
   Dhamma.  Perception is not a factor here:  If a bhikkhu teaches 
   Dhamma to a woman he thinks is a man, this factor is fulfilled as 
   well.
     
     According to the Vibhanga, a female peta, deva or animal (probably 
   a naga) in the form of a human woman, are each grounds for a dukkata 
   here.
     
     Dhamma the Vibhanga defines in the same terms as under Pacittiya 
   4: "a saying made by the Buddha, his disciples, seers, or heavenly 
   beings, connected with the teaching, connected with the goal."  
     
     Precisely what this means is a point of controversy.  The 
   Commentary identifies "sayings made by the Buddha, his disciples, 
   seers, or heavenly beings" with different parts of the Pali Canon -- 
   in Pali -- and then treats "connected with the teaching, connected 
   with the goal" as nouns, the first referring to the Canon, and the 
   second to the ancient commentary named the Maha Atthakatha.  This 
   last point is highly unlikely, since the Maha Atthakatha did not yet 
   exist when the Canon was being composed.
     
     There are two alternatives to the Commentary's interpretation:  
   One follows the Commentary in treating "connected with the teaching, 
   connected with the goal" as nouns, but interprets them as meaning 
   //any// statement dealing with the Dhamma, no matter what language 
   it is in, and regardless of whether or not it is quoted from a text.  
   Thus, according to this interpretation, anything a bhikkhu would say 
   about the Dhamma -- quoted from the Canon, from a later text, or of 
   his own invention -- would count as Dhamma here.
     
     The second interpretation regards "connected with the teaching, 
   connected with the goal" as adjectives modifying "sayings made by 
   the Buddha, his disciples, seers, or heavenly beings." This makes 
   more sense in terms of Pali syntax, but limits the meaning of 
   //Dhamma// in this rule to passages from the Canon.  This would not 
   necessarily limit it to passages in the Pali language, though.  
   Translations from the Canon would also come under the rule, since 
   there is a passage in the Cullavagga (V.33.1) where the Buddha 
   allows bhikkhus to learn Dhamma each in his own language, thus 
   showing, contrary to the Commentary, that Dhamma does not have to be 
   in Pali to be Dhamma. 
     
     There is little in the Canon to decide between these two 
   interpretations, and the question comes down to what one perceives 
   to be the purpose of the rule.  Adherents of the first 
   interpretation say that the rule is designed to prevent the sort of 
   suspicions that arise when a bhikkhu is talking at length alone with 
   a woman, but this argument does not fit with the Buddha's allowance 
   for a bhikkhu to give a talk when a woman asks him for instruction.
     
     It is more likely that the rule is aimed at preventing a bhikkhu 
   from using his knowledge of Dhamma as a come-on, a way of making 
   himself attractive to a woman.  As any man who teaches Dhamma soon 
   learns, there are women who find such knowledge irresistible.  To 
   view the rule in this light makes either of the two interpretations 
   tenable, so the wise policy is to adhere to the interpretation of 
   the Community to which one belongs.  
     
     This rule applies to telephone conversations as well as to 
   conversations in person, but because the Parivara (I.5.7) notes that 
   it deals only with the spoken word, it does not cover letters or 
   other written communications. 
     
     Six sentences.  As for the amount of Dhamma a bhikkhu may say to a 
   woman or women without a knowledgeable man present, the Pali word 
   for "sentence," (//vaca//), can also mean "word," but the Commentary 
   states specifically that one //vaca// is approximately equal to a 
   line of verse.  The Sub-commentary goes on to say that the 
   Commentary's definition here applies to poetry, while one //vaca// 
   of prose is equal to the conjugation of a verb, i.e., six words.  In 
   either case, six vacas would amount to six sentences.
     
     Conversations on other topics. Strangely enough, neither the 
   Vibhanga nor the Commentary makes mention of conversations with 
   women that do not touch on the Dhamma.  The Sub-commentary notes 
   this, and in one of its rare stabs at humor concludes, "It is 
   perfectly all right to talk as much as you like about Tamils and 
   that sort of thing."
     
     Conversation that does not deal with the Dhamma, though, is termed 
   "animal talk" (//tiracchana-katha//) in the Canon, and there are 
   several passages (e.g., Pc. XXI.1;  LXXXV.1; Mv.V.6.3-4) that 
   criticize members of the group of six for engaging in animal talk:  
   worldly talk about "kings, robbers, and ministers of state 
   (politics); armies, alarms, and battles; food and drink; clothing, 
   furniture, garlands, and scents; relatives; vehicles; villages, 
   towns, cities, the countryside; women and heroes; the gossip of the 
   street and the well; tales of the dead; also philosophical 
   discussions of the past and future (this is how the Sub-commentary 
   to Pacittiya 85 explains 'tales of diversity'), the creation of the 
   world and of the sea, and talk of whether things exist or not."  The 
   Sub-commentary notes, though, that to discuss any of these topics in 
   a way to foster an understanding of the Dhamma -- e.g., discussing 
   the impermanence of worldly power -- is not considered improper.
     
     Although there is no specific penalty for indulging in such 
   worldly talk, a bhikkhu who indulges in it with lay people, bhikkhus 
   or novices to the point where he becomes offensive to the Community 
   may be subject to an act of censure, banishment or suspension on the 
   grounds of "unbecoming association with householders" or "verbal 
   frivolity."  Furthermore, a bhikkhu sitting alone with a woman (or 
   women) engaging in such talk would be subject to the conditions of 
   Pacittiya 44 or 45 and Aniyata 1 or 2.
     
     It is also worth noting in this regard that, unlike Pacittiyas 44 
   & 45 and Aniyatas 1 & 2, this rule covers situations where either 
   the bhikkhu or the woman, or both, are standing.  In other words, if 
   a bhikkhu and a woman are conversing while standing, he may teach 
   her at most six sentences of Dhamma unless any of the no-offense 
   clauses apply.
     
     Non-offenses.  There is no offense if, after the bhikkhu teaches 
   the woman six sentences of Dhamma, either he or she changes position 
   -- stands up, sits down, etc. -- and he continues with six more 
   sentences.  This point was most likely included to indicate separate 
   conversations.  Once a bhikkhu has taught five or six sentences to a 
   woman, he may teach her again when they meet again and is not 
   condemned to silence for the rest of his life.
     
     Another exemption is that a bhikkhu, after teaching six sentences 
   of Dhamma to one woman, may turn and teach six more sentences to 
   another without incurring a penalty.  Thus the Commentary notes that 
   a bhikkhu addressing an assembly of 100 women may teach them a total 
   of 600 sentences of Dhamma if he aims each set of six at a different 
   woman.
     
     A third exemption is that there is no penalty for a bhikkhu who is 
   teaching Dhamma to someone else, and a woman happens to be listening 
   in.
     
     Finally, as noted above, if a woman asks a bhikkhu a question, a 
   bhikkhu may give her a talk even if no other man is present.  This 
   exemption is common to all the rules that deal with instructing 
   women (see Pacittiyas 21 & 22), but precisely what it means is 
   somewhat uncertain, as none of the texts define how teaching Dhamma 
   (//dhammam deseti//) differs from  giving a talk (//katheti//), if 
   they differ at all.  The Commentary notes simply that in giving a 
   talk one is not limited to six sentences; its example of a 'talk' is 
   a recitation of the complete Digha Nikaya (!), which shows that, as 
   far as the commentators are concerned, teaching Dhamma and giving a 
   talk differ only in length.  Thus a bhikkhu may answer a woman's 
   question about Dhamma with a talk including as many sentences of 
   Dhamma as he needs to make his point clear.
     
     This allowance is important in that it honors women in their 
   desire to understand the Dhamma.  A wise policy, though, would be to 
   show restraint in such situations.  The relationship of male teacher 
   to female student has a long, well-known history of getting out of 
   hand.  Even if a bhikkhu is in control of himself in such 
   conversations, passers-by -- and the woman herself -- can easily 
   misconstrue his words and actions.  So, wherever possible, he should 
   go out of his way to guard himself against suspicion and 
   misunderstandings in such cases by having a man present when talking 
   alone with a woman, even though the special exemption is made.
   
       Summary: Teaching more than six sentences of Dhamma to a 
       woman, except in response to a question, is a pacittiya 
       offense unless a knowledgeable man is present.
   
   
   
                                 * * *
   
   
   
       8. Should any bhikkhu report (his own) factual superior 
       human state to an unordained person, it is to be confessed.
   
   The factors for the full offense here are three:
   
     1) //Object//:  an unordained person, i.e., anyone -- human or not 
       -- who is not a bhikkhu or bhikkhuni.
     
     2) //Effort//:  One reports one's actual attainment of a superior 
       human state to such a person.
     
     3) //Result//:  The person immediately understands. 
     
     Only two of these factors -- effort and result -- require 
   explanation.
   
     Effort.  The meaning of //superior human state// is discussed at 
   length under Parajika 4.  In brief, it covers (a) jhana, (b) the 
   cognitive powers that can arise as its result, and (c) the 
   transcendent states.  
     
     //Factual// is not explained in the texts, but probably means 
   factual from the bhikkhu's own point of view.  In other words, 
   whether or not he has actually attained a superior human state, if 
   he thinks he has and reports it to an unordained person, he commits 
   an offense all the same.  If he actually has attained such a state, 
   e.g., jhana, but thinks he hasn't, and yet claims that he has -- in 
   other words, he is telling what he thinks to be a lie -- he incurs a 
   parajika.
     
     To report, says the Vibhanga, means to speak directly of one's own 
   attainments.  To speak indirectly of one's own attainments -- e.g., 
   "The bhikkhu who lives in this dwelling enters jhana at will" -- 
   entails a dukkata.  According to the Commentary, gestures fall under 
   this rule as well.  Thus, if a lay person asks a bhikkhu who has 
   attained Stream-entry if he has reached any of the noble 
   attainments, and the bhikkhu nods, his nod would fulfill the factor 
   of effort here.
     
     The origin story to this rule deals with bhikkhus who, as a tactic 
   for getting almsfood in a time of scarcity, had agreed to speak of 
   one another's superior human states to householders.  This would 
   seem to suggest that to speak of another bhikkhu's actual attainment 
   of superior human states with such motives in mind -- e.g., hoping 
   to get a share of the increased gains he might receive -- should 
   entail a penalty as well, but none of the texts mention this point, 
   so it is not an offense.  Still, any bhikkhu who plans to act in 
   such a way, on the grounds that whatever is not an offense is 
   perfectly all right, should remember that the Buddha criticized the 
   bhikkhus in the origin story in very strong terms.
     
     Result.  As noted above, the bhikkhu incurs the full penalty only 
   if his listener immediately understands what he has said.  If the 
   listener does not understand, the bhikkhu incurs a dukkata 
   regardless of whether he spoke directly or indirectly of his 
   attainments.
     
     Whether or not the person addressed believes what is said, is of 
   no account in determining the offense.
     
     Non-offenses.  The Vibhanga states that to report one's own 
   superior human attainments to another bhikkhu or to a bhikkhuni 
   carries no penalty.  There is, though, a series of stories in the 
   Vinita Vatthu to Parajika 4 that raise a number of points to bear in 
   mind in such situations.  A typical example -- the stories differ 
   only in minor details -- is this: 
   
       "Then Ven. Maha Moggallana, as he was descending Vulture 
       Peak Mountain, smiled at a certain place.  Ven. Lakkhana 
       said to him, 'Friend Moggallana, what is the reason, what is 
       the cause for your smile?'
       
       "'This is not the time, friend Lakkhana, to answer this 
       question.  Ask me in the presence of the Blessed One.'
       
       "So Ven. Lakkhana and Ven. Maha Moggallana...having 
       approached and paid homage to the Blessed One, sat down to 
       one side.  As they were sitting there, Ven. Lakkhana said to 
       Ven. Moggallana, 'Just now, friend Moggallana...you smiled.  
       What was the reason, what was the cause for your smile?'
       
       "'Just now, my friend, I saw a man immersed head and all in 
       a dung pit, eating dung with both hands.  The thought 
       occurred to me, "Isn't it amazing, isn't it astounding, that 
       there are beings even like this...."'
       
       "Bhikkhus were offended and annoyed and spread it about, 
       'Ven. Moggallana is boasting of a superior human state!'
       
       "Then the Blessed One said to the bhikkhus, 'Actually, 
       bhikkhus, there //are// disciples of vision and knowledge 
       who will know or see or bear witness like this.  Once I 
       myself saw that being, but I didn't disclose it.  Had I 
       disclosed it, others would not have believed me, and that 
       would have been to their pain and detriment for a long time.  
       That being, bhikkhus, was once a corrupted Brahmin right 
       here in Rajagaha.  He, in the time of the Buddha Kassapa, 
       having invited a Community of bhikkhus to a meal, having 
       filled a trough with dung and announcing the time, said, 
       "Venerable sirs, eat from this and take with you as much as 
       you like."  Having been boiled in purgatory as a result of 
       that deed for many years, many hundreds of years, many 
       thousands of years, many hundreds of thousands of years, he 
       is now -- through the remainder of the result of that deed 
       -- experiencing existence as an individual like this.  
       Moggallana spoke truly, bhikkhus.  There is no offense for 
       him.'"
   
     Ven. Moggallana's conduct here -- waiting until he is in the 
   presence of his teacher before relating his vision -- has become a 
   model for conduct among meditators, for as the bhikkhus' reaction 
   and the Buddha's comments make clear, there are situations where the 
   act of relating one's visions, etc., even when allowed, will serve 
   no positive purpose.
     
     Displaying psychic powers.  A related rule in the Cullavagga 
   (V.8.2) states that to display psychic powers to lay people is a 
   dukkata.  In the origin story leading up to that rule, the Buddha 
   levels strong criticism at such an act: "Just as a woman might 
   expose her sexual organ for a miserable wooden //masaka// coin, so 
   too have you displayed a superior human state, a wonder of psychic 
   power, to lay people for the sake of a miserable wooden bowl."
     
     To display psychic powers to anyone who is not a lay person, 
   though, is no offense.  Thus, given the way these two rules are 
   framed, one may not tell a novice of one's powers, but may levitate 
   before his very eyes.
   
       Summary:  To tell an unordained person of one's actual 
       superior human attainments is a pacittiya offense.
   
   
   
                                 * * *
   
   
   
       9. Should any bhikkhu report (another) bhikkhu's gross 
       offense to an unordained person -- unless authorized by the 
       bhikkhus -- it is to be confessed.
   
       "Now at that time Ven. Upananda the Sakyan was on bad terms 
       with some group-of-six bhikkhus.  Having committed an 
       offense of intentional emission of semen, he asked the 
       Community to put him on probation....It so happened that a 
       certain guild in Savatthi was presenting food to the 
       Community.  Ven. Upananda, being on probation, sat down on 
       the last seat in the dining hall.  The group-of-six bhikkhus 
       said to the lay people, 'Friends, this Ven. Upananda the 
       Sakyan, your esteemed dependent, emitted semen making do 
       with the very same hand with which he is eating your gift of 
       faith....(This is why), being on probation, he is sitting on 
       the last seat.'"
   
   There are two factors for the full offense here: 
   
     1) //Object//:  a gross offense committed by another bhikkhu. 
     
     2) //Effort//:  One reports it to an unordained person without 
       having been authorized to do so by the Community.
   
     Object.  The Vibhanga states that //gross offense// means any of 
   the four parajika or thirteen sanghadisesa offenses, while 
   Buddhaghosa reports the ancient commentaries as saying that it 
   covers only the sanghadisesas.  His discussion of this point is 
   interesting for the light it throws on the history of the texts:  He 
   presents two arguments for the commentaries' position, effectively 
   demolishes them, but then backs down and ends up siding with them.  
   Why he does this is hard to say, although it may be that he himself 
   disagreed with the ancient commentaries on this point, but was 
   forced to side with them by the elders of the Mahavihara who were 
   responsible for putting the seal of approval on his work.  
     
     At any rate, the details of the argument lie outside the scope of 
   this guide.  The Vinaya Mukha has already adopted Buddhaghosa's 
   arguments against the ancient commentaries here, and we will simply 
   follow our usual policy of siding with the Vibhanga wherever the 
   other texts depart from it.  //Gross offense// means both the four 
   parajikas and the thirteen sanghadisesas.
     
     A bhikkhu's non-gross offenses, and an unordained person's 
   misbehavior -- gross or not -- are grounds for a dukkata  (%).  (The 
   passage on which this last point is based is sometimes translated, 
   "tells one who is not ordained of a transgression" when it should 
   read, "tells of an unordained person's transgression.")  According 
   to the Commentary, //gross misbehavior// on the part of an 
   unordained person means breaking any of the five precepts.  Anything 
   else would count as not gross.
     
     This dukkata penalty for informing an unordained person about 
   another unordained person's transgressions of the precepts is a 
   point frequently overlooked in discussions of this rule, but it is 
   important.  It seems to be aimed at keeping bhikkhus from being 
   gossips, so that novices and lay people may seek advice from a 
   bhikkhu concerning the difficulties they have in observing the 
   precepts without fear that the bhikkhu will spread it about to other 
   unordained people as well.  
     
     This also helps preserve the good faith of donors:  They can give 
   their support to the bhikkhus without fear that the recipients of 
   their support might be gossiping about their lapses in the practice 
   behind their backs.  If donors were to learn that a bhikkhu //had// 
   been gossiping about them, they might become so disgusted as to 
   withdraw their support from the religion as a whole.
     
     Effort.  //Unordained person// here means anyone who is not a 
   bhikkhu or a bhikkhuni.
     
     To report an offense to an unordained person means to tell him/her 
   both the action and the class of the offense.   Thus, to say, "Ven. 
   Upananda committed a sanghadisesa by masturbating," would fulfill 
   the fact of effort here; while to say simply, "Ven. Upananda 
   committed a sanghadisesa." or "Ven. Upananda masturbated," would 
   not, and would not even be grounds for a lesser offense.  
     
     This allowance, which looks strange on the surface, was made 
   apparently for such cases as when a lay person, seeing a senior 
   bhikkhu sitting at the end of the line, might ask one of the other 
   bhikkhus why.  A bhikkhu would be well-advised, though, to examine 
   his motives before making use of this allowance, for to take 
   advantage of it to discredit a fellow bhikkhu would be to incur a 
   dukkata under Pacittiya 13.  Though the penalty is minor, little 
   acts and minor offenses of this sort are often the ones most 
   destructive to the harmony of the Community.
     
     The authorization.  The Vibhanga does not give any indication of 
   when the Community should authorize a bhikkhu to tell unordained 
   people about another bhikkhu's gross offense.  As the Vinaya Mukha 
   sees it, the purpose of the training rule is to prevent bhikkhus 
   from advertising one another's faults among people outside the 
   Community.  However, there are cases, it says, where a bhikkhu may 
   commit a gross offense and refuse to acknowledge it, as when 
   committing a parajika and yet continuing to assume the status of a 
   bhikkhu, or committing a sanghadisesa and refusing to go through the 
   procedures for rehabilitation.  Thus the Community in such cases is 
   allowed to authorize one of its members to inform lay people, such 
   as the bhikkhu's supporters, as a way of exerting pressure on him to 
   submit to his penalty.
     
     According to the Commentary, though, the authorization is to be 
   used in cases where the Community feels that the act of informing 
   the laity would help to convince a well-intentioned but weak-willed 
   bhikkhu who repeatedly commits sanghadisesa offenses -- even if he 
   willingly undergoes the period of penance -- to mend his ways.
     
     Both interpretations fit with the Canon, although it should be 
   borne in mind that using the authorization in line with the Vinaya 
   Mukha's rationale -- to exert pressure on a bhikkhu who refuses to 
   undergo a penalty -- can often backfire, for the laity may simply 
   think that the Community is jealous of the support they are giving 
   to the bhikkhu they assume to be innocent of any wrong-doing.
     
     The Vibhanga also does not tell how the authorization is to be 
   issued.  According to the Commentary, it is to be made as a 
   declaration (//apalokana//) stated three times and unanimously 
   agreed to by the Community meeting within a proper boundary for 
   formal acts.
     
       The Vibhanga does state, though, that when giving the 
   authorization, the Community may make it limited to families, 
   limited to offenses, limited to both or to neither.  Limited to 
   families means that the bhikkhu receiving the authorization may 
   inform only certain specified families.  Limited to offenses means 
   that he may report only certain of the guilty bhikkhu's offenses.  A 
   bhikkhu who oversteps the limits of his authorization incurs a 
   pacittiya.
     
     Non-offenses.  We have already covered the cases that the Vibhanga 
   includes in the no-offenses clauses.  To recapitulate:  There is no 
   penalty -- 
     
     1) in telling an unordained person about another bhikkhu's serious 
       offense if one states the action but not the class of offense, or 
       the class but not the action; or
     
     2) in reporting another bhikkhu's serious offense -- action and 
       class of offense -- to an unordained person when one has been 
       properly authorized to do so, as long as one does not overstep 
       the bounds of one's authorization.  
   
       Summary:  Telling an unordained person of another bhikkhu's 
       serious offense -- unless one is authorized by the Community 
       to do so -- is a pacittiya offense.
   
     
   
                                 * * *
   
   
   
       10. Should any bhikkhu dig soil or have it dug, it is to be 
       confessed.
   
   This is an offense with four factors:  object, effort, perception, 
   and intention.
   
     Object. The Pali word for soil, //pathavi//, also means ground or 
   earth.  Thus the Vibhanga distinguishes what forms of earth are and 
   are not classed as soil:
     
     Pure loam, pure clay, whatever is mostly loam or clay with a 
   lesser portion of rock, stones, potsherds, gravel, or sand mixed in, 
   is classed as soil (//jata-pathavi//).
     
     Whatever is pure rock, stones, potsherds, gravel, or sand, or any 
   of these with a lesser portion of loam or clay mixed in, is earth 
   not classed as soil (//ajata-pathavi//).  Also, burnt clay or loam 
   -- according to the Commentary, this means soil that has been burnt 
   in the course of firing a bowl, pot, etc. -- is not classed as soil.  
   As for heaps of loam or clay that have been dug up:  If they have 
   been rained on for less than four months, they are not classed as 
   soil, but if rained on for four months or more, they are.  Also, the 
   layer of fine dust that forms on the surface of dry soil as the 
   result of wind erosion is not classed as soil. 
     
     As the Commentary makes clear in discussing the Vibhanga's 
   no-offense clauses, there is no penalty in digging earth not classed 
   as soil.  Thus, for example, digging into a pile of newly dug-up 
   loam or drawing diagrams in the dust on top of dry soil would not be 
   an offense.
     
     Effort.  The Vibhanga says that the term //digging// also covers 
   burning, i.e., firing pottery; and breaking, i.e., making a furrow 
   with a rake or a stick.  Thus, using a stick to draw in the soil or 
   driving in a stake or pulling one out in such a way as to disturb 
   the surrounding soil would fulfill the factor of effort here.
     
     Non-offenses.  Because perception and intention are mitigating 
   factors here, there is no offense for the bhikkhu who digs soil -- 
   
     //unknowingly// -- e.g., digging into a pile of soil perceiving it 
       to be sand;  
     //unthinkingly// -- e.g., absent-mindedly drawing in the dirt 
       while talking with someone else; or 
     //unintentionally// -- e.g., raking leaves, pulling a wheelbarrow 
       through the mud, or digging in a pile of sand and accidentally 
       digging into the soil underneath.
   
     Also, there is no offense in asking for clay or soil, or in 
   indicating a need for a hole in the ground, without expressly giving 
   the command to dig.  ("Please get me some clay to make a pot."  
   "We're going to need a hole right here.")  According to the 
   Commentary, an explicit request that a reservoir or pit, etc., be 
   dug also entails no penalty as long as one does not say precisely 
   where to dig it.  ("We're going to have to drain the water from A to 
   B, so dig the trench wherever you think it would do the job best.")  
   This sort of request or hint is termed //kappiya-vohara// -- 
   "allowable expression," or in plain English, "wording it right" -- 
   and often finds use in in the context of rules where an express 
   command would be an offense but an indication of a desire or intent 
   would not.
     
     The Commentary quotes the ancient commentaries as saying that if 
   another person or animal has fallen into a pit, there is no penalty 
   for digging the victim out.  The same holds true if another person 
   or animal is trapped by a fallen but still-living tree:  The bhikkhu 
   may cut the tree to free the victim without incurring a penalty 
   under the following rule.  
     
     Although the Commentary cannot find any justification in the Canon 
   for these opinions, it states that they should be accepted since 
   they are the unanimous judgment of the ancient commentaries.  As we 
   have noted before, Buddhaghosa does not always accept even the 
   unanimous judgment of the ancient commentaries, but perhaps he felt 
   that these were cases in which it would be better to err on the side 
   of compassion rather than the side of strictness.
     
     However, the Commentary goes on to say that if a bhikkhu falls 
   into a pit himself, he should not dig any earth that would be 
   classed as soil, even for the sake of his life.  The same holds true 
   if he is trapped by a fallen but still-living tree:  He may not cut 
   the tree even though his life is in danger.
     
     The reason for this rule, as indicated by the origin story, is 
   that people in general at the time of the Buddha viewed soil as 
   having a form of one-facultied life.  The Jains, who were 
   contemporaries of the Buddha, classed life into five categories 
   according to the number of senses or faculties the living thing 
   possessed.  In the one-facultied category, where there is only the 
   sense of touch, they included soil and vegetation.  One scholar has 
   suggested that the Jains here were simply systematizing an animist 
   belief, predating their theories, that soil and plants had souls.  
   At any rate, this sort of view was so widespread at the time that 
   any potters who were meticulous in their precepts would take their 
   clay only from termite nests and other piles of dug-up earth.  The 
   Ghatikara Sutta (M.81) describes a potter -- a non-returner in the 
   dispensation of the Buddha Kassapa -- who even though he was a lay 
   man would take the earth for his pots only from collapsed 
   embankments and the piles of dirt around rat holes so as to avoid 
   injuring the soil.
     
     Another consideration, carrying more weight at present, is that 
   the act of digging soil risks killing or injuring whatever animals 
   may be living there.
     
     This rule, together with the following one, also effectively 
   prevents bhikkhus from engaging in agriculture.
   
       Summary:  Digging soil or commanding that it be dug is a 
       pacittiya offense.
       
                            * * * * * * * *
