


============article by Bob Lang====

As some of you know, Dave Davis is trying to put together a series
of FAQs for a.a addressing various kinds of arguments for the
existence of god (e.g., the five ways of Acquinas, Goedel's
ontological proof).

My contribution to this is a FAQ on the argument from mystical
experience. I've included it below.

I'd like to encourage others to help with this effort by either
a) emailing me constructive criticism of the FAQ included in this
post, or b) volunteering to write a FAQ on one of the remaining
arguments. 

The hope, as always, is to cut down on signal-to-noise and reduce
repetition of the same topics.

If you're interested in writing a FAQ, send email to Dave Davis
<ddavis01@world.std.com>. If you've got input, suggestions,
criticism of the FAQ included in this post, please email me.
[snip /DDD]

Thanks.

---------------------begin included text-----------------------

<The argument from mystical experience>

<Background>
The argument from mystical experience is intriguing for several
reasons. First, mystical experiences -- the ineffable awareness of 
the
true existence of the object of one's religious beliefs -- seem to be 
at
the core of all religions. Were it not for the ability to have, or at
least the hope of having, such experiences, religions might cease to
exist.

Second, the existence of mystical experiences (from here on ME)
provides the possibility of an instantaneous conversion: an atheist 
has
an inexplicable experience which she can only attribute to god and,
voila -- she's now a theist.

Third, there's the possibility that MEs are "priviledged knowledge."
What if non-believers simply lack the appropriate "senses" to perceive
god? Knowing that MEs exist, how can know whether the object of the 
ME
exists?

So just what is a mystical experience? The simplest definition is
any experience in which the experiencer claims to be directly in
touch with god. But that is not entirely adequate. In _Varieties of
Religious Belief_, William James gives many representative examples
of MEs, of which the following is one:

"I was in perfect health: we were on our sixth
day of tramping, and in good training. . . . I
felt neither fatigue, hunger, nor thirst, and
my state of mind was equally healthy. . . . I
can best describe the condition in which I was
by calling it a state of equilibrium. When all
at once I experienced a feeling of being
raised above myself, I felt the presence of
God--I tell of the thing just as I was
conscious of it--as if his goodness and his
power were penetrating me altogether. The
throb of emotion was so violent that I could
barely tell the boys to pass on and not wait
for me. i then sat down on a stone, unable to
stand any longer, and my eyes overflowed with
tears....

I think it well to add that in this ecstasy
of mine God had neither form, color, odor,
nor taste; moreover that the feeling of his
presence was accompanied by no determinate
localization. It was rather as if my
personality had been transformed by the
presence of a _spiritual spirit_. But the more
I seek words to express this intimate
intercourse, the more I feel the impossibility
of describing the thing by any of our usual
images. At bottom the expression most apt to
render what I felt was this: God was present,
though invisible; he fell under no one of my
senses, yet my consciousness perceived him" 
[1].

This example illustrates the ineffable nature of the experience
that ME arguers emphasize, including an awareness of god that is
gained not through the senses.

There are two primary kinds of ME arguments that I'm aware of: I'll 
call
them "strong" and "weak" arguments. A strong ME argument hopes to
provide evidence of god's existence. One way this evidence is provided
is by attempting to establish the cognitivity of MEs. A cognitive
experience "is one on the basis of which we gain knowledge of some
objective reality" [2]. That means that if MEs can be shown to be
cognitive, they can count as evidence for the existence of god. If
people are experiencing god in a cognitive way, god must exist. But
even when they set out to establish cognitivity, most ME arguers 
concede
that it cannot be done. For example, in _John of the Cross and the
Cognitive Value of Mysticism_, Payne discusses the possible 
explanations
for the religious experiences of John of the Cross, a well-known
Christian mystic. Payne _does_ hope to show that John's experiences 
were
cognitive, but concludes that the best he can hope for is to show that
cognitivity is at least as good an explanation as any other: "Still, I
think we have shown that, given the satisfaction of certain conditions
which many believers probably meet, it is reasonable to accept
contemplative awareness as a cognitive mode of experience. And this, 
it
seems to me, is as much support as faith can legitimately expect of
philosophy here: not a conclusive demonstration that belief in the
cognitive value of mystical states is true, but only a solid argument
that this belief is not contrary to reason" [3].

I am not aware of any arguments in which ME is claimed to be _good_
evidence for the existence of god.

This does not mean, however, that ME arguments are worthless. 
Religious
experience arguments do not always seek to provide proof of god's
existence. Such arguments are "weak" ME arguments. Weak ME arguments
attempt to show that it is rational for those who've had a ME to 
believe
that the experience was an actual perception of god (or some other 
form
of "ultimate reality"). There is a subtle distinction between using 
MEs
as evidence for god's existence on the basis of a ME and claiming that
individuals are justified in believing based on MEs. In weak ME
arguments, the issue of whether a theist's ME-derived belief actually
corresponds to something out there in the objective world is not
crucial. The point is that belief is rational and justified. Non-ME
experiencers have no reason to believe. On the one hand, this is a 
very
persuasive kind of argument because it can be formulated consistently
with little room for objection. On the other hand, it is unpersuasive
because there is no hope of convincing someone not already convinced.


<Published support for the argument from mystical experience>

William James, Varieties of Religious Experience
Nelson Pike, Mystic Union
Wayne Proudfoot, Religious Experience
William Alston, Perceiving God

James' argument in Varieties was one of the first ME arguments in 
modern
times and certainly the most influential. Perhaps the most important
recent argument for MEs, and to my mind, the most persuasive, is made 
by
Alston. Alston's argument is of what I've called the weak variety: he
does not purport to give evidence to non-believers for a particular
god's existence; instead, he hopes to show that MEs provide a rational
justification for belief for those who've had MEs.

Rather than summarize general arguments for and against MEs, it will 
be
more instructive to look in some detail at what I consider the most
persuasive ME argument (Alston's), then look at its merits and
shortcomings.

Alston's argument depends on his assertion that there can be no
non-circular proof of the reliability of any doxastic practice. A
doxastic (or belief-forming) practice is any practice through which we
form beliefs or opinions, such as deductive reasoning or empirical
observation.

According to Alston's unique epistemology, we cannot justify or defend
the reliability of any doxastic practice without using tests from 
within
the practice itself. For example, in sense perception, verification by
others is one of the primary tests. If I say that hot water freezes
faster than cold water, others are likely to doubt me. But I can 
present
a simple experiment and its results for others to examine and 
reproduce.
If, under the same conditions, everyone gets the same results, we
conclude that the statement "under the proper conditions, hot water
freezes faster than cold water" is true. Note that the test to
determine the truth of my claim was a test based in sense perception --
specifically empirical observation. Any test for any sense perception
(SP) -related claim must also be SP-related. Furthermore, there is no
single, external "meta-practice" we can appeal to to determine if any
the SP doxastic practice really is reliable. This is what Alston 
means
by no non-circular proof. 


But just because we must rely on circular proof, we need not conclude
that SP is _un_reliable or that we must all become solipsists. We can
suppose SP to be reliable for two reasons: 1) because it is widely
practiced and 2) for the sake of pragmatism -- we simply cannot 
function
without assuming the reliability of sense perception. Although we 
cannot
prove its reliability in a non-circular way, lacking compelling 
evidence
_against_ the reliability of SP, we can and should trust its
reliability.

Alston extends this claim to all doxastic practices -- including, of
course ME. Just as we can trust SP to be reliable by providing 
circular
proof, so can we trust the circular proofs of MP (mystical percpetion -
-
this is Alston's term. When referring to Alston, I'll use MP, as
distinguished from the generic, ME.) For example, the Catholic Church
considers the moral betterment of the experiencer to be one way of
determining whether a ME was legitimate. This is clearly a circualr 
test
within Christian mystical tradition, and would not apply to SP or any
other mystical tradition.

A common way to refute MP arguments is to appeal to SP. Consider the
verification-by-others test. There are many different mystical
traditions, none of which agree (e.g., Buddhists claim to be in touch
with an undifferentiated unity, while Christians claim to be in touch
with a personal creator and sustainer of the universe). If we apply 
the
verification-by-others test we see that this disagreement renders MP 
to
be unreliable: just as we could not accept the hypothesis that hot 
water
freezes faster if many different experimenters got many different
results, we cannot accept the many differing claims of the many
different mystical traditions.

But Alston would point out that any use of SP to prove or disprove MP 
is
not allowed. Proof of a doxastic practice can (and indeed must) be
circular. We have no compulsion to apply the SP test of verification 
by
others to MPs. Furthermore, the fact that there are many different
mystical traditions is immaterial. Each tradition is its own doxastic
practice and each has tests for its own validity. Thus, they cannot be
expected to agree.


<Published refuations of the argument from mystical experience>

Forgie, William, "Theistic Experience and the Doctrine of Unanimity,"
International Journal of the Philosophy of Religion 15 (1994): 13-30.

Richard M. Gale, _On the Nature and Existence of God_, Cambridge
University Press, Cambridge, N.Y., 1991, p. 313.

Robert Pasnau, "Justified Until Proven Guilty: Alston's new
Epistemology."


I've been able to find only two published refutations of Alston. The
first is contained in Richard M. Gale's _On the Nature and Existence 
of
God_, the second is Robert Pasnau's "Justified Until Proven Guilty."
I'll discuss their objections along with interspersed objections of my
own.

Objection: MP is not a distinct doxastic practice. This objection 
holds
that the formulation of beliefs about an MP are done by means of
ordinary SP; thus MP should be subject to the same tests as MP. For
example, on the basis of an MP in which the experiencer claims to feel
god's love, the experiencer would naturally conclude that god is 
loving.
This conclusion is made using simple inductive reasoning, which is a
subset of the more general SP doxastic practice.

Or consider an alternative example: Descriptions of mystical 
experiences
invariably include statements like, "God brought me comfort" or "a
feeling of euphoria." Feelings -- comfort, euphoria, and the like --
are physical, sense-related states. Thus, it's not clear what the
difference between mystical experiences and "ordinary" sense 
experiences
are. If MPs are really SPs, they should be subject to the same kinds 
of
tests. If they are subject to SP tests, we know what the results will
be: MPs will be found to be unreliable, contradictory, and unfit as
sources of knowledge.

But Alston argues that "the formation of perceptual beliefs about God
... belongs to a distinctively different doxastic practice [from the 
SP
doxastic practice]." He uses the following example to support his
contention:

"suppose I were to make an analogous critique of
introspective reports, e.g., that I now feel
excited. Here too the report cannot be assessed
on the basis of whether other people experience
the same thing under the same conditions. Even
if they don't that has no tendency to show that
I didn't feel excited. But this will not lead
most of us to deny that such beliefs can be
justified. We would simply point out that we
should not expect beliefs about one's own
conscious states to be subject to the same sorts
of tests as beliefs about ships and sealing wax.
More indirect tests of a public sort can be
given to determine the subject's mastery of
mentalistic language and his general reliability
as a reporter. But as for particular reports,
assuming general competence, there is no appeal
beyond his word" [4].

This is not, in my opinion, a good analogy. In contrast to religious
experiences, everyone has felt excited at one time or another and
understands the conditions under which the feeling is likely to occur.
The same cannot be said for religious experiences. Furthermore,
excitement is, in a sense, a physical phenomenon that can be tested 
with
sense perception tests like monitoring of brain activity or heart 
rate.
By this example at least, MP does not seem to be a distinct doxastic
practice.

Objection: Religious diversity. This is an objection that nearly any
atheist would make intuitively. Alston has a reasonable response to 
it,
but ultimately he seems to dodge the issue.

Alston does not think that MPs must be considered as a single doxastic
practice; rather, he sees them as many separate doxastic practices. As
such, different mystical traditions cannot be expected to agree. Gale
argues that this is unfair: "Again, we find Alston committing the
fallacy of thinking that if he can give a categoreally based 
explanation
for a disanalogy between the religious- and sense-experience doxastic
practices, it renders the disanalogy harmless" [5]. Gale suggests that
while on the one hand Alston wants to make MP and SP analogous in
certain respects, he is not willing, on the other hand, to make MP
subject to an analogous tests -- e.g., he is not willing to make
agreement among different religious traditions a criterion for the
reliability of MPs.

It is a crucial question: should we consider each religious tradition 
to
be its own doxastic practice or should we consider MPs as a whole to 
be
a single doxastic practice. If we consider MPs as consisting of many
distinct doxastic practices, Alston's position is fairly secure: each
doxastic practice has its own tests, none of which can be verified
non-circularly. However, Gale's objection remains: just how analogous 
is
analogous? How can Alston justify making MPs into many doxastic
practices and still consider MP a reasonable analogue to SP, when SP
clearly is a single doxastic practice? Alston can simply argue that
this is one of the ways in which the two are not analogous, but his
position smacks of inconsistency.

If, on the other hand, we consider MP to be a single doxastic 
practice,
we see that there are many incompatible ways of dealing with MPs and 
we
can conclude that MPs are unreliable.

Even if we concede Alston's view that MP consists of many distinct
doxastic practices, problems persist. Alston uses Christian mystical
perception (CMP) to illustrate how a particular mystical doxastic
practice is legitimate. In doing this, however, he has not 
demonstrated
the reliability of the practice as a whole. Alston shows how CMP has 
its
own checks and tests for determining the truth of MP claims, but his
thesis is consistently that we should grant MPs _categorically_ the 
same
reliability we grant to SP. How can we say anything meaningful about
MPs as a whole if we consider just one MP in isolation (i.e., CMP),
especially when Alston himself admits that different mystical 
traditions
have different tests? In other words, in order to say that all MP
traditions are legitimate, each would have to be scrutinized,
understood, and only if it seems to have legitimate tests, claimed to 
be
a legitimate doxastic practice in its own right. Not having done this,
it seems to me that the most he can claim is that CMP is a legitimate
doxastic practice; he cannot extend that claim to the MP traditions he
has not analyzed and certainly not to MP as a whole. Alston himself 
has
said, "I am committed to the proposition that most forms of MP are
somewhat unreliable" [6].

Objection: Just because we engage in a doxastic practice doesn't mean 
it
is reliable. Whereas Alston claims that if we engage in a doxastic
practice, we must consider it to be reliable, Pasnau claims this is 
not
the case. On the contrary, Pasnau says it is perfectly reasonable to
consistently engage in a practice and have doubts about its 
reliability.
He uses the example of ethics: most people, by a process they don't
fully understand, derive a personal code of ethics. There is certainly
no way to know if the process is reliable or if the beliefs formed are
true. Yet it is a process we may engage in every day. The implication
for MPs is that the experiencer needn't take the practice or the
resultant beliefs that are formed as reliable.

Alston sees this objection as merely a clash of Pasnau's intuition 
with
his own: "It seems clear to me that if I confidently form beliefs in a
certain way, and continue to do so over a long period of time, where
this (naturally) involves taking those beliefs to be true, I thereby
evince my confidence that that way of forming beliefs can be relied 
onto
yield mostly true beliefs" [7].

Objection: An MP can be interpreted as an ordinary SP. By Alston's
definition of a religious experience, it is tautologically true that
having a religious experience (or more specifically a CMP) entails a
belief in god: "I want to include any experiences that the subject
takes, or would take if the question arose, to be an _intuitive_,
experiential awareness of God, as contrasted with just thinking about
God...." [8].

However, we can certainly conceive of an atheist having an experience
that would otherwise be labelled as mystical, yet interpret it simply
wrote in <stryder.770771010@access3>:

"I experienced the power of prayer in a very
strong way. My experiences, both alone (I see
now I really WAS alone) and in church were
quite dramatic. My life was punctuated with
tears and wonderful joy.

At one point, I began to wonder how much of
what I was experiencing was pure emotionalism.
So I decided to try an experiment. I went
into a dark room and prayed similarly to the
way I had prayed in the past, but this time I


 

lm.com



<Argument Name>
 Augustine's Epistemological Proof
<Background>

Augustine, Aurelius. Bp. of Hippo Regius (N. Africa); d. 428. Began 
professional career as teacher of Rhetoric at Milan; planned on career 
in 
philosophy;spent 10 years as a Manichean (dualistic religion); 
converted
to 'orthodox' (Nicean) christianity after study with Bp. 
Ambrose and a mystical experience. Wrote 1st? Latin spiritual auto-
biography, _Confessions_. Wrote many, many books, esp. 
The_City_of_God, 
which develops a 'Christian' view of history, and also attempts to
explain the Fall of Rome. Tremendously influential in medieval 
thought.
Augustine's primary philosophical mentors were the Neoplatonists,
esp. Plotinus, Poryphry, and Varro; but the influences of Cicero
(Stoicism) and the Christian Scriptures (esp. Paul) should not be 
neglected. A. is usually held to have little Greek; he gives little
evidence of acquaintence with Aristotlean thought or books (except
via Cicero).

<Synopsis>


The argument appears, in the form of a Socratic dialogue
between A. and his friend Evodius, in De_libero_arbitrio
(written between 388 and 395, and not substantially
retracted in the _Retractations_ at the end of A.'s
career). The theme of DLA is not so much about 'free will' in our
sense, but more about 'the problem of evil'. (1)

Knowles paraphrases it (I've added in some quotes from Aug.):

 To a further, more rigourous proof, based on his own
 system of thought, he [Aug.] devotes particular care.
 The argument runs thus. If there is a being higher than,
 and superior to, the human soul [or, 'the human mind' /D],
 that being is God. ['All I need do is to show you that
 there is a being of such a kind, and either you will
 admit this being to be God, or, if there is anything
 higher, you will grant that the higher being is God.
 So, whether there is something higher or there is not,
 it will be clear that God exists, when ... I shall
 show ... that there exists something higher than reason. 
 /DLA Bk II] Now, by our intellectual processes of 
 thought we attain to, and know that we attain to, truth.
 But this truth is not 'our' truth, since all may have it
 and recognize it [...] It is itself permanent and im-
 mutable [A.'s ex: 'the unchangeable truth of number'], whereas 
 what we see is only partial and changeable. 
 There is therefore 'above' us a Truth perfect and unchangeable. 
 This Truth, which can also be shown to be also the 
 Good and the Beautiful , is God. ['...if there is nothing 
 more excellent, then truth itself is God.' /DLA Bk II ] (1)

Hick is more succinct:

 Augustine had argued in Platonic fashion that our
 intelligence must recognize something superior to itself,
 namely wisdom or truth; and either this is God, or, if
 there be something superior to it, then *this* is God.(1)

(1) Augustine, The_Problem_of_free_choice. Ancient Christian Writers
 series (Longmans: 1955). Well annotated ed., transl. by 
 Dom Mark Pontifex. Also avail. in 'The Age of Belief' (Signet
 paperback; I don't recall the editor or other pub. info).
 A. treats epistemological issues more extensively in 
 De_Magistro ('On the Teacher'; another Socratic-style dialogue, 
 this time with his son, Adeodatus)
(2) David Knowles, The_Evolution_of_Medieval_Thought. 
(3) John Hick, Arguments_for_the_Existence_of_God. H. mentions
 A.'s argument as a precursor of Anselm's. Quite so. 
 
<Published Modern Supportive Critiques>
 Nothing completely pertinent leaps to mind; Gilson and
Copelston, I'm sure, would discuss this. C.S Lewis, in the first
four chapters of his book, _Miracles_ introduces a strongly similar
heuristic for deciding between 'naturalism' and 'supernaturalism' ; 
but I don't see that CSL 'got it out' of Augustine. 

<Published Modern Refutations>
<Internet Resources>
 The CCAT Gopher at the University of Pennsylvania has extensive
Augustine material; also, any mailing lists discussing Late Antiquity
or the Early Medieval period almost must discuss Augustine. 

<Additional Comments>

 This argument has long been a favorite of mine, or at least 
is one that I've found aesthetically attractive. It is 
epistemological,
it seems to me, because it works from 'what can we know?' and 
'how is it that we can know anything?'. It is also (mostly) 'a priori'
(rather 'a posteriori' as in the Argument from Design'. In both these 
we can see the ancestry that Anselm drew upon. 

 In contemporary thought, a 'naturalistic' view of reason is
almost a given. That is, reason is seen as an an adaptive behavior,
in the evolutionary sense (citations, anyone?). Thus this argument
will tend to have little persuasive power, for folks (naively or
after doing their philosophical homework) sharing the modern cast of 
mind.

 However, any refutation of reason as 'special' needs to tread
carefully to avoid circularity of question-begging. If Augustine's 
argument reminds us of this, then it continues to do useful work. 

============

More on the FAQ project:

I have someone working on Plato's argument (from the Laws); another
person intends something on Paley's version of the Argument from 
Design,
but I haven't seen it yet. Slots are therefore still open- refute your
choice philosopher now! Operators are stadning by!


Dave Davis





 

m




<Argument Name> 
 Anselm's Ontological Argument
<Background and Short Synopsis>
 Anselm (Archbp. of Canterbury) an Italian-born Benedictine,
was a 11th c. (pre-Scholastic) teacher and abbot. 
He is usually held to have built on Augustinian
foundations for his philosophical and theological works; certainly he 
wrote
before the re-introduction of Aristotle into the West. His principal 
works 
were Proslogion (which contains the Ontological Argument), Monologion 
(which
contains some material recalling Augustine's Epistemological Argument, 
q.v.),
and Cur_Deus_Homo ('Why God became a Man'- Christian theodicy).
These are widely available in translation, compilations, and excerpts.

 And whatever is understood, exists in the understanding.
 And assuredly that, than which nothing greater can be 
 conceived [L.: aliquid quo nihil maius cogitari possit*], 
 cannot exist in the understanding alone. For 
 suppose it exists in the understanding alone: than it can 
 be conceived to exist in reality; which is greater.
 Therefore, if that, than which nothing greater can be 
 conceived, exists in the understanding alone, the very being,
 than which nothing greater can be conceived, is one than
 which a greater can be conceived. But, obviously this is
 impossible. Hence, there is no doubt that there exists a
 being, than which nothing greater can be conceived...

Source: Anselm (of Canterbury), 'Prologion', Basic_Writings
(La Salle, IL: Open Court Press, 1962), p.8 .
*Elsewhere 'nihil melius cogitari possit' = nothing better than 
which cannot be conceived. That precise form of words is apparently
not vital to A. 

Hick (Arguments_for_the_Existence_of_God) sees *three*
arguments for God in the Proslogion. I have been talking about
the one above, which certainly has the most notoriety. 

A boiled-down version of the argument:

 1. If the greatest being possible ('that, than which nothing
 greater can be conceived') does not exist,
 then it is possible that there exists a being 
 greater than the greatest possible being.
 2. It is not possible that there exists a being greater
 than the greatest being possible.
 Therefore
 3. The greatest being possible exists. (1)

(1) J.W. Cornman & K. Lehrer, Philosophical_
 Problems_&_Arguments (NY: Macmillian/Collier 1973)

Another attempt at synopsis:
 1) God is a being who posseses all perfections
 2) Existence is a perfection
 Therefore,
 God exists. (1)

(2) Olson, Robert G. Short_Intro._to_Philosophy (NY: HBW, 1967) p. 74.

<Positive Evaluations>
Hartshorne, and others (apparently; I haven't recently seen the
material) continue to find Anselm's Ontological Argument worthy of
consideration. One professor of philosophy that I know of describes 
Anselm's approach not as *a proof of God's existence* but as *a vision
of God's nature* (which might mitigate against its utility in standard
philosophical discourse :-) ). Certainly it has been the source of
many variations of Ontological Arguments, including efforts by 
Descartes,
Leibnitz, Hartshorne, and Goedel. In The_Evolution_of_Medieval_
Thought (Vintage Books: 1962) David Knowles writes, "...[Anselm's]
argument, when set out in its bare terms, without any reference to
his experience or views, is couched in terms of pure dialectic, and
must stand or fall by its sheer dialectical force. A principal
reason of our difficulty in appreciating its power may well be that 
pur dialectic makes but a weak appeal to our minds." (p. 106)

<Negative Evaluations> 
[Kant spent a good deal of ink on Anselm. 'Existence is not a
predicate' is his principal contribution to the analysis of this 
approach.]
Knowles writes that we owe the description of arguments of this sort
as 'ontological' to Kant, 'for whom an ontological proof was any 
proof independent of existence and based on a simple analysis of
concepts." (p. 102) Knowles also mentions, '...Geyer dismisses it
[Anselm's Ontological Argument] out of hand as a fallacy. Cornford 
and Lehrer also find it unconvincing; they hold that using Anselm's
logic, "We can even prove that the being whose description involves
the most contradictions exists." (p.388)
 
<Internet Resources>
Rondo Keele <Rondo.Keele@m.cc.utah.edu> and Burkhard Reike 
<reike@teneriffa.uni-paderborn.de> have contributed well-thought 
forum. 

<Additional References>
Plantinga, Alvin. God_and Other_Minds.

<Additional Comments>
As I see it, the trouble with Anselm's argument is that 'greater'
remains an inadequately defined term in it. Many things seem 'greater'
or 'lesser' to us; a blue whale seems greater than a slug; a star 
seems
greater than a single asteroid. But these differences, while real 
enough, elude a closely specified definition of 'greater'- surely God 
is not
the greatest in mass, or even complexity. This robs the argument
of at least some of its persuasive power.
 Even so, the logic might hold if the terms were granted. If this 
were the case, one would be left with an argument pointing to God, as 
the
most perfectly existing of all existing things, without any further
indication of what this might mean. That is: 'God is that than which a 
greater cannot be conceived- which means that it actually exists -
*whatever that 'it' is *.' A meaning for 'God' here that entailed 'the 
sum
of all possible eternal or self-generating universes' could not be 
ruled 
out (as long as at least one such cosmos could be seen to exist). 
This,
*whatever else it is* is not 'what everyone calls 'God'. However, 
detailed refutation of Anselm's work is difficult; many arguments
go no further than the contemporary effort of 'Gaunilo' (a fellow
monk) who argued that Anselm's logic equally well proved a perfect
island. Again, from Cornford & Lehrer: "Anselm's reply was merely to
say that the logic of his argument applies only to the greatest 
*being*
possible [strictly, 'the greatest conceivable' being] and to no 
other."
(p.386)

Some approaches to Anselm regard the argument as
in part epistemological - that is, more concerned with *what
we can know* than with *what can (or must) exist*. Note,
on this point, that Anselm consistently referred to
'that than which a greater cannot be conceived', which
phrasing is distinctable from 'Greatest Possible Being'

A little bit more from Olson:

 In his own day, Anselm's argument was criticized
 on the grounds that perfection did not imply existence;
 if it did, then utopia or a perfect society would
 exist. A. pointed out in rebuttal that there is a
 difference between the concept of a being such as
 God who possesses *all* perfections and the concept 
 of utopia to which we attribute only a limited 
 number of perfections of a special kind. 
 (Ibid. Emphasis in original)
 
Dave Davis

These are my opinions and activities alone.

QOTD:

The only intelligible way of rejecting Anselm's claim that
God's existence is necessary is to maintain that the concept 
of God, as a being greater than which cannot be conceived,
is slef-contradictory or nonsensical. Supposing that this
is false, Anselm is right to deduce God's necessary existence
from his characterization of Him [sic] as a being greater
than which cannot be conceived. 
 N. Malcolm, 'Anselm's Ontological Argument'
 in Knowledge_and_Certainty (NJ: PH, 1963). p.149




 

lm.com
amu.edu
aam



 
<Argument Name>
 Aquinas' Five Ways: I. From Motion
<Background and Short Synopsis>
 Thomas Aquinas was b. near Naples in 1225 and d. near there in 
1274,
 after a career that included teaching theology at the Univ.
of Paris. He was a Roman Catholic cleric, as were most academics in 
this
period. While much of his writing (dictated to students) is seen to 
have
been concerned with 'baptizing Aristotle' as it were, the Biblical,
Augustinian and (soi distant) Neo-Platonic sources of his thought
ought not to be overlooked.
 His principal works (certainly those which are still
read today) were the Summa_Theologica (1265-72; conclusion 
posthumously
contributed by a student) and the Summa_Contra_Gentiles (which 
contains,
if my memory serves me, an argument for God's existence not contained
in the S_T). These are widely available in translation, compilations, 
and
excerpts.
 His influence on Roman Catholic thought was tremendous, up to 
and into
the 20th c. (Maritain, Gilson, Adler). His influence outside of
this sphere is less, though (again if memory serves) Thomas was not
one of the 'schoolmen' despised by Luther and Calvin.
In the S_T, Thomas advances the quinque_viae (five
ways) 'in which the idea of God is required in explaining the world'
(I will mostly follow Reese's synopsis):

 a) There is motion in the world ; and
 Whatever is moved is moved by another; But, if all of the
 links in the chain of motions were intermediate links, we
 would have an unsatisfactory explanation of motion.
 Hence, at the origin of each series of unmoved movers there 
must
 be an initial mover, which
 is unmoved. 'and this everyone understands to be God.'

[I will plunk in ways B,C,D, & E some other time, if we proceed
 with this. /DDD]

<Positive Evaluations>
"His natural theology, in fact, legitimizes the whole ambit of
 the Christian hope, but at the same time remains as modest
 as it can possibly be." E. Gilson, The_Spirit_of_Medieval
 _Philosophy (1936).
<Negative Evaluations>
"Why could not change have been going on for an infinitely
 long period of time? ... It should be noted that on this
 [second] interpretation the crucial claim in the argument
 is not that there would be an infinite number of different
 explanations [for things changing in the world], but that
 any complete explanation would be infinitely long... [However]
 Science explains particular things and events... [Science
 as a method of explanation] in no way requires that the universe as a
 whole must be explainable ... There would, then, be no
 reason to claim that God is necessary to explain the world
 around us, no reason to postulate God as a theoretical
 explanatory entity." J.W. Cornman & K. Lehrer, Philosophical_
 Problems_&_Arguments (NY: Macmillian/Collier 1973)
 [Excellent book! /DDD]

<Additional References>
Copelston, F.C. _Aquinas_ (Baltimore: Penquin Books, 1957). Reese, 
W.L.
Dictionary_of_Philosophy_and_Religion
(Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Humanities Press, 1980)
Russell, Bertrand. History_of_Western_Philosophy (1947)

<Additional Comments>
Aquinas' arguments mostly seem to have relied on a horror of infinite
regression, which might not seem as fearful to folks today. However, 
as Kung
writes, "...there is food for thought here...[If we did not affirm the
causality that cosmological
arguments such as Thomas' are dealing with] would we not have to
assume the groundlessness and instability of reality as a whole and
therefore profess nihilism-- which is an alternative
to be taken seriously?" (Kung, Does_God_Exist? 1981). Kant is usually 
held
to have killed off Thomas' five ways, though they continue to
pop up with modifications.





 



============article by Bob Lang====

As some of you know, Dave Davis is trying to put together a series
of FAQs for a.a addressing various kinds of arguments for the
existence of god (e.g., the five ways of Acquinas, Goedel's
ontological proof).

My contribution to this is a FAQ on the argument from mystical
experience. I've included it below.

I'd like to encourage others to help with this effort by either
a) emailing me constructive criticism of the FAQ included in this
post, or b) volunteering to write a FAQ on one of the remaining
arguments. 

The hope, as always, is to cut down on signal-to-noise and reduce
repetition of the same topics.

If you're interested in writing a FAQ, send email to Dave Davis
<ddavis01@world.std.com>. If you've got input, suggestions,
criticism of the FAQ included in this post, please email me.
[snip /DDD]

Thanks.

---------------------begin included text-----------------------

<The argument from mystical experience>

<Background>
The argument from mystical experience is intriguing for several
reasons. First, mystical experiences -- the ineffable awareness of 
the
true existence of the object of one's religious beliefs -- seem to be 
at
the core of all religions. Were it not for the ability to have, or at
least the hope of having, such experiences, religions might cease to
exist.

Second, the existence of mystical experiences (from here on ME)
provides the possibility of an instantaneous conversion: an atheist 
has
an inexplicable experience which she can only attribute to god and,
voila -- she's now a theist.

Third, there's the possibility that MEs are "priviledged knowledge."
What if non-believers simply lack the appropriate "senses" to perceive
god? Knowing that MEs exist, how can know whether the object of the 
ME
exists?

So just what is a mystical experience? The simplest definition is
any experience in which the experiencer claims to be directly in
touch with god. But that is not entirely adequate. In _Varieties of
Religious Belief_, William James gives many representative examples
of MEs, of which the following is one:

"I was in perfect health: we were on our sixth
day of tramping, and in good training. . . . I
felt neither fatigue, hunger, nor thirst, and
my state of mind was equally healthy. . . . I
can best describe the condition in which I was
by calling it a state of equilibrium. When all
at once I experienced a feeling of being
raised above myself, I felt the presence of
God--I tell of the thing just as I was
conscious of it--as if his goodness and his
power were penetrating me altogether. The
throb of emotion was so violent that I could
barely tell the boys to pass on and not wait
for me. i then sat down on a stone, unable to
stand any longer, and my eyes overflowed with
tears....

I think it well to add that in this ecstasy
of mine God had neither form, color, odor,
nor taste; moreover that the feeling of his
presence was accompanied by no determinate
localization. It was rather as if my
personality had been transformed by the
presence of a _spiritual spirit_. But the more
I seek words to express this intimate
intercourse, the more I feel the impossibility
of describing the thing by any of our usual
images. At bottom the expression most apt to
render what I felt was this: God was present,
though invisible; he fell under no one of my
senses, yet my consciousness perceived him" 
[1].

This example illustrates the ineffable nature of the experience
that ME arguers emphasize, including an awareness of god that is
gained not through the senses.

There are two primary kinds of ME arguments that I'm aware of: I'll 
call
them "strong" and "weak" arguments. A strong ME argument hopes to
provide evidence of god's existence. One way this evidence is provided
is by attempting to establish the cognitivity of MEs. A cognitive
experience "is one on the basis of which we gain knowledge of some
objective reality" [2]. That means that if MEs can be shown to be
cognitive, they can count as evidence for the existence of god. If
people are experiencing god in a cognitive way, god must exist. But
even when they set out to establish cognitivity, most ME arguers 
concede
that it cannot be done. For example, in _John of the Cross and the
Cognitive Value of Mysticism_, Payne discusses the possible 
explanations
for the religious experiences of John of the Cross, a well-known
Christian mystic. Payne _does_ hope to show that John's experiences 
were
cognitive, but concludes that the best he can hope for is to show that
cognitivity is at least as good an explanation as any other: "Still, I
think we have shown that, given the satisfaction of certain conditions
which many believers probably meet, it is reasonable to accept
contemplative awareness as a cognitive mode of experience. And this, 
it
seems to me, is as much support as faith can legitimately expect of
philosophy here: not a conclusive demonstration that belief in the
cognitive value of mystical states is true, but only a solid argument
that this belief is not contrary to reason" [3].

I am not aware of any arguments in which ME is claimed to be _good_
evidence for the existence of god.

This does not mean, however, that ME arguments are worthless. 
Religious
experience arguments do not always seek to provide proof of god's
existence. Such arguments are "weak" ME arguments. Weak ME arguments
attempt to show that it is rational for those who've had a ME to 
believe
that the experience was an actual perception of god (or some other 
form
of "ultimate reality"). There is a subtle distinction between using 
MEs
as evidence for god's existence on the basis of a ME and claiming that
individuals are justified in believing based on MEs. In weak ME
arguments, the issue of whether a theist's ME-derived belief actually
corresponds to something out there in the objective world is not
crucial. The point is that belief is rational and justified. Non-ME
experiencers have no reason to believe. On the one hand, this is a 
very
persuasive kind of argument because it can be formulated consistently
with little room for objection. On the other hand, it is unpersuasive
because there is no hope of convincing someone not already convinced.


<Published support for the argument from mystical experience>

William James, Varieties of Religious Experience
Nelson Pike, Mystic Union
Wayne Proudfoot, Religious Experience
William Alston, Perceiving God

James' argument in Varieties was one of the first ME arguments in 
modern
times and certainly the most influential. Perhaps the most important
recent argument for MEs, and to my mind, the most persuasive, is made 
by
Alston. Alston's argument is of what I've called the weak variety: he
does not purport to give evidence to non-believers for a particular
god's existence; instead, he hopes to show that MEs provide a rational
justification for belief for those who've had MEs.

Rather than summarize general arguments for and against MEs, it will 
be
more instructive to look in some detail at what I consider the most
persuasive ME argument (Alston's), then look at its merits and
shortcomings.

Alston's argument depends on his assertion that there can be no
non-circular proof of the reliability of any doxastic practice. A
doxastic (or belief-forming) practice is any practice through which we
form beliefs or opinions, such as deductive reasoning or empirical
observation.

According to Alston's unique epistemology, we cannot justify or defend
the reliability of any doxastic practice without using tests from 
within
the practice itself. For example, in sense perception, verification by
others is one of the primary tests. If I say that hot water freezes
faster than cold water, others are likely to doubt me. But I can 
present
a simple experiment and its results for others to examine and 
reproduce.
If, under the same conditions, everyone gets the same results, we
conclude that the statement "under the proper conditions, hot water
freezes faster than cold water" is true. Note that the test to
determine the truth of my claim was a test based in sense perception --
specifically empirical observation. Any test for any sense perception
(SP) -related claim must also be SP-related. Furthermore, there is no
single, external "meta-practice" we can appeal to to determine if any
the SP doxastic practice really is reliable. This is what Alston 
means
by no non-circular proof. 


But just because we must rely on circular proof, we need not conclude
that SP is _un_reliable or that we must all become solipsists. We can
suppose SP to be reliable for two reasons: 1) because it is widely
practiced and 2) for the sake of pragmatism -- we simply cannot 
function
without assuming the reliability of sense perception. Although we 
cannot
prove its reliability in a non-circular way, lacking compelling 
evidence
_against_ the reliability of SP, we can and should trust its
reliability.

Alston extends this claim to all doxastic practices -- including, of
course ME. Just as we can trust SP to be reliable by providing 
circular
proof, so can we trust the circular proofs of MP (mystical percpetion -
-
this is Alston's term. When referring to Alston, I'll use MP, as
distinguished from the generic, ME.) For example, the Catholic Church
considers the moral betterment of the experiencer to be one way of
determining whether a ME was legitimate. This is clearly a circualr 
test
within Christian mystical tradition, and would not apply to SP or any
other mystical tradition.

A common way to refute MP arguments is to appeal to SP. Consider the
verification-by-others test. There are many different mystical
traditions, none of which agree (e.g., Buddhists claim to be in touch
with an undifferentiated unity, while Christians claim to be in touch
with a personal creator and sustainer of the universe). If we apply 
the
verification-by-others test we see that this disagreement renders MP 
to
be unreliable: just as we could not accept the hypothesis that hot 
water
freezes faster if many different experimenters got many different
results, we cannot accept the many differing claims of the many
different mystical traditions.

But Alston would point out that any use of SP to prove or disprove MP 
is
not allowed. Proof of a doxastic practice can (and indeed must) be
circular. We have no compulsion to apply the SP test of verification 
by
others to MPs. Furthermore, the fact that there are many different
mystical traditions is immaterial. Each tradition is its own doxastic
practice and each has tests for its own validity. Thus, they cannot be
expected to agree.


<Published refuations of the argument from mystical experience>

Forgie, William, "Theistic Experience and the Doctrine of Unanimity,"
International Journal of the Philosophy of Religion 15 (1994): 13-30.

Richard M. Gale, _On the Nature and Existence of God_, Cambridge
University Press, Cambridge, N.Y., 1991, p. 313.

Robert Pasnau, "Justified Until Proven Guilty: Alston's new
Epistemology."


I've been able to find only two published refutations of Alston. The
first is contained in Richard M. Gale's _On the Nature and Existence 
of
God_, the second is Robert Pasnau's "Justified Until Proven Guilty."
I'll discuss their objections along with interspersed objections of my
own.

Objection: MP is not a distinct doxastic practice. This objection 
holds
that the formulation of beliefs about an MP are done by means of
ordinary SP; thus MP should be subject to the same tests as MP. For
example, on the basis of an MP in which the experiencer claims to feel
god's love, the experiencer would naturally conclude that god is 
loving.
This conclusion is made using simple inductive reasoning, which is a
subset of the more general SP doxastic practice.

Or consider an alternative example: Descriptions of mystical 
experiences
invariably include statements like, "God brought me comfort" or "a
feeling of euphoria." Feelings -- comfort, euphoria, and the like --
are physical, sense-related states. Thus, it's not clear what the
difference between mystical experiences and "ordinary" sense 
experiences
are. If MPs are really SPs, they should be subject to the same kinds 
of
tests. If they are subject to SP tests, we know what the results will
be: MPs will be found to be unreliable, contradictory, and unfit as
sources of knowledge.

But Alston argues that "the formation of perceptual beliefs about God
... belongs to a distinctively different doxastic practice [from the 
SP
doxastic practice]." He uses the following example to support his
contention:

"suppose I were to make an analogous critique of
introspective reports, e.g., that I now feel
excited. Here too the report cannot be assessed
on the basis of whether other people experience
the same thing under the same conditions. Even
if they don't that has no tendency to show that
I didn't feel excited. But this will not lead
most of us to deny that such beliefs can be
justified. We would simply point out that we
should not expect beliefs about one's own
conscious states to be subject to the same sorts
of tests as beliefs about ships and sealing wax.
More indirect tests of a public sort can be
given to determine the subject's mastery of
mentalistic language and his general reliability
as a reporter. But as for particular reports,
assuming general competence, there is no appeal
beyond his word" [4].

This is not, in my opinion, a good analogy. In contrast to religious
experiences, everyone has felt excited at one time or another and
understands the conditions under which the feeling is likely to occur.
The same cannot be said for religious experiences. Furthermore,
excitement is, in a sense, a physical phenomenon that can be tested 
with
sense perception tests like monitoring of brain activity or heart 
rate.
By this example at least, MP does not seem to be a distinct doxastic
practice.

Objection: Religious diversity. This is an objection that nearly any
atheist would make intuitively. Alston has a reasonable response to 
it,
but ultimately he seems to dodge the issue.

Alston does not think that MPs must be considered as a single doxastic
practice; rather, he sees them as many separate doxastic practices. As
such, different mystical traditions cannot be expected to agree. Gale
argues that this is unfair: "Again, we find Alston committing the
fallacy of thinking that if he can give a categoreally based 
explanation
for a disanalogy between the religious- and sense-experience doxastic
practices, it renders the disanalogy harmless" [5]. Gale suggests that
while on the one hand Alston wants to make MP and SP analogous in
certain respects, he is not willing, on the other hand, to make MP
subject to an analogous tests -- e.g., he is not willing to make
agreement among different religious traditions a criterion for the
reliability of MPs.

It is a crucial question: should we consider each religious tradition 
to
be its own doxastic practice or should we consider MPs as a whole to 
be
a single doxastic practice. If we consider MPs as consisting of many
distinct doxastic practices, Alston's position is fairly secure: each
doxastic practice has its own tests, none of which can be verified
non-circularly. However, Gale's objection remains: just how analogous 
is
analogous? How can Alston justify making MPs into many doxastic
practices and still consider MP a reasonable analogue to SP, when SP
clearly is a single doxastic practice? Alston can simply argue that
this is one of the ways in which the two are not analogous, but his
position smacks of inconsistency.

If, on the other hand, we consider MP to be a single doxastic 
practice,
we see that there are many incompatible ways of dealing with MPs and 
we
can conclude that MPs are unreliable.

Even if we concede Alston's view that MP consists of many distinct
doxastic practices, problems persist. Alston uses Christian mystical
perception (CMP) to illustrate how a particular mystical doxastic
practice is legitimate. In doing this, however, he has not 
demonstrated
the reliability of the practice as a whole. Alston shows how CMP has 
its
own checks and tests for determining the truth of MP claims, but his
thesis is consistently that we should grant MPs _categorically_ the 
same
reliability we grant to SP. How can we say anything meaningful about
MPs as a whole if we consider just one MP in isolation (i.e., CMP),
especially when Alston himself admits that different mystical 
traditions
have different tests? In other words, in order to say that all MP
traditions are legitimate, each would have to be scrutinized,
understood, and only if it seems to have legitimate tests, claimed to 
be
a legitimate doxastic practice in its own right. Not having done this,
it seems to me that the most he can claim is that CMP is a legitimate
doxastic practice; he cannot extend that claim to the MP traditions he
has not analyzed and certainly not to MP as a whole. Alston himself 
has
said, "I am committed to the proposition that most forms of MP are
somewhat unreliable" [6].

Objection: Just because we engage in a doxastic practice doesn't mean 
it
is reliable. Whereas Alston claims that if we engage in a doxastic
practice, we must consider it to be reliable, Pasnau claims this is 
not
the case. On the contrary, Pasnau says it is perfectly reasonable to
consistently engage in a practice and have doubts about its 
reliability.
He uses the example of ethics: most people, by a process they don't
fully understand, derive a personal code of ethics. There is certainly
no way to know if the process is reliable or if the beliefs formed are
true. Yet it is a process we may engage in every day. The implication
for MPs is that the experiencer needn't take the practice or the
resultant beliefs that are formed as reliable.

Alston sees this objection as merely a clash of Pasnau's intuition 
with
his own: "It seems clear to me that if I confidently form beliefs in a
certain way, and continue to do so over a long period of time, where
this (naturally) involves taking those beliefs to be true, I thereby
evince my confidence that that way of forming beliefs can be relied 
onto
yield mostly true beliefs" [7].

Objection: An MP can be interpreted as an ordinary SP. By Alston's
definition of a religious experience, it is tautologically true that
having a religious experience (or more specifically a CMP) entails a
belief in god: "I want to include any experiences that the subject
takes, or would take if the question arose, to be an _intuitive_,
experiential awareness of God, as contrasted with just thinking about
God...." [8].

However, we can certainly conceive of an atheist having an experience
that would otherwise be labelled as mystical, yet interpret it simply
wrote in <stryder.770771010@access3>:

"I experienced the power of prayer in a very
strong way. My experiences, both alone (I see
now I really WAS alone) and in church were
quite dramatic. My life was punctuated with
tears and wonderful joy.

At one point, I began to wonder how much of
what I was experiencing was pure emotionalism.
So I decided to try an experiment. I went
into a dark room and prayed similarly to the
way I had prayed in the past, but this time I


 

(Continued from last message)
decided to address Satan instead of Christ.

Sure enough, the warm, comforting feeling of
being cleansed and empowered flooded through
my body. I then tried praying to Mickey
Mouse, and sure enough, got the same results."

We need not accept this particular anecdote as veracious. It does
illustrate, however, a rationally drawn a conclusion about a mystical
perception different from the conclusion "I was in touch with god." In
other words, one can have an "MP" and rationally interpret it as
ordinary SP. Alston has not given us compelling reasons for concluding
one over the other.

On the basis of his epistemology and his examination of CMP, Alston 
has
shown that it is rational to believe in god based on a CMP. It is, in
my opinion, a strong case for a weak claim. He has not shown that MPs
from any other mystical tradition (for example, Buddhism or Islam) are
reliable, nor has not shown that even a Christian _must_ interpret
what appears to be an MP as an actual MP.

---

Notes:

[1] From William James, _The Varieties of Religious Experience_, 
quoted
in Nelson Pike, _Mystic Union: an essay in the phenomenolgy of
mysticism_. Cornell University Press, Ithaca, N.Y., 1992, p. 117.

[2] Richard M. Gale, _On the Nature and Existence of God_, Cambridge
University Press, Cambridge, N.Y., 1991, p. 313.

[3] Stephen Payne, _John of the Cross and the Cognitive Value of
Mysticism_, Kluwer Academic Publishers, Boston, 1990, p. 219.

[4] William Alston, "The Automony of Religious Experience,"
International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 31, v2-3 (June 1992),
p. 763. 

[5] Gale, p. 322.

[6] Alston, "Autonomy," p. 36.

[7] William Alston, "Reply to Pasau," Philosophical Studies 72 (1993),
p. 38.

[8] Alston, "Autonomy," p. 68.

---------------------end included text-------------------------
Bob Lang | Them lasers is *fan*tastic.
rjl@sei.cmu.edu | (David Letterman)




 

m


[I'm taking this one out of chronological order, because
 it is pregnant with several arguments, and not easily
 fitted into our schemata. /DDD ]

The background is: In Book X of The_Laws Plato (through speaking
through 'The Athenian' )
is proposing that the Laws of his Republic include piety towards the
gods; for this to be a just law, there should be a rational 
demonstration of their existence. So, he attempts to provide one. 
Reading behind the text, in Plato's society, there are people 
who argue that nature (or matter) is primary- i.e., more fundamental 
than
'soul' (Gr: 'psyche' ). Plato may be trying to respond to these
people as well.

The argument actually has the seeds of several other arguments
within it: 
 the Moral Argument (that divinity is needed for morals) 
 the First Cause argument/Argument from Motion (it is
 fairly close to this, more formally put by Aristotle) 
 and, surprisingly, 
 Pascal's Wager (this not in_ovuo, but in_gametes!)

It even pre-echoes (to my reading) Augustine's and CSL's 
'reason is divine' theme.

The key assumption is that some things are in motion, and secondarily
that other things are at rest. The argument proceeds from this taken
as an axiom [to speak anacronistically].

The Athenian [the main speaker in the dialogue that comprises
The_Laws] offers a two-part argument that is not easily reduced to
a syllogism or anything like it. 

Part I.
Of the various kinds of motions there are two that are particularly 
interesting: 
 Motion I is "permanently capable of moving both itself and other
 things by processes of combination and separation, increase and 
 diminuation;
 Motion II is "permanently capable of moving other things but not 
 itself".
 
In a Motion II sequence (one thing causing another thing
causing still another, etc.), no first cause is possible, because 
something
whose motion is transmitted to it from something else cannot be the 
first
thing to effect an alteration [This foreshadows the horrow of infinite
regression.]

Something which has set itself in motion,[Motion I] and effects
an alteration in something else which, in turn, effects something else
and the motion is transmitted to thousands upon thousands of things 
one
after another [Motion I leads to Motion II], can be and is the first 
cause.

The Athenian [speaking for Plato] then revisits this point from a 
different perspective. Suppose the universe got into a standstill 
state: 
the self-generating motion (the first kind) would have to be the first 
motion to arise, because no antecedent impulse can ever be transmitted 
from something else in a situation where no antecedent impulse exists.
[Which, perhaps in a way anticipates the Big Bang singularity? ]

Part II: 

Suppose one could observe self-generating motion, what would it look 
like?
The Athenian answers that any object that moves itself is ``alive.'' 

The Athenian gives a definition of the thing called a "soul" as 
"motion 
capable of moving itself" (which is the first kind of motion). So, 
Plato by definition equates soul and first cause, and so concludes 
that 
the soul is older than matter.

Conclusion:

This first-cause "soul" is God or the gods. (Plato here argues for at
least two gods: "that which does good [regularity] and that which has 
the opposite capacity" [chaos].)

Or, to boil this down even further:

 The only things that move themselves are those that
 are alive, or have soul (which is the same as being
 alive).

 Matter cannot move itself; it is secondary to soul
 (which can move matter).

 Anything that moves around things like the Sun and 
 the planets must be divine.

Finally:
 Physics [Psyche] is God.

<Comments>
Err, umm... :-) Plato's idea of 'motion' seems to include
the sort that occurs when our minds 'move' to a new insight,
or recollection, etc. Interesting, but vexacious.

Portions of this article were originally written by Jonathan 
Wistar, not of the Wistar Institute. 



 

References: <D3FtE4.I6y@world.std.com>



: The argument runs thus. If there is a being higher than,
: and superior to, the human soul [or, 'the human mind' /D],
: that being is God. ['All I need do is to show you that

Wrong. for many reasons
a>this assumes there is such thing as a soul which is an entity which 
hasn't
been proven. therefore the statement relies on a circular argument
b>this being, god, is often quoted as not just being greater than 
humans, but
the greatest, and therefore it's to assume that all birds are 
penguins.
c> the human mind is an actual physical *entity* which proves how 
stupid the
person defining the terms are.
d> if i am correct, all religions would consider that the soul <> 
(brain)

: /DLA Bk II] Now, by our intellectual processes of 
: thought we attain to, and know that we attain to, truth.
a> assumes truth. be careful not to have two varying degrees of
truth, such as truth about gravity and *truth* about history.


: But this truth is not 'our' truth, since all may have it
: and recognize it [...] It is itself permanent and im-
b> two truths? everyone knows there's only one truth.

: This Truth, which can also be shown to be also the 
: Good and the Beautiful , is God. ['...if there is nothing 
wrong. this again assumes another UNproven entity, mainly good and
beautiful, which obviously, many people don't adhere to absolutely, or
can see depedantly. My dependant entities clause is in many other
articles, such that an entity which is entirely dependant on some 
other
entity is not one at all, because entities are *independant*, and 
exist
by definition.








 

.edu
References: <D3FtI8.JIG@world.std.com>



: And whatever is understood, exists in the understanding.
: And assuredly that, than which nothing greater can be 
: conceived [L.: aliquid quo nihil maius cogitari possit*], 
: cannot exist in the understanding alone. For 
: suppose it exists in the understanding alone: than it can 
: be conceived to exist in reality; which is greater.
a> pink unicorns exist in reality, because they can exist in
the understanding.

b> assumes such thing as freewill, and that understanding is not
environmentally based, which is a big supposition even to christians.
 1> christ convicted judas before he commited the act and
 as such is predestination, no free will.


: impossible. Hence, there is no doubt that there exists a
: being, than which nothing greater can be conceived...
a> there has been no *known* boundaries to human knowledge, only their
lifespan, and hence containing an infinite being in infinite space is
unsolvable and neither a positive nor negative answer can be achieved.
Anselm needs to take basic Calc.



 

References: <D3FuAG.4yG@world.std.com>


: The argument actually has the seeds of several other arguments
: within it: 
: the Moral Argument (that divinity is needed for morals) 
a> i thought humans were needed for morals, or is it morals are
needed for humans? chicken and egg scenario.

: the First Cause argument/Argument from Motion (it is
: fairly close to this, more formally put by Aristotle) 
b> assumes cause/effect universe, where obviously, the universe is
action reaction. action reaction states that the universe in constant
and as such, could continue along for ever, chaotically, but contained 
by such laws as gravity.

: Pascal's Wager (this not in_ovuo, but in_gametes!)
a> pascal's wager doesn't account for many gods, gods at war,
or the fact that such a belief requires money for a particular 
religion
in which case it's not a bet against nothing, but something.

: thing to effect an alteration [This foreshadows the horrow of 
infinite
: regression.]
infinite regression is entirely possible, because counting between 
infinities
would only mean you have to decide on the method of counting relative 
to
another entity. because this is what is done in relativity (measuring 
a mile
based on feet), it is entirely acceptable, and cannot be dismissed so 
easily.


: Something which has set itself in motion,[Motion I] and effects
: an alteration in something else which, in turn, effects something 
else
: and the motion is transmitted to thousands upon thousands of things 
one
: after another [Motion I leads to Motion II], can be and is the first 
cause.
This assumes a Motion I, which is unsettling as an answer, for 
instance, why
not two motions, three, or constant?

: different perspective. Suppose the universe got into a standstill 
state: 
if the universe was already in motion, than it couldn't and if it 
wasn't
than it is by definition. This supposes nothing.

: [Which, perhaps in a way anticipates the Big Bang singularity? ]
the big bang is a theory, and includes many more dimensions than 
three, which
doesn't play any similarity.

: Part II: 

: The Athenian gives a definition of the thing called a "soul" as 
"motion 
: capable of moving itself" (which is the first kind of motion). So, 
so a squirrel is a soul.

: Plato by definition equates soul and first cause, and so concludes 
that 
: the soul is older than matter.
but this also means that it's the soul's fault for all that happens to 
matter.

: This first-cause "soul" is God or the gods. (Plato here argues for 
at
integers have no upper limit, yet they exist.

: Anything that moves around things like the Sun and 
: the planets must be divine.
but the suns and planets circle each other, and so does gravity, hence
everything is divine and therefore theword divine is meaningless, by
occam's razor.

: Finally:
: Physics [Psyche] is God.
psyche and physics are two seperate entities, else use the same words.




 
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