   
   
   
   
                               CHAPTER EIGHT
                                           
          Part Eight:  The In-accordance-with-the-Rule Chapter
          ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
   
   
   
       71. Should any bhikkhu, admonished by the bhikkhus in 
       accordance with a rule, say, "Friends, I will not train 
       myself under this training rule until I have put questions 
       about it to another bhikkhu, experienced and learned in the 
       discipline," it is to be confessed.  Bhikkhus, (a training 
       rule) is to be understood, is to be asked about, is to be 
       pondered.  This is the proper course here.
   
   This rule deals with cases where a bhikkhu tries to excuse himself 
   from following any of the training rules, without showing 
   out-and-out disrespect for the rule or the person admonishing him.  
   (If he showed out-and-out disrespect, the case would come under 
   Pacittiya 54.)  The factors for the full offense here are three.
   
     1) //Object//:  One has been admonished by a fellow bhikkhu who 
   cites a rule formulated in the Vinaya.
     
     2) //Intention//:  One does not want to train oneself in line with 
   the rule.
     
     3) //Effort//:  One says something to the effect that one will not 
   train in line with the rule.
     
     Only two of these factors -- object and effort -- require 
   explanation.
     
     Object.  Only if the other bhikkhu cites a rule in the Vinaya is 
   this factor grounds for a pacittiya.  If he criticizes one's 
   actions, citing standards of behavior outside of the Vinaya -- e.g., 
   he says that one has been acting out of greed, anger, delusion, or 
   fear -- this factor becomes grounds for a dukkata.
     
     If the person admonishing one is not a bhikkhu, then regardless of 
   whether he/she cites a rule in the Vinaya or standards of behavior 
   outside of the Vinaya, this factor is again grounds for a dukkata.
     
     As under Pacittiya 54, whether or not one views the admonition as 
   valid is not an issue here.
     
     Effort.  Looking at the Vibhanga's discussion of this factor, it 
   would appear to cover only cases where one used the precise words 
   mentioned in the training rule, but the K/Commentary -- drawing 
   probably on the Great Standards -- expands it to cover any case 
   where one says something as a ploy to excuse oneself from following 
   the rule without showing disrespect.  Examples might include:  "I'll 
   worry about that rule when I come to it." "I don't have time for 
   that right now." "I've been wondering:  Do you really think that 
   that rule applies in this day and age?  It gets in the way of our 
   spreading the Dhamma."  In other words, this factor closes any 
   loopholes left by Pacittiya 54.
     
     Non-offenses.  According to the Vibhanga, the only way to avoid an 
   offense in situations like this is to say that one will learn about 
   the rule and train in line with it.  As the no-offense clauses to 
   Pacittiya 54 make clear, though, if one has been admonished with any 
   interpretation of a rule that differs from one's teachers', one may 
   avoid an offense simply by stating that one's teachers taught 
   differently.
   
       Summary:  Saying something as a ploy to excuse oneself  from 
       training under a training rule when being admonished by 
       another bhikkhu for a breach of the rule is a pacittiya 
       offense.
   
   
   
                                 * * *
   
   
   
       72. Should any bhikkhu, when the Patimokkha is being 
       repeated, say, "Why are these lesser and minor training 
       rules repeated when they lead only to anxiety, bother and 
       confusion?" the criticism of the training rules is to be 
       confessed.
   
       "Now at that time the Blessed One gave a talk to the 
       bhikkhus on the subject of discipline.  He spoke in praise 
       of discipline, in praise of the mastery of discipline, and 
       in praise of Ven. Upali, referring to him again and again.  
       The bhikkhus (said), '...Come, friends, let's study 
       discipline with Ven. Upali.'  They and many other bhikkhus 
       -- elders, newly ordained, and those in between -- studied 
       discipline with Ven. Upali.  
       
       "Then the thought occurred to some group-of-six bhikkhus:  
       'Now, friends, many bhikkhus...are studying discipline with 
       Ven. Upali.  If they become well-versed in the discipline, 
       they will push us and pull us around however they like, 
       whenever they like, and as long as they like.  Come, 
       friends, let's criticize the discipline.'  Then the 
       group-of-six bhikkhus, approaching the bhikkhus, said, 'Why 
       are these lesser and minor training rules repeated when they 
       lead only to anxiety, bother, and confusion?'"
   
   The full offense here has three factors.
   
     1) //Object//:  another bhikkhu.
     
     2) //Effort//:  One criticizes the discipline in his presence
     
     3) //Intention//:  so as to discourage the study of the 
   discipline.
   
     Object & effort.  There is a pacittiya for criticizing the 
   discipline in the presence of a bhikkhu; and a dukkata for 
   criticizing the Dhamma in his presence, or criticizing either the 
   discipline or the Dhamma in the presence of an unordained person.
     
     The training rule would seem to indicate that these actions are 
   grounds for an offense only while the Patimokkha is being recited or 
   rehearsed, but the no-offense clauses in the Vibhanga give no 
   allowance to criticize the discipline at other times, and the 
   K/Commentary follows the Vibhanga in not making the recitation of 
   the Patimokkha a necessary factor for the offense here.  In other 
   words, the factor of effort here is fulfilled if one criticizes the 
   discipline at //any// time.
     
     Intention.  This factor is fulfilled either if one's intention is 
   to keep that particular bhikkhu from studying or mastering the 
   discipline, or if one wants the discipline in general to disappear 
   from lack of study.
     
     Further action.  A bhikkhu who makes a concerted effort to speak 
   in dispraise of the Dhamma or discipline may be subject to an act of 
   censure or banishment, depending on the seriousness of the case 
   (Cv.I.4.1; Cv.I.14.2).
     
     Non-offenses.  There is no offense if, without intending to 
   criticize the discipline, one suggests to another person that he/she 
   master the Suttas or the Abhidhamma first, before mastering the 
   discipline.
   
       Summary:  Criticizing the discipline in the presence of 
       another bhikkhu, in hopes of preventing its study, is a 
       pacittiya offense.
   
   
   
                                 * * *
   
   
   
       73. Should any bhikkhu, when the Patimokkha is being recited 
       every half-month, say, "Just now have I heard that this 
       case, too, is handed down in the Patimokkha, is included in 
       the Patimokkha, and comes up for recitation every 
       half-month;" and if other bhikkhus should know, "That 
       bhikkhu has already sat through two or three recitations of 
       the Patimokkha, if not more," the bhikkhu is not exempted 
       for being ignorant.  Whatever the offense he has committed, 
       he is to be dealt with in accordance with the rule; and in 
       addition, his deception is to be exposed:  "It is no gain 
       for you, friend, it is ill-done, that when the Patimokkha is 
       being recited, you do not pay proper attention and take it 
       to heart."  Here the deception is to be confessed.
   
   To summarize the Vibhanga:  If a bhikkhu -- when the recitation of 
   the Patimokkha comes to a rule he has violated -- tries to excuse 
   himself through the sort of pretence cited in the rule, he 
   immediately incurs a dukkata if he has already listened to the 
   Patimokkha in full three times or more.  The other bhikkhus may then 
   expose his deception through a formal act of the Community.  If he 
   then continues with the pretence, he incurs a pacittiya.  If they do 
   not bring the formal act against him, though, he incurs a dukkata 
   for each effort he makes in keeping up the pretence.  There is no 
   offense, though, if he is not feigning ignorance or if he has not 
   yet heard the Patimokkha in full at least three times.
     
     Obviously, these explanations were written when Pali was the 
   bhikkhus' native language, and the recitation of the Patimokkha in 
   Pali offered the opportunity to learn the rules, along with the 
   opportunity to feign ignorance without telling an out-and-out lie.  
   In other words, one could say immediately after the recitation of a 
   particular rule, "Just now have I heard that this rule is in the 
   Patimokkha," and strictly speaking it would be true:  One //has// 
   just heard it, even if for the umpteenth time, but one hopes that 
   the other bhikkhus will be deceived into inferring that one has just 
   heard it for the first time.
   
     At any rate, the discussion of this rule in the Vibhanga and 
   commentaries makes no exceptions for bhikkhus whose native language 
   is not Pali, and since the Patimokkha is available in a number of 
   translations, the "grace period" in which one is expected to be 
   ignorant -- three recitations covers a month to a month and a half 
   -- is not too short a time for a new bhikkhu to read and remember 
   the rules in translation.
     
     The factors for the full offense here are three.
   
     1) //Object//:  One has heard the Patimokkha in full for at least 
   three times, one has tried to feign ignorance, but the bhikkhus have 
   brought a formal act against one, exposing one's deceit.
     
     2) //Intention//:  One wants to deceive the bhikkhus into 
   believing that one is ignorant of the rule one has broken.
     
     3) //Effort//:  One says a half-truth to deceive them.  
   (Out-and-out lies would come under Pacittiya 1.)
     
     Perception is not a mitigating factor here.  If the act exposing 
   one's deceit has been properly carried out, then regardless of 
   whether or not one perceives it as valid, one incurs a pacittiya for 
   trying to deceive the bhikkhus any further.  If it has been 
   improperly carried out, one incurs a dukkata for trying to deceive 
   them further, regardless of how one perceives the act.
     
     Non-offenses.  There is no offense if one has heard the Patimokkha 
   in full less than three times, or if one is not intending to deceive 
   anyone. 
     
       Summary:  Using half-truths to deceive others into believing 
       that one is ignorant of the rules in the Patimokkha, after 
       one has already heard the Patimokkha in full three times, 
       and a formal act exposing one's deceit has been brought 
       against one, is a pacittiya offense.   
   
   
   
                                 * * *
   
   
   
       74. Should any bhikkhu, angered and displeased, give a blow 
       to (another) bhikkhu, it is to be confessed.
   
   The factors for the full offense here are three.
   
     1) //Object//:  another bhikkhu.
     
     2) //Effort//:  One gives him a blow
     
     3) //Intention//:  out of anger.
     
     Object.  A bhikkhu is grounds for the full offense here; anyone 
   unordained, grounds for a dukkata.  According to the Commentary, 
   //anyone unordained// includes animals as well as higher forms of 
   life, such as human or celestial beings.
     
     Effort.  This factor is fulfilled whether one gives a blow -- 
     
     with one's own body (hitting with a fist, jabbing with an elbow, 
       kicking with a foot); 
     with something attached to the body (e.g., a stick, a knife); or 
     with something that can be "thrown" (this includes such things as 
       throwing a rock, shooting an arrow, or firing a gun).  According 
       to the Vibhanga, this last category includes throwing "even a 
       lotus leaf," which shows that the blow need not be painful in 
       order to fulfill this factor.
   
     This factor also includes such things as twisting the other 
   person's arm behind his back or wringing his neck:  It is fulfilled 
   as soon as one touches his body with the intent to do these things.
     
     Intention.  If one gives a blow for reasons other than anger, the 
   action does not fall under this rule.  Thus, for instance, if one 
   thumps a fellow bhikkhu on the back to help dislodge something 
   caught in his throat, there is no offense.  And as the Commentary 
   notes, if -- motivated by lust -- one gives a blow to a woman, one 
   incurs the full penalty under Sanghadisesa 2.
     
     For some reason, the Commentary says that if one cuts off the nose 
   or ear of a fellow bhikkhu in order to disfigure him, one incurs 
   only a dukkata.  As the Vinaya Mukha points out, though, there is no 
   basis in the Vibhanga or in reason for this statement.  It is hard 
   to imagine anyone doing this unless motivated by anger, and cutting 
   another person would come under the factor of giving a blow with 
   something connected with the body.
     
     "Result" is not a factor here.  Whether or not the other person is 
   hurt -- or how badly he/she is hurt -- does not affect the offense.  
   If one intends simply to hurt the other person, but he/she happens 
   to die from one's blow, the case is treated under this rule, rather 
   than under Parajika 3.  In other words, the penalty is a pacittiya 
   if the victim is a bhikkhu, and a dukkata if not.
     
     Non-offenses.  According to the Vibhanga, there is no offense for 
   a bhikkhu who, trapped in a difficult situation, gives a blow 
   "desiring freedom."  The Commentary's discussion of this point shows 
   that it includes what we at present would call self-defense; and the 
   K/Commentary's analysis of the factors of the offense here shows 
   that even if anger or displeasure arises in one's mind in cases like 
   this, there is no penalty.
   
       Summary:  Giving a blow to another bhikkhu when motivated by 
       anger is a pacittiya offense.
   
   
   
                                 * * *
   
   
   
       75. Should any bhikkhu, angered and displeased, raise his 
       hand against (another) bhikkhu, it is to be confessed.
   
   This rule is similar to the preceding one, differing only in the 
   factor of effort:  //Raising one's hand// means raising any part of 
   one's body (the hand, the foot, etc.) or anything attached to the 
   body (a stick, a rock, a gun, a bow and arrow) in a threatening 
   manner.
   
     The Commentary notes that if one intends only to raise one's hand, 
   but then accidentally gives a blow, one incurs a dukkata.  The 
   Sub-commentary explains this in the only way that would make sense:  
   One incurs the dukkata for the blow, but a pacittiya for raising the 
   hand in the first place.
     
     The Sub-commentary also notes that if an animal, for example, is 
   making a mess and a bhikkhu raises his hand against it, this would 
   be included under "desiring freedom" -- i.e., from the mess -- and 
   so would not be an offense.
   
       Summary:  Making a threatening gesture against another 
       bhikkhu when motivated by anger is a pacittiya offense.
   
   
   
                                 * * *
   
   
   
       76. Should any bhikkhu charge a bhikkhu with an unfounded 
       sanghadisesa (offense), it is to be confessed.
   
     Here again the factors for the full offense are three.
     
     1) //Object//:  another bhikkhu.
     
     2) //Perception//:  One perceives him to be innocent of the 
   offense one is charging him with.
     
     3) //Effort//:  One accuses him in his presence -- or gets someone 
   else to accuse him in his presence -- of having committed a 
   sanghadisesa offense.
     
     If one makes an unfounded charge accusing another bhikkhu of 
   having committed a lesser offense or of falling away from right 
   views, one incurs a dukkata.  The same penalty holds for making an 
   unfounded charge accusing an unordained person of having committed a 
   wrong doing or of falling away from right views.
     
     The topic of unfounded charges is a complex one, and has already 
   been covered in detail under Sanghadisesa 8.  Additional points may 
   be inferred from the discussion of that rule, the differences being 
   that intention is not a factor here, and the change in effort -- one 
   is accusing the other bhikkhu of a sanghadisesa or lesser offense -- 
   changes the seriousness of the penalty.
     
     Non-offenses.  As under Sanghadisesa 8, there is no offense if one 
   makes the accusation -- or gets someone else to make the accusation 
   -- when one thinks it to be true, even if it turns out that the 
   other bhikkhu is actually not guilty of the offense.    
   
       Summary:  Making an unfounded charge to another bhikkhu -- 
       or getting someone else to make the charge to him -- that he 
       is guilty of a sanghadisesa offense is a pacittiya offense.
   
   
   
                                 * * *
   
   
   
       77. Should any bhikkhu purposefully provoke anxiety in 
       (another) bhikkhu, (thinking,) "This way, even for just a 
       moment, he will have no peace" -- if doing it for just this 
       reason and no other -- it is to be confessed.
   
   The Vinaya Mukha's explanation for this rule is worth quoting at 
   length:
   
       "There are people who normally tend to be anxious about one 
       thing or another....If someone speaks to a bhikkhu such as 
       this of contingencies that run counter to the Buddha's 
       ordinances and are impossible to know -- e.g., 'When you 
       were ordained, how can you know that all the qualifications 
       (for a valid formal act) were fulfilled?  If they were 
       lacking, doesn't that mean you aren't really ordained?' -- 
       even this is enough to set him worrying, giving him all 
       sorts of anguish.  A bhikkhu who is unrestrained and who -- 
       looking for fun with no concern for how his friends will 
       suffer -- takes such matters to tell them, is penalized with 
       a pacittiya in this rule."
   
     The full offense here has three factors.
     
     1) //Object//:  another bhikkhu.
     
     2) //Effort//:  One mentions that he might have broken a rule 
   unknowingly.
     
     3) //Intention//:  One's purpose is to cause him anxiety, even if 
   just for a moment.
     
     Object.  A bhikkhu here is grounds for a pacittiya; an unordained 
   person, grounds for a dukkata.
     
     Effort.  The Vibhanga gives a few examples of rules the other 
   person might have broken unknowingly:  He may have drunk liquor, may 
   have eaten food at the wrong time, or may have sat in private with a 
   woman, all without knowing it. (Although this last would not be an 
   offense if done unknowingly, it is close enough to an offense that 
   the mention of the possibility would cause an ignorant bhikkhu 
   anxiety.)  In the origin story, some group-of-six bhikkhus made 
   insinuating remarks to the group of 17 that since they were ordained 
   when they were less than 20 years old, they were not really 
   ordained.  (Again, since the group of 17 were the instigators for 
   that rule, they were not subject to it.)  All of this shows that 
   this factor is fulfilled by any statement one might make to another 
   bhikkhu insinuating that he may have broken a rule, even if the 
   action one mentions is not strictly speaking an offense.
     
     Intention.  If, not wanting to cause the other person anxiety, one 
   has other reasons for mentioning rules he/she might have broken 
   unknowingly -- e.g., one seriously thinks that he may have been 
   improperly ordained -- there is no offense.
     
       Summary:  Saying to another bhikkhu that he may have broken 
       a rule unknowingly, simply for the purpose of causing him 
       anxiety, is a pacittiya offense.
   
   
   
                                 * * * 
   
   
   
       78. Should any bhikkhu stand eavesdropping on bhikkhus when 
       they are arguing, quarreling, and disputing, thinking, "I 
       will overhear what they say" -- if doing it for just this 
       reason and no other -- it is to be confessed.
   
       "Now at that time some group-of-six bhikkhus were quarreling 
       with the well-behaved bhikkhus.  The well-behaved bhikkhus 
       (meeting among themselves) said, 'These group-of-six 
       bhikkhus are shameless.  There's no way you can argue with 
       them.'
       
       "Later, the group-of-six bhikkhus said to them, 'Why do you 
       disgrace us by calling us shameless?'
       
       "'But how did you overhear?'
       
       "'We stood eavesdropping on you.'"
   
   The factors for the full offense here are three.
   
     1) //Object//:  other bhikkhus who are involved in an argument 
   over an issue.
     
     2) //Effort//:  One stands eavesdropping on them,
     
     3) //Intention//:  with the purpose of using what they say against 
   them, either in a formal act (reproving, reminding, or reprimanding 
   them) or simply to make them feel remorseful or ashamed.
     
     Object.   According to the Vibhanga, the words, //arguing, 
   quarreling, and disputing// refer to arguments over issues (see 
   Pacittiya 63).  The Commentary says that this refers to one kind of 
   issue -- disputes -- but accusations would appear to fit here as 
   well.
     
     This factor is fulfilled regardless of whether the two parties in 
   the dispute/accusation are confronting each other or -- as in the 
   origin story -- one party is talking in private.  It is also 
   fulfilled regardless of whether or not one is already involved in 
   the dispute oneself.
     
     Bhikkhus involved in an argument are grounds for a pacittiya;  
   unordained people involved in an argument, grounds for a dukkata.  
   Perception -- e.g., whether or not one perceives the bhikkhus as 
   bhikkhus -- is not a mitigating factor here.
     
     People who are not involved in an argument are not grounds for an 
   offense.  Thus there is no penalty in eavesdropping on a Dhamma talk 
   or on a bhikkhu sitting in private with a woman, to see what they 
   will say to each other.
     
     Effort.  The Vibhanga goes into a fair amount of detail on this 
   factor, allotting the offenses as follows (assuming the other 
   factors to be fulfilled as well):
     
     One goes with the purpose of eavesdropping on the other party (%):  
       a dukkata.  One stays in one place eavesdropping on them:  a 
       pacittiya.
     
     One is walking behind the other part, and speeds up one's steps to 
       overhear them:  a dukkata.  One stays in one place eavesdropping 
       on them:  a pacittiya.
     
     One is walking ahead of the other party and slows down to overhear 
       them:  a dukkata.  One stays in one place eavesdropping on them:  
       a pacittiya.
     
     One is sitting, standing, or lying down in place, and the other 
       party happens to walk past (%):  One should cough, clear one's 
       throat, or (the K/Commentary states) say, "I'm here."  Not to do 
       so entails a pacittiya.
     
     At present, surreptitiously reading another person's mail would 
   seem to fulfill this factor as well.
     
     Intention.  According to the Vibhanga, there is no offense if one 
   happens to overhear bhikkhus arguing and goes away thinking, "I 
   won't get involved," or "I will free myself" ("by declaring my 
   innocence," says the Commentary).
   
       Summary:  Eavesdropping on bhikkhus involved in an argument 
       over an issue -- with the intention of using what they say 
       against them -- is a pacittiya offense.
   
   
   
                                 * * *
   
   
   
       79. Should any bhikkhu, having given consent (by proxy) to a 
       formal act carried out in accordance with the rule, later 
       complain (about the act), it is to be confessed.
   
       "Now at that time some group-of-six bhikkhus were indulging 
       in bad habits but protested when a formal act was being 
       carried out against any one of their group.  Now it happened 
       that the Community was meeting on some other business, and 
       the group-of-six bhikkhus, involved in making robes, sent 
       their consent with one of their members.  Then the 
       Community, thinking, 'Look, friends, one of the group-of-six 
       has come alone.  Let's carry out a formal act against him,' 
       did just that.  
       
       "He then returned to where the group-of-six bhikkhus were 
       staying.  They asked him, 'What, friend, did the Community 
       do?'"
       
       "'They carried out a formal act against me.'
       
       "'That wasn't what we gave our consent for, that they would 
       carry out a formal act against you.  If we had known that 
       they would carry out a formal act against you, we wouldn't 
       have given our consent!'"
   
   
   Formal acts.  A formal act is a procedure the Community follows in 
   settling any of the four kinds of issues:  disputes, accusations, 
   offenses, or duties.  The Vinaya gives the pattern for settling each 
   of the various issues falling into these four categories:  the 
   minimum number of bhikkhus that has to be present, the 
   qualifications (positive or negative) of the individual or situation 
   warranting the act, and the formal procedure -- a declaration, a 
   motion, a motion with one announcement, or a motion with three 
   announcements -- to follow in carrying out the act.  An act carried 
   out in accordance with these patterns is said to be carried out in 
   accordance with the rule.
   
     However, for a formal act to be valid and irreversible, it must be 
   carried out not only in accordance with the rule, but also by a 
   complete assembly (Mv.IX.2.4).  This point is to prevent small 
   factions from carrying out acts as they like.  When this point was 
   first raised, the question arose, How many bhikkhus are needed for 
   an assembly to be complete?  All the bhikkhus in the world?  All the 
   bhikkhus in a particular monastery?  The Buddha's answer was, All 
   the bhikkhus in a monastery, and he gave permission for the bhikkhus 
   to delineate boundaries (//sima//) so as to determine who did and 
   did not have to join in the act for the assembly to be complete 
   (Mv.II.5.2,6.1,12.7).  Later, he gave permission that an ill bhikkhu 
   living within the boundary did not have to attend the meeting, but 
   could give his consent by proxy, through word or gesture, and the 
   assembly would still be regarded as complete (Mv.II.23.1-2).
     
     Thus a complete assembly is defined as follows:  All the bhikkhus 
   within the boundary are either present at the meeting (sitting 
   within 1.25 meters of one another in the meeting) or have given 
   their consent by proxy, and no one makes a valid protest against the 
   act's being carried out (Mv.IX.3.5-6).  (An invalid protest would be 
   one made by someone who is not a bhikkhu, by a bhikkhu who is 
   insane, possessed by a spirit, outside the boundary, or suspended 
   from the Community, or by the bhikkhu against whom the act is being 
   carried out (Mv.IX.4.7-8).)
     
     Before we go on to discuss this rule, there are a few added points 
   concerning the origin story we should touch on:
   
     1) When a bhikkhu makes a valid protest, he does not need to 
       justify it.  In other words, he can make protest simply because 
       he doesn't agree with the act, and his protest stands regardless 
       of whether or not he can find any basis for it in the Dhamma and 
       Vinaya.
     
     2) One Community may not carry out a formal act against another 
       Community (Mv.IX.2.3).  What this means is that they may carry it 
       out against no more than three bhikkhus at a time.  This is why 
       the group-of-six bhikkhus were able to protect one another from 
       being subject to a formal act, for there were usually more than 
       three of them at any one meeting of the Community.  Even though 
       the ones against whom the formal act was being carried out had no 
       right to protest, their friends did, and they took advantage of 
       their right.
     
     3) In the passage where the Buddha gives permission for bhikkhus 
       to give their consent by proxy (Mv.II.23.1-2), he states that 
       this permission applies to ill bhikkhus.  Yet in the origin 
       stories to this rule and the following one, the group of six are 
       not ill, they give their consent by proxy, and the act carried 
       out with their consent is considered to be valid.  None of the 
       texts make note of this point, but it seems to indicate that 
       //ill// in this context covers not only physical illness, but 
       also any other serious inconvenience that prevents one from 
       joining in the meeting.
   
     The factors for the offense under this rule are three.
     
     1) //Object//:  a valid formal act to which one has given one's 
   consent.
     
     2) //Perception//:  One perceives it as valid.
     
     3) //Effort//:  One complains about it.
     
     Object & perception.  The various permutations of these factors 
   are as follows:
   
     a valid act that one perceives to be valid:  grounds for a 
       pacittiya;
     an invalid act that one perceives to be valid:  grounds for a 
       dukkata;
     an act that one is doubtful about, regardless of its actual 
       validity:  grounds for a dukkata;
     an act that one perceives to be invalid, regardless of its actual 
       validity:  grounds for no offense.
   
     Effort.  Any expression of displeasure with the act would fulfill 
   this factor.  If, however, one states that the act was not carried 
   out in accordance with the rule, then regardless of whether or not 
   one had given one's consent, the case would fall under Pacittiya 63, 
   rather than here.
     
     Non-offenses.  There is no offense in complaining about the act if 
   one perceives it as having been carried out not in accordance with 
   the rule, by an incomplete assembly, or against someone who did not 
   warrant such an act.  This exemption holds regardless of whether, in 
   fact, the act was valid or not.
   
       Summary:  Complaining about a formal act of the Community to 
       which one gave one's consent -- if one knows that the act 
       was carried out in accordance with the rule -- is a 
       pacittiya offense.   
   
   
   
                                 * * *
   
   
   
       80. Should any bhikkhu, when deliberation is being carried 
       on in the Community, get up from his seat and leave without 
       having given consent, it is to be confessed.
   
   The origin story here is a sequel to the one for the preceding rule.
   
       "Now at that time the Community was meeting on some 
       business, and the group-of-six bhikkhus, involved in making 
       robes, sent their consent with one of their group.  Then the 
       Community, thinking, 'We'll carry out the formal act 
       (against the one member of the group-of-six) that was our 
       //real// purpose in meeting,' set forth a motion.  The 
       bhikkhu -- thinking, 'It's just in this way that they carry 
       out formal acts against us one at a time.  Well, who are you 
       going to carry out //this// act against?' -- without giving 
       his consent, got up from his seat and left."
   
     As explained under the preceding rule, a bhikkhu has no right to 
   protest when the Community is carrying out a formal act against him.  
   However, the Community may not carry out an act against a bhikkhu 
   who is not in its midst (see Adhikarana-Samatha 1), and any act is 
   invalid if carried out when there is a bhikkhu within the boundary 
   who is not in the meeting and who has not given his consent.  The 
   bhikkhu in the origin story took advantage of these two principles 
   to escape from the formal act being carried out against himself, and 
   the Buddha then formulated this rule to impose a penalty on any 
   bhikkhu who tried the same maneuver in the future.
   
     There are four factors for the full offense.
     
     1) //Object//:  A formal act has been started but has yet to be 
   finished, and is being carried out in a valid manner.
     
     2) //Perception//:  One perceives it as being carried out in a 
   valid manner.
     
     3) //Intention//:  One wants to invalidate the act or to keep the 
   group from carrying it out.
     
     4) //Effort//:  One goes beyond one //hatthapasa// (1.25 m.) from 
   the bhikkhus sitting in the meeting, without having first given 
   one's consent.
     
     Object & perception.  The various permutations of these two factor 
   are as follows:
   
     a valid act that one perceives to be valid:  grounds for a 
       pacittiya;
     an invalid act that one perceives to be valid:  grounds for a 
       dukkata;
     an act that one is doubtful about, regardless of its actual 
       validity:  grounds for a dukkata;
     an act that one perceives as invalid, regardless of its actual 
       validity:  grounds for no offense.
   
     According to the Vibhanga, the time period covered by this factor 
   begins at the point where the matter has been brought up in the 
   Community -- or a motion has been set forth -- and ends when the 
   Community's decision has been announced.
     
     The Commentary, in discussing this point, says that, in the case 
   of an accusation, the point when the matter has been brought up is 
   when both sides have stated their initial positions, and a bhikkhu 
   has been authorized to cross-examine them.       
     
     Effort.  The Vibhanga divides the effort here into three parts and 
   allots the penalties as follows:
   
     One gets up to go:  a dukkata.
     One reaches the distance of one //hatthapasa// from the meeting:  
       another dukkata.
     One passes beyond the distance of one //hatthapasa//:  a 
       pacittiya.
   
     The K/Commentary adds that one must also remain within the 
   boundary (//sima//) for this factor to be fulfilled, but the 
   Vibhanga makes no mention of this, and there seems no reason to 
   adopt it.  If we did adopt it, it would mean that if a formal act 
   were being carried out against a bhikkhu, and he left the meeting 
   and the boundary to avoid it, he would be committing no offense.  
   Thus it seems better to stick with the Vibhanga and say that this 
   factor is fulfilled when one goes beyond one hatthapasa away from 
   the meeting, regardless of whether one then stays within the 
   boundary or not.
     
     Intention.  There is no offense if, without giving one's consent, 
   one leaves the meeting for purposes other than to invalidate the 
   act.  Examples in the Vibhanga include:
   
     One is ill.
     One has to do something (e.g., prepare or give medicine) for one 
       who is ill.
     One is overcome with the need to urinate or defecate.
     One leaves, without desiring to invalidate the act, with the 
       thought, "I'll come right back."
     
     In all of these cases, though, if possible, it is best to give 
   one's consent before going.
     
     Non-offenses.  In addition to the above cases, there is also no 
   offense if one leaves a meeting without giving one's consent with 
   the purpose of invalidating the act if one perceives that:
   
     the act will lead to quarreling, a crack, or a split in the 
       Community; or
     the act is being carried out not in accordance with the rule, by 
       an incomplete assembly, or against/for a person who doesn't 
       warrant it.
   
       Summary:  Getting up and leaving a meeting of the Community 
       in the midst of a valid formal act -- without having first 
       given one's consent to the act and with the intention of 
       invalidating it -- is a pacittiya offense. 
   
   
   
                                 * * *
   
   
   
       81. Should any bhikkhu, (acting as part of) a Community in 
       concord, give robe-cloth (to an individual bhikkhu) and 
       later complain, "The bhikkhus apportion the Community's 
       gains according to friendship," it is to be confessed.
   
   Apportioning the Community's gains.  The Cullavagga (VI.15.2) 
   contains a passage saying that no one -- not even the Community 
   itself -- can take any of the following items belonging to the 
   Community and turn them over to individual ownership:  monasteries 
   or monastery land; dwellings or land on which dwellings are built; 
   furnishings, such as couches, chairs, or mattresses; metal vessels 
   or tools; building materials or articles made of pottery or wood.  
   The collective term for these goods is //garubhanda//, or heavy 
   articles.  The penalty for handing any of the Community's garubhanda 
   over to individual ownership is a thullaccaya.  In the origin story 
   to Parajika 4, the Buddha states that a bhikkhu who gives the 
   Community's garubhanda to a lay person is one of the five great 
   thieves in the world.
   
     Light articles (//lahubhanda//) belonging to the Community, 
   though, may be turned over to individual ownership -- of a bhikkhu 
   or novice -- but only when the proper procedures are followed.  The 
   usual pattern is to appoint a Community official, through a formal 
   act, to be responsible for making sure that such items be 
   distributed fairly to the members of the Community eligible to 
   receive them.  Such officials include distributors of robe-cloth, of 
   food, of fruit, of non-staple foods, and of small accessories, such 
   as scissors, sandals, water strainers, etc. (Cv.VI.21). 
     
     In addition, this training rule shows that a Community acting as a 
   whole may take light articles belonging to it and turn them over to 
   individual bhikkhus or novices.  (According to the K/Commentary to 
   Pacittiya 79, this can be done with a simple declaration 
   (//apalokana//), although the kathina ceremony, which would fall 
   under this general category, follows the pattern of a motion with 
   one announcement.)  A typical example, apart from the kathina, would 
   be if the Community receives a particularly fine piece of cloth and, 
   instead of cutting it up to share the pieces out among the members, 
   decides to present the entire piece to one of its members who has 
   been especially helpful to the group.  This is one way in which the 
   Community may reward a Community official for his services.
     
     Any member of the Community who disagrees with such a decision may 
   prevent it from happening by protesting during the declaration.  The 
   purpose of this rule is to prevent members of the Community from 
   complaining, after the they have taken part in such a decision, that 
   the Community was acting out of favoritism.
     
     The factors for the full offense are two.
     
     1) //Object//:  One has acted as part of a Community that has 
   given robe-cloth to a bhikkhu who has been chosen, through a prior 
   formal act, to be a Community official. 
     
     2) //Effort//:  One complains afterwards that the Community acted 
   out of favoritism.
     
     Object.  //Acting as part of a Community// means that one is in 
   communion with the Community that handed over the cloth, and that 
   one was in the same boundary with them:  i.e., one was either in the 
   meeting or had given one's consent to it.
     
     //Robe-cloth// means a piece of any of the six kinds of allowable 
   cloth, measuring at least four by eight fingerbreadths.
     
     The various permutations of articles and recipients are as 
   follows:
     
     Complaining when the Community has given robe-cloth to a Community 
       official:  a pacittiya.
     Complaining when the Community has given any other light article 
       to a Community official:  a dukkata.
     Complaining when the Community has given any light article -- 
       cloth or otherwise -- to a bhikkhu who is not a Community 
       official or to a novice:  a dukkata.
     
     Perception is not a mitigating factor here.  For example, if the 
   recipient was made a Community official through a valid formal act, 
   then regardless of how one perceives that act, it has no effect on 
   the penalty under this rule.  (The Vibhanga is somewhat confusing on 
   this point, not saying explicitly whether the factor of "perception 
   with regard to the formal act" refers to the act by which the 
   official was appointed or to the act by which the cloth was handed 
   over to him.  The first interpretation, though, is the only one that 
   makes sense in light of the no-offense clauses, and the K/Commentary 
   confirms that it is the correct one.) 
     
     Effort.  This factor is fulfilled by any expression of personal 
   displeasure with the Community.  If, however, one accuses the 
   Community of having carried out the act improperly -- not in 
   accordance with the rule, or with an incomplete assembly -- the case 
   would come not here, but under Pacittiya 63.
     
     Non-offenses.  The Vibhanga says that if the article //was// given 
   out of habitual favoritism, anger, delusion, or fear, there is no 
   offense in complaining, "What is the use of giving it to him?  After 
   receiving it he'll ruin it; he won't take proper care of it."  
   Notice, however, that even in cases of this sort one is allowed to 
   criticize only the recipient, and not the Community -- for, after 
   all, one had one's chance to protest during the meeting, but 
   remained silent.
   
       Summary:  After participating in a formal act of the 
       Community giving robe-cloth to a Community official:  
       Complaining that the Community acted out of favoritism is a 
       pacittiya offense.
   
   
   
                                 * * *
   
       82. Should any bhikkhu knowingly divert to an individual 
       gains that had been allocated for the Community, it is to be 
       confessed.
   
   This rule has already been explained under NP 30.
   
       Summary:  Persuading a donor to give to another individual a 
       gift that he or she had planned to give to a Community -- 
       when one knows that it was intended for the Community -- is 
       a pacittiya offense
   
                            * * * * * * * *
